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This dissertation examines the consequences of the Korean Airline Deregulation Act
of May 2008. I propose an empirical methodology for analyzing demand and supply in
differentiated product markets that measures welfare effects due to the entry of Low Cost
Carriers (LCCs) from two perspectives: pre- and post-deregulation. I have built a panel of
airline carrier level data for each of the seven domestic non-stop routes from June 2006 to
October 2010 to investigate whether the deregulation policy is desirable for increasing the
net welfare gains to air passengers, and for promoting competition among airline carriers.
Chapter 1 explains the implementation and effects of the Act change on the Korean airline
industry. The Act removed restrictions imposed on both aircraft size and aircraft age for the
non-scheduled air service carriers so that all LCCs were able to operate jet aircraft which
had more than 100 seats per airplane. Since May 2008, the competition, long dominated by
two legacy carriers, Korean Air (KAL) and Asiana Air (AAR), has intensified as emerging
LCCs have began offering lower air fares.
Chapter 2 outlines the empirical framework of the nested logit model and applies it to
two categories of city pair routes in Korea: five Jeju island routes and two inland routes. A
priori there are expectations of differences in both types of travelers and in alternatives to air
transportation, thus differences in air travel demand sensitivity to price and non-price factors,
such as frequent flights and aircraft size. In this chapter, I find evidence of a common sensi-
tivity to price across the Jeju island routes and the inland routes and route-specific response
to flight characteristics.
Thus, I propose a joint constrained model in terms of price sensitivity where the param-
eter for price variable is constrained to be the same across all seven routes, but the flight
characteristics should be permitted to have route-specific effects. Frequent flights, larger air-
craft, evenly distributed flight schedules on peak-demand hours (lunchtime for some routes),
and shorter airtime duration generate a higher utility for air passengers.
Chapter 3 models the supply side and legacy carriers’ strategic responses to the emer-
gence of LCCs. The two legacy carriers established their own subsidiary LCCs (dependent
LCCs). KAL entered some routes with its subsidiary LCC, JNA, while AAR rebadged to
ABL, its subsidiary LCC, replacing their prior service.
Chapter 4 integrates the demand- and supply-side in order to derive average price elas-
ticities for air travel demand, implied marginal costs and Lerner indices for each carrier’s
flights. Price-cost markups are recovered after the demand parameters are first obtained and
then inserted in the pricing equation. The estimated results for a dominant airline carrier on
some inland routes are inconsistent with the static profit maximization assumption, having
inelastic demand elasticities and negative marginal costs.
Chapter 5 contributes to the literature on the spatial competition of the airline industry.
Empirical findings using time-series data from June 2006 to October 2010 in this chapter
suggest that the effects of competition on the degree of inter-firm departure times differenti-
ation would have a different impact across the Jeju island routes and the inland route in the
deregulated period.
Chapter 6 evaluates the welfare gains due to the entry of LCCs. I calculate welfare gains
from various types of post-deregulation entry behaviors that are driven by the change in
market structure. I find a few entries (i.e., none in half the markets) induced by deregulation.
The welfare calculations imply that consumer welfare results are mixed and total welfare
results have little evidence to support welfare improvement.
I find the introduction of fuel surcharge to be the major obstacles hindering benefits from
the Act change for aggregate consumers and industry-wide producers at times of unusually
high fuel surcharges. Finally, I summarize and discuss some problems with extensions of
this approach.
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Chapter 1
Institutional Background
1.1 Introduction
Low cost carriers (LCCs) have emerged and revolutionized short-haul flight markets around
the world, expanding the choice of air transport to air passengers at lower fares as a global
phenomenon at the end of the 20th century and the beginning of the 21st century. Even
though the growth of the airline industry slowed down worldwide over the past few years,
the largest LCCs, such as Southwest in the United States, have continued to grow rapidly
while new smaller LCCs have collapsed. These have different product and market strategies
than the traditional full service legacy carriers. Established legacy carriers, on the other hand,
have responded to entry of LCC competitors by diversifying their strategies to compete for
the short-haul flights market as well.
As aviation industry dynamics have changed, with deregulation around the globe, the
emergence of LCCs has been linked with greater market competition. For example, before
2004, the Korean domestic airline markets were characterized by duopolies: two legacy
carriers, Korean Air (KAL) and Asiana Air (AAR) were the only carriers in each domestic
city pair market. Since the May 2008 Deregulation Act, the Korean airline industry has
undergone significant changes. It is interesting to examine the effects of this deregulation
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policy on the domestic Korean city pair markets. The competition in some, but not all, of
the markets long dominated by KAL and AAR has increased since the deregulation. New
LCCs entered a few of these markets at ticket prices of about 70 or 80 percent of the prices
being charged by the legacy carriers. Given that a hub-and-spoke system is not the optimal
air transport network strategy for Korean domestic short haul routes, the two incumbents
have developed new business strategies. The legacy carriers, KAL and AAR, rebadged and
entered a few of their own markets with LCC operations either replacing their prior service
or competing with it for some city pair routes.
Previously, many empirical papers assessed the effects of the U.S. Airline Deregulation
Act of 1978 on travelers and carriers while there have been no such studies focused on
the effects of deregulation of the Korean airline industry. Empirical studies of the U.S.
deregulation have found hub-and-spoke effects to be important. With allowing carriers more
freedom in pricing and in entry and exit since 1978, all fare and entry regulations were
eliminated in January 1983. Morrison and Winston [1986] analyzed the welfare effects on
air passengers and found the largest source of the welfare gains from deregulation occurred
through increases in departure frequencies. Their results suggested that changes in the route
structures contributed greatly to the success of the deregulation of 1978 because development
of hub-and-spoke route structures increased departure frequencies.
Unlike perfectly competitive markets in which firms take prices as a given, the air travel
industry is characterized by differentiated products. With differentiated products, competi-
tion has both price and non-price dimensions. Airline carriers choose not only prices, but
also flight frequency and flight departure times. One would expect that an introduction of
a new entrant would lead to decrease in the prices of other competing airlines. In response
to the entry of LCCs, incumbents may significantly reduce fares. On the other hand, in-
cumbents might decrease airline capacities following entry of LCCs. Besides, theoretical
models of spatial product differentiation suggest two possible polar cases regarding location
competition outcomes: Minimal differentiation in order to steal customers from rivals, and
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maximal differentiation in order to soften price competition with competitors.
One of the studies in the airline industry literature related to departure flights scheduling
competition is Borenstein and Netz [1999]. Spatial competition theory has been applied
to airline studies such that airlines compete on departure times where the departure times
of flights on a route can be interpreted as locations on a 24-hour clock. They empirically
tested the relationship between the level of competition and spatial product differentiation
using cross-sectional U.S airline 1975 and 1986 data, respectively for a given number of
flights on a route. According to their findings, airlines scheduled their flights more closely
to rivals’ flights as competition increased for both periods and an even stronger tendency
was observed when fares were not regulated (1986) than when fares were regulated (1975).
Yetiskul and Kanafani [2010] also tested location theory using cross-sectional U.S. airline
2005 data. They found that for a given number of flights on a route, intense competition
leads to less departure time differentiation as expected in Hotelling’s model. This tendency
is lower in the presence of low cost carriers on a route. In a location of gasoline stations
study, however, Netz and Taylor [2002] found the opposite effect, that firms located their
stations farther to reduce price competition as competition increased.
Many empirical studies that are related to the estimation of demand for differentiated
products have used the Berry, Levinsohn, and Pakes’ (hereafter BLP) methodology.1 In their
paper, BLP introduced a variety of discrete choice models ranging from a simple logit model
to a full random coefficients model. As in many empirical studies, market demand is de-
rived from a general class of discrete choice models of individual consumer behavior. Their
primary method for estimating the demand for differentiated products, using discrete choice
models, assumes that each consumer’s utility for products in a market depends upon the
characteristics of the product and the consumer’s tastes. Each consumer is assumed to pur-
chase one unit of the good that has the highest utility and may choose to purchase an outside
good instead of an “inside” product. Then, product level market demands are derived as the
1See Berry [1994], Berry et al. [1995].
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aggregate outcome of consumer decisions in the absence of observing individual consumer
purchase decisions to estimate the demand parameters. This proposed estimation method
explicitly allows for the possibility that prices are correlated with unobserved demand fac-
tors, such as style, consumers perceptions about quality, durability, and brand reputation,
which are inherently difficult to quantify into variables that can be included in the analysis.
It is well known that ignoring the correlation between price and omitted demand determi-
nants may lead to biased estimates and even sometimes lead to improbable upward sloping
demand curves.
Among a variety of discrete choice models, the nested logit model may be used to de-
scribe the demand structure of the domestic air travel industry in Korea. I apply the nested
logit model to two types of city pair markets in Korea, which are city pairs for flying to and
from Jeju island and inland city pairs. These differ in both types of travelers and in alterna-
tives to air transportation. Jeju island routes are primarily for vacation travelers, but, inland
routes attract a great numbers of business travelers. Thus, there are a priori expectations of
differences in air travel demand sensitivity to price and other factors, such as airtime dura-
tion and aircraft types. And in terms of outside goods, domestic city pair traveling on inland
routes may be undertaken using alternative travel modes such as rail or bus service, whereas
there is no closely comparable ferry service to Jeju island. I examine the nested logit de-
mand model to estimate demand parameters and marginal costs in imperfectly competitive
markets from two perspectives: Pre- and post- deregulation, to search for systematic patterns
over time.
The rest of this dissertation is organized as follows. The rest of chapter 1 explains the
implementation and effects of the deregulation act on the Korean airline industry. The issues
in the air travel industry - route specific preference over departure times - are also introduced.
Chapter 2 outlines the basic framework of the nested logit model and describes the empirical
specification of the air travel demand. In this chapter, the variables used in the model are
defined and I provide summary statistics for the panel data from June 2006 to October 2010,
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two years before and after the Deregulation Act of May 2008. The route-by-route estimation
results based on three different specifications are presented. Chapter 3 models the supply
side and describes legacy carriers’ strategic responses to the emergence of LCCs. Chapter
4 integrates the demand- and supply-side in order to derive price elasticities for air travel
demand, implied marginal costs, and Lerner indices. Chapter 5 examines inter-firm departure
flight times differentiation on the routes. Chapter 6 evaluates the welfare effects due to
the entry of LCCs. Finally, I conclude and discuss some problems with extensions of this
approach.
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1.1.1 The Korean Airline Industry
Domestic air passenger traffic in Korea has shown a reversal in growth since it picked up
around a 16% annual growth rate in the late 1980’s and early 1990’s. On the other hand,
international air passenger traffic has been increasing since the Severe Acute Respiratory
Syndrome (SARS) epidemic had a severe negative effect on Asian air travel markets in 1998
and the economic crisis swept across the nation in the late 1990s. While two legacy car-
riers, KAL and AAR, target international routes instead of pursing relatively low profits in
domestic routes following the introduction of high-speed rail services, Korean Train eXpress
(KTX), in 2004, LCCs have emerged and entered some domestic city pair markets. In 2005,
the first LCC, Hansung Airlines (HAN), received its Air Operator’s Certificate (AOC), thus
formally approved with the delivery of ATR-72 turboprop aircraft with 78 available seats.
Since then the volume of passengers using LCCs had been growing at a faster pace than be-
fore in the Korea domestic airline markets which were characterized by duopolies: KAL and
AAR. As shown in Figure 1.1,2 competition in some of the domestic airline markets, long
dominated by KAL and AAR, has intensified over the past few years as a growing number of
low cost carriers (LCCs) have begun to offer tickets at 70 to 80 percent of the price offered by
these legacy carriers, showing considerable growth of market share over the past few years.
In the six months prior to June 2011, aggregate domestic market shares of LCCs were about
40%, a new record for LCC penetration in the North Asian nation, making a significant rise
from 9.7% in 2008.3
2Data source: The Ministry of Land, Transport and Maritime Affairs
3Source: Centre for Asia Pacific Aviation & OAG Facts, See appendix Figure 2.
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Figure 1.1: Percentage of domestic flight shares operated by LCCs (including both indepen-
dent LCCs and dependent LCCs) and Legacy carriers by year
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While it is difficult to formally define low cost carriers (LCCs), any definition should
be categorized into two types from the view point of ownership; independent LCCs and
dependent LCCs. First, independent LCCs refer to LCCs that are not owned by full service
legacy carriers. Pure LCCs or true LCCs may also refer to independent LCCs. Second,
dependent LCCs refer to LCCs that are wholly-owned LCC subsidiaries of legacy carriers.
Unlike independent LCCs, Dependent LCCs may have code-share flights with their parent
company on a specific route. In response to the emergence of independent LCCs, both legacy
carriers rebadged and entered some city pair routes with their own LCCs since October 2008.
KAL is a parent company of Jin Air (JNA) and AAR is a parent company of Air Busan
(ABL). As shown in Figure 1.1, the volume of traffic by LCCs including both independent
LCCs and dependent LCCs has rapidly grown relative to that of the two major airlines from
2008 to 2009.
Beyond the supply side perspective of the impact of LCCs’ entry on Korean airline mar-
kets, “a five-day work week” was introduced for Korea. The National Assembly cleared
a legislative bill to amend the Labor Standard Act (LSA) on August 2003. This amended
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LSA introduced a five-day work week by reducing the maximum legal working hours from
44 to 40 per week. Previously, Korean workers had traditionally worked more hours than
their counterparts in OECD countries. The average working hours were 2447 in 2001, about
600 hours more than workers in the US, Japan and England. The law imposing a shorter
workweek on public sector workers, financial institutions and private companies with more
than a thousand employees was passed by the South Korean parliament in 2004. For firms
with between 300 and 1000 employees, This amended LSA was effective from July 2005
for firms with between 300 and 1000 employees, and from July 2006 for firms with between
100 and 299 employees. In 2011, South Korean companies of all sizes became required to
switch to the five-day work week. The law establishing the five-day work week sought to
improve the quality of life for South Koreans.
After officially establishing “a 5-day work week” system in 2004, people’s leisure ac-
tivities have changed greatly. With having increased leisure hours, employees are highly
enthused by the new system, in looking forward to their personal time. Thus, reducing total
working hours has led to better quality of family life and higher productivity for employ-
ees. A five day work week system, combined with emergence of LCCs, has prompted more
people to fly due to substantial reduction in fares.
1.1.2 The Deregulation Act of May 2008: Implementation and Effects
Prior to May 2008 Korean airline regulation had restrictive licensing policies (listed in Table
1.1). This regulation system categorized airline carriers into two types: scheduled air service
carriers and non-scheduled air service carriers. While non-scheduled air service carriers were
only allowed to operate irregular flight services, scheduled air service carriers could operate
regular flight services with a license issued by a government aviation body. Only registration
was required to be a non-scheduled air service carrier, but the license was necessary to be
a qualified scheduled air service carrier. In order to earn the “license,” airline carriers had
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to fulfill all required criteria of safety with a record minimum of two years operation with
over 20,000 flights without accidents. Non-scheduled air service carriers were only allowed
to operate aircraft with less than 80 available seats per airplane and there was a restriction
on their fleet age (requiring less than 25 years age limit for each aircraft) as well. These
restrictions on non-scheduled air service carriers, combined with irregular flights service,
greatly limited their aircraft availability and selection. It forced them to use only small
turbo-prop aircraft.
Thus, Korean government legislation enabled the two legacy carriers to dominate domes-
tic markets and allowed them to charge high fares as the government restricted competition
from LCCs. Although there were a few independent LCCs serving regional routes before
2008, most of these were non-scheduled air service carriers which were subject to the regu-
lated market policy. In this context, “the license policy” hindered prospective entrants from
settling in the market.
Table 1.1: Deregulation Act of May 2008
Regulation system Scheduled air service Non-scheduled air service
Requirement License Registration
Aircraft size No limit 80 seats limit per plane - -
Aircraft age No limit Less than 25 years - -
Before May 2008 After May 2008
Domestic service International service
The two legacy carriers’ protected dominant positions in domestic markets came to an
end in May 2008. The deregulation act of May 2008 removed restrictions and opened the
markets. Restrictions imposed on both aircraft size and aircraft age for the non-scheduled
airlines were eliminated so that LCCs were able to operate jet aircraft which had more than
80 seats per airplane. The air transport liberalization has led to substantial traffic growth,
carrying more passengers at lower fares. Moreover, it has stimulated LCCs on high volume
routes, creating new demand for air services as well as shifting of existing demand away
from traditional legacy carriers. In particular, competition among the two legacy carriers and
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independent LCCs for some of the Jeju island routes has intensified due to the dominance of
air transportation for travel to and from Jeju island, the country’s largest island and tourist’s
destination.
Several new LCCs have been established over the last three years even though two of
them ceased operations. The survivors are in the process of restructuring; Jeju Air (JJA)
permanently removed all four Dash 8 Q400s, turboprop aircraft with 78 available seats per
airplane, in June 2010. In an attempt to consolidate the fleet around a single airplane type,
JJA took delivery of one Boeing 737 in 2011 on top of its existing a fleet of five B737s.
Furthermore, Jeju Air is scheduled to take delivery of three more in 2012 and one more in
2013. Another independent LCC, Eastar Jet (ESR) repeatedly boosted its fleets up to six
Boeing 737s in March 2010. This change in competition driven by LCCs has pushed the
two legacy carriers to adjust their strategies in order to pursue dominant market positions.
Both legacy carriers established their own subsidiary LCCs, competing with the independent
LCCs.
1.1.3 Two Legacy Carriers Fined for Anti-Competitive Actions against
LCCs as of March 2010
In March 2010, Korea’s Fair Trade Commission (FTC) imposed fines on KAL (8.4 mil-
lion U.S.dollars) and on AAR (549,796 U.S.dollars) for disrupting the operations of newly
sprouting LCCs. According to the FTC, both KAL and AAR pressed travel agencies to re-
strict the ticket sales of the independent LCCs such as JJA, HAN, and ONA, threatening to
withhold peak period seats on popular routes and domestic routes to Jeju island. As a re-
sult, these independent LCCs had great difficulty in selling tickets for major routes including
domestic routes to Jeju island. According to the FTC’s statement:
The airline transportation industry requires massive investment at the initial
stage to secure aircraft and other infrastructure. The inability to sell airline tick-
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ets through travel agencies caused great difficulty in their operations and made it
hard for them to settle into the market. If they fail to safely settle in the market,
new companies are likely to collapse because of the massive initial spending.4
Thus, it is of interest to analyze what conditions are necessary for deregulation in Korea to
be desirable in order to promote competition among airline carriers and increase consumer
welfare, enabling LCCs to operate jet aircraft along with the two major airlines, KAL and
AAR. From now on, the period prior to the May 2008 implementation of the act will be re-
ferred to as “the pre-deregulation period” and the period after the May 2008 implementation
of the act will be referred to as “the post-deregulation period.”
1.1.4 Departure Flight Times Differentiation in Airline Competition
In the air travel industry, demand is not perfectly inelastic and potential air passengers’ pre-
ferred departure times are non-uniformly located over time, i.e., heterogeneous consumers’
preferences. The air travel demand models for nonstop Jeju island routes and inland routes
should be considered, respectively, because these routes have different alternative transporta-
tion modes and types of travelers. Specifically, the Jeju island routes are primarily for va-
cation travelers and, the inland routes attract a greater number of business travelers. Thus,
there are a priori expectations of route-specific differences in air travel demand sensitivity to
price and other factors, i.e., passengers’ most preferred departure times.
For the Jeju island routes, air travel demand would be high for flights that either depart or
arrive during lunch time where time zone change effect is irrelevant in the Korean domestic
routes. Vacationers may depart from the island before or around 11AM (noon) as they have
to check out of hotels by 11AM. In turn, they would prefer to fly around noon from an origin
city in order to arrive at the island around 3PM (4PM) because hotel guests can check in after
4The two independent LCCs ceased their operations in 2008: November (HAN) and December (ONA).
The Korea FTC statement might have limited the effects of LCCs, for example, the lack of entry to inland
routes for the two years following the May 2008 Deregulation Act.
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3pm. For the inland routes, business travelers probably differ from vacationers: their most
preferred departure times are concentrated into a few hours of a day, either early morning
or late night. For business travelers, the mid day flights departing around lunchtime may be
virtually irrelevant, but seen as ideal by vacationers who do not want to get up at 5:30AM to
make an 8AM flight. Flight timing (e.g., time of day) is an important factor for both types
of travelers. Thus, air travel demand for the inland routes will be less for flights that either
depart or arrive during lunchtime.
From 10PM to 4AM, I don’t observe any flights so I drop these 6 hours from the 24 hour
clock. Then, I divide the remaining 18 hours into three clusters: Morning cluster (4AM-
10AM), lunch cluster (10AM-4PM), and evening cluster (4PM-10PM) (Figure 1.2).
Figure 1.2: Clustered demand and passengers’ preferred departure times
Morning Cluster: 4AM-10AM Evening Cluster: 4PM-10PM 
Lunch Cluster: 10AM-4PM 
• Prediction Departure flight schedules around lunchtime (10AM-4PM) are more evenly
distributed in the Jeju island routes than in the inland routes.5
5Lunch cluster is defined over 6 hour clock: 10AM-4PM. 1PM 
2PM 12PM 
11AM 
4PM, 
10AM 
3PM 
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I expect that vacationers may find flights - either departing or arriving at lunchtime - con-
venient as their most preferred departure times are concentrated into lunchtime. Thus, air
travelers flying to/from Jeju island would experience more utility when departure flight times
spread out evenly around lunch time on a route.
In order to capture the degree of departure times differentiation on a route, we need a
measure that takes into account how each pair of flight competes with all others on a route.
The differentiation index, adapted from the one used by Borenstein and Netz [1999], DIFF
needs to be modified. ClusterDIFF6 takes a value in the interval [0,1]. ClusterDIFF is cal-
culated by using departure times of all non-stop flights. The closer the index to 1, the flights
are more evenly distributed over a 6-hour clock, maximizing departure time differentiation.
When this index is equal to 0, all flights depart at the same time, meaning no differentiation
in departure times.
Table 1.2 reports summary statistics for the average values of the differentiation index,
ClusterDIFF and the number of daily flights scheduled at each cluster for the Jeju island
routes. From June 2006 to October 2010, two years before and after the deregulation, each
6There are n daily direct flights on a route, which depart at d1, . . . , dn minutes.
For the morning ClusterDIFF , each departing time, d1, . . . , dn, is expressed as minutes after 4AM. For the
lunch ClusterDIFF , each departing time, d1, . . . , dn , is expressed as minutes after 10AM. For the evening
ClusterDIFF , each departing time, d1, . . . , dn, is expressed as minutes after 4PM. For example, if one flight is
scheduled at 8AM and another is scheduled at 9AM during the morning cluster, |d1−d2| = |240−300| = 60
is the measure of the departure time difference between the first and second flight during morning cluster.
The average distance between flights is measured as:
AV GDIFF =
2
n(n−1)
n
∑
i=1
n−1
∑
j>1
[
min
{∣∣di−d j∣∣ , 360− ∣∣di−d j∣∣}]α , 0 < α < 1
where 360 denotes the cluster length in minutes. AV GDIFF is minimized at zero when all flights depart at
the same time. AV GDIFF is maximized when flights on a route are evenly distributed over a cluster, 6-hour
clock. The power of α denotes the marginal effect of changes in time differences between flights on a route. I
arbitrarily choose α = 0.5, and the results do not qualitatively change across alternative values of α .
For comparisons of ClusterDIFF across routes with different numbers of flights, AV GDIFF is normalized
by the maximum possible departure schedule differentiation, MAXDIFF , which is the value when the flights
are equally spaced around the 6-hour clock for each cluster.
MAXDIFF =
{
2
n(n−1) ∑
n/2−1
k=1 n
(
k 360n
)α
+ n2 (180
α) , ∀n = even
2
n(n−1) ∑
(n−1)/2
k=1 n
(
k 360n
)α
, ∀n = odd
Finally, the measure that is taken to the data is ClusterDIFF = AV GDIFFMAXDIFF .
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observation includes direct flights on a route.
Table 1.2: Average cluster differentiation index by route (Jeju island routes)
Morning DIFF Lunch DIFF Evening DIFF Morning DIFF Lunch DIFF Evening DIFF
# of flights # of flights # of flights # of flights # of flights # of flights
0.758 0.979 0.945 0.821 0.987 0.934
14.5 26.2 18.4 19.1 35.7 20.8
0.706 0.942 0.940 0.644 0.961 0.903
4.7 6.4 5.8 4.4 9.2 7.0
0.140 0.657 0.893 0.000 0.909 0.886
1.4 2.4 4.5 0.4 4.2 3.8
0.024 0.931 0.867 0.289 0.857 0.518
0.9 3.2 4.0 2.0 2.7 3.0
0.382 0.940 0.722 0.421 0.710 0.940
2.8 4.8 3.7 2.9 2.4 6.7
# of flights are rounded.
Jeju-Gwangju
Jeju-Cheongju
Route
Pre-deregulation (before May 2008) Post-deregulation (after May 2008)
Jeju-Seoul
Jeju-Busan
Jeju-Daegu
Table 1.2 gives average daily differentiation index and flight frequency by clusters. As
can be seen from the table, several interesting trends are evident. The number of daily
flights increased on the Jeju-Seoul, Jeju-Busan route in the post-deregulation period. These
increased flight frequency are mainly scheduled over the lunch cluster, thus maximizing
lunch cluster departure time differentiation. Specifically, for the Jeju-Seoul route, the num-
ber of daily flights during the lunch cluster has risen almost 40 percent during the post-
deregulation period. By contrast, the opposite effects are observed on the Jeju-Cheongju
and Jeju-Gwangju route in that the number of daily flights has been fairly constant. Flights
are more evenly scheduled around either morning (Jeju-Gwangju route) or evening (Jeju-
Cheongju). Departure flights scheduling can be constrained by demand-side consideration,
i.e., airlines scheduled more flights around lunch cluster on a route where lunchtime demand
is high relative to others. Beyond this demand side perspective, each route is a part of a Jeju
routes network so airlines may face operational rigidities. Operational rigidities, along with
capacity constraints, can pose constraints that affect airlines’ strategic responses through
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schedule differentiation or choices between overall and Jeju route segment profitability for
an airline.
Table 1.3 describes the average values of the differentiation index, ClusterDIFF and the
number of daily flights scheduled at each cluster for the inland routes. No significant change
in the number of flights is observed in the inland routes. Surprisingly, for the Seoul-Busan
route, departure flights around the lunch cluster are more evenly distributed than the Jeju
island routes.7
Table 1.3: Average cluster differentiation index by route (Inland routes)
Morning DIFF Lunch DIFF Evening DIFF Morning DIFF Lunch DIFF Evening DIFF
# of flights # of flights # of flights # of flights # of flights # of flights
0.787 0.990 0.985 0.837 0.994 0.974
6.2 13.2 11.6 6.6 12.7 10.8
0.610 0.890 0.912 0.527 0.707 0.746
2.2 2.6 3.1 2.0 2.0 3.0
# of flights are rounded.
Route
Pre-deregulation (before May 2008) Post-deregulation (after May 2008)
Seoul-Busan
Seoul-Gwangju
It is not clear to see whether departure flight schedules around lunchtime (10AM-4PM)
are more evenly distributed in the Jeju island routes than in the inland routes. Thus, to inves-
tigate the effect of lunch cluster departure time differentiation on the air passengers’ utility,
other factors, i.e., flight characteristics, seasonality effect, etc., also need to be controlled
(chapter 2).
7See appendix Table15. For the other inland routes, no significant changes in the number of flights are
observed.
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Chapter 2
Modeling the Demand Side
2.1 Theoretical Model
The demand model starts from the specification of a discrete choice model. The utility of
consumer i for product j depends on the characteristics of the product and the consumer.
U
(
X j,zi,ξ j, p j,εi j;αi,βi
)
where X j,zi,ξ j, p j and αi,βi are observed product characteristics of product j, socio-economic
variables of individual consumer i, unobserved product characteristics of product j, the price
of product j and demand parameters, respectively. The random term εi j captures the con-
sumer’s specific tastes, which are assumed to be identically and independently distributed
across consumers and products. Different assumptions about the distributions of the random
term and the demand taste parameters have important implications for the resulting model.
In a simple logit model,1 individual consumer i has the same coefficients for price and prod-
uct characteristics. This means the consumer’s specific taste parameters for price, αi = α ,
and for product attributes, βi = β , are written as invariant across consumers, i = 1,2 . . . , I.
1The multinomial logit model and its extension as developed by McFadden (1973, 1974, 1976a, 1978, 1979,
1982).
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The simple logit model is derived on the assumption that the random terms εi j in the utility
function have independent extreme-value distributions. The following consequence of the
assumption that the variation in consumer tastes enters only through the additive term εi j
places very strong restrictions on the pattern of cross- price elasticities from the estimated
demand model in a simple logit model. In particular, the substitution pattern among products
is completely driven by market shares, not by how products are similar in physical attributes.
In contrast, the nested logit model relaxes this restrictive assumption that consumer het-
erogeneity only enters through the additive term εi j while maintaining the advantage of a
simple logit model in tractability, αi = α , and βi = β . A group of similar alternatives is
called a nest and each alternative belongs to exactly one nest. The key specification idea of
the nested logit model is the way in which the consumer’s specific taste term is entered in the
utility function. It allows the consumer’s utility to be correlated among products belonging
to the same nest where higher substitution patterns are supposed to exist between products
belonging to the same segment or nest. An increase in the price of product j affects some
consumers who currently purchase good j so that these consumers will substitute similar
products within the same nest. The nested logit model is derived from the assumption that
the random terms εi j have a generalized extreme-value distribution; thereby, a general pat-
tern of dependence among the choices only within the same nest is allowed, avoiding the IIA
(Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives) property.2
2The restrictions imposed by the IIA property of a simple logit model are very unappealing in many applica-
tions. The model with the IIA property predicts too high a joint probability of selection for two alternatives that
are in fact perceived as similar rather than independent by the individual consumeri. For instance, commuters
initially face a decision between two modes of transportation: red bus and auto. Suppose commuters choose
these two options with equal probability, 0.5, so that the odds ratio equals 1. Now a third mode, blue bus, is
added and commuters treat the two buses as equivalent. They are expected to choose between bus and car still
with equal probability, so the probability of car is still 0.5, while the probabilities of each of the two bus types
is 0.25. Suppose X1,X2, and X3 are the attributes of a trip by red bus, blue bus, and auto, respectively.Then, one
expects
P(Red bus |X1, X2) = P(Red bus |X1, X3) = P(Blue bus |X2, X3) = 1/2
and
P(Red bus |X1, X2, X3) = P(Blue bus |X1, X2, X3) = 1/4
The relative odds of alternatives 1 and 3 depend on the presence of alternative 2. They are 1 : 1 if choice
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In the present application, I follow Cardell’s (1991) exposition of the nested logit model;
the statistical properties of the distribution that the random terms εi j have to follow in order
to obtain a model consistent with the results in McFadden (1981).
2.2 Empirical Model
I apply the nested logit model to two types of city pair markets in Korea. There are city
pairs for flying to and from Jeju island and inland city pairs. These differ in both types of
travelers and in alternatives to air transportation. Jeju,3 located off of the southern coast of
mainland South Korea, is an island whose weather is mild even in winter season and is a
famous resort. Every year, over 4 million visitors from mainland Korea, Japan, and China
arrive at the island through the airport. Jeju island routes are primarily for vacation travelers,
while inland routes attract a great numbers of business travelers. Thus, there are a priori
expectations of differences in air travel demand sensitivity to price and other factors, such
as airtime duration and aircraft types. And with respect to outside goods, domestic city
pair traveling on inland routes may be undertaken using alternative travel modes such as rail
or bus service, whereas there is no closely comparable ferry service to Jeju island. Thus, I
would expect αr and/or βr to differ by Jeju island routes (r= 1,2,3,4,5) versus inland routes
(r = 6,7).4
2.2.1 The Air Travel Demand for Jeju Island Routes
Within the Jeju island routes, there are r= 1,2,3,4,5 routes; Jeju-Seoul(r= 1), Jeju-Busan(r=
2), Jeju-Cheongju(r = 3), Jeju-Daegu(r = 4), and Jeju-Gwangju (r = 5) route. Assume I
2 is not present. They are 1 : 2 if choice 2 is present. This is inconsistent with the simple logit model. IIA
property implies that this is not the case: for the odds ratio between car and red bus to be preserved, the new
probabilities must be: car 0.33; red bus 0.33; blue bus 0.33. See Wooldridge 2002, pp. 501-2
3See appendix for a map showing location of Jeju and other airport cities in this study.
4I limit the sample to routes where a substantial number of passengers fly. In addition, some domestic city
pair routes are excluded if data such as fares or aircraft size were missing, or if the number of flights in a given
route were less than three.
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observe t = 1, . . . . . . ,T time periods, each with i = 1, . . . . . . , I potential air passengers on
r = 1,2,3,4,5 Jeju island routes, respectively. I observe data for a cross section of airline
specific non-stop flights over 50 months (June 2006 to October 2010). For each time pe-
riod, I observe monthly aggregate passengers on each route by airline carriers, and product
characteristics for j = 0,1, . . . ,J airline carrier specific non-stop flights. Air passenger i is
assumed to choose a flight which gives the highest utility and may choose an outside good
instead of an inside good. Then, j = 0 represents an outside good, a no flying decision. Time
subscripts, t, are included to account for the panel structure of the data.
Figure 2.1: Korean Domestic Air Travel Demand structure: Jeju island routes
Choice Set of route 1
Korean Domestic Airline Industry
Jeju island Inland
Route 1
Fly, g = 1
Outside good, j=0, g = 0…Airline j=1 Airline j=J
Route k
g = 0 
……
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The indirect utility obtained by air passenger i flying a city pair route r = 1,2,3,4,5 from
direct flight j in time t is
U rJe ju,igt = δ
r
Je ju, jt +ζ
r
igt+ (1−σr)εi jt (1)
where δ rJe ju, jt = X rJe ju, jtβr − αr prjt + ξ jt measures mean utility levels for direct flight
j = 0,1, . . . ,J and X rJe ju, jt is observed characteristics of non-stop flight j by different air-
line carriers, ξ jt are unobserved (by the researchers) product characteristics of direct flight
j. g = 0,1 is a group within a specific route r = 1,2,3,4,5. The term ζ rigt is air traveler i’s
idiosyncratic tastes for the nests g= 0,1 within the individual routes from Jeju island routes,
and it captures route specific unobservables. This nested error term is defined over non-stop
flights that fly a specific route and is constant within the route. The j = 0,1, . . . ,J flights on a
route are nested as two exhaustive and mutually exclusive nests. I consider the specification
that only two nests, g = 0,1 are present for each route r = 1,2,3,4,5, respectively. Thus,
route specific flights j = 0,1, . . . ,J are nested into two segments. I categorize inside goods
group g = 1 as one nest, and an outside good group g = 0 as another nest in which only the
non-buying option, j = 0 is available. Individuals’ heterogeneity enters the model through
the random part of utility
[
ζ rigt +(1−σr)εi jt
]
and in particular, the term (1−σr)εi jt captures
the idiosyncratic preference for direct flight j. The nesting parameter σr lies between 0 and
1, which measures the correlation of the air passengers’ utilities across flights compared with
the potential fliers who did not choose air travel at time t. As σr goes to 1, flights operated
by different carriers are perceived as perfect substitutes. The variable εi jt is an individual i
specific unobservable.
The specification of the demand in this discrete choice model is finished with an out-
side good. By construction, in the current framework, the relative prices along with flight
attributes, such as aircraft size and flight frequency, and/or brand reputation determine the
probabilities of choosing a flight j = 0,1, ......,J, conditional upon the decision to fly. The
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outside good j = 0 is assumed to be the only member of g = 0, normalizing the utility from
the outside good to zero, U rJe ju,i0t = 0. The existence of the outside good allows air pas-
sengers to choose none of the inside goods. The outside good serves as a unit of account
to measure the worth of different inside goods relative to one another; for instance, it is a
numeraire good and is used in normalizing the mean utility level of flight j = 0,1, ......,J.
I define a market as a nonstop route air travel market at time t; therefore, there are route
specific outside goods which vary over time. In particular, I define the route specific outside
goods that are proportional to population and Gross Regional Domestic Product (GRDP) per
capita of origin cities, and enplanement of the route (Table 2.1).
Table 2.1: Data to be used to construct the route specific outside good
Origin city Seoul Busan Daegu Cheongju Gwangju
Population 10,218,943 3,571,903 2,496,152 501,959 1,426,444
GRDP (US $BN) 222.70 48.96 29.12 9.20 20.25
GRDP per capita (US $) 21792.9 13708.4 11667.6 18320.1 14194.4
Given the functional form assumptions that if both εi jt and
[
ζ rigt +(1−σr)εi jt
]
follow a
type I extreme value distribution with 0 < σ < 1,5 the discrete choice route specific market
share function is derived6
s jt =
exp(δ rJe ju, jt/1−σr)
Dσrg
[
∑g=0,1g D
(1−σr)
g
] (2)
where g = 1 represents making the choice to fly on a specific route, g = 0 represents a no
flying decision and Dg ≡ ∑g=0,1j∈g exp(δ rJe ju, jt/(1−σr)). δ rJe ju, jt = X rJe ju, jtβr−αr prjt + ξ jt is the
5Air passengers are assumed to purchase the flight that gives the highest utility in timet.
6See Berry [1994] for a complete version of the derivation; If product j is in group g, the well known
formula for the market share of product j as a fraction of the total group share is s j/g = e
δ j/(1−σ)/Dg, where the
denominator of this expression for a product in group g is sg = D
(1−σ)
g /
[
∑g D
(1−σ)
g
]
, giving a market share of
s j = s j/g  sg = eδ j/(1−σ)/Dσg
[
∑g D
(1−σ)
g
]
.
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mean utility for non-stop flights j = 1, . . . ,J. In order to apply the standard instrumental
variable method, a linearly transformed demand equation proposed by Berry (1994) is used
with the data for each city pair route r = 1,2,3,4,5, separately.
ln
(
s jt
)− ln(s0t) = X rJe ju, jtβr−αr prjt + γrzit +σrln(s jt/gt)+ξ jt (3)
where s jt is the market share of flight j at time t, and s0t is the market share for the out-
side good. s jt/gt is the within the flying nest (g = 1) share of flight j and is calculated by
dividing total passengers carried by each airline carrier by the total passengers of the flying
inside goods. X rJe ju, jt includes not only observed product characteristics such as aircraft size,
airtime duration, and service flight frequency, but also meteorological data of Jeju island to
capture seasonality in Jeju’s air travel industry. prjt is the air fare of flight j, and a socio-
economic variable zit describes characteristics of the decision makers, air traveler i. Here, I
use Gross Regional Domestic Product (GRDP) per capita of origin cities in order to capture
regional consumer heterogeneity.
The correlation of prjt with ξ jt , the econometric error term, suggests the use of instru-
ments for prices. In addition, there is another endogenous variable in the demand: ln
(
s jt/gt
)
,
the within group market shares, by construction. The set of instruments and their validity are
discussed in a later section.
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2.2.2 The Air Travel Demand for Inland Routes
Figure 2.2: Korean Domestic Air Travel Demand structure: Inland routes
Korean Domestic Airline Industry
Jeju island Inland
Route k + 1 Route k + 2
Choice Set of route k + 1
Fly, g = 1
Outside good, j=0, g = 0…Airline j=1 Airline j = J
g = 0 
……
Within inland routes, there are two routes (r = 6,7);7 Seoul-Busan(r = 6) and Seoul-
Gwangju(r = 7). Assume I observe t = 1, . . . . . . ,T time periods, each with i = 1, . . . . . . , I
potential air passengers on r = 6,7 inland routes, respectively. I observe data for a cross
section of airline specific non-stop flights over 50 months (June 2006 to October 2010). Air
7Some domestic city pair routes are excluded if data such as fares or aircraft size were missing, or if the
number of flights in a given route were less than three. These routes include the Seoul-Daegu, the Seoul-
Pohang, and the Seoul-Ulsan city pair markets, which have no LCCs entry during the sample time period.
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passenger i is assumed to choose a flight which gives the highest utility and may choose an
outside good instead of an inside good. Then, j = 0 represents an outside good, a no flying
decision. Time subscripts, t, are included to account for the panel structure of the data. The
indirect utility obtained by air passenger i flying a route ∀r = 6,7 from direct flight j in time
t is
U rInland,igt = δ
r
Inland, jt +ζ
r
igt+ (1−σr)εi jt (4)
where δ rInland, jt = X
r
Inland, jtβr−αr prjt + ξ jt measures mean utility levels for direct flight
j = 0,1, . . . ,J and X rInland, jt is observed characteristics of non-stop flight j by different airline
carriers, ξ jt are unobserved (by the researchers) product characteristics of direct flight j.
g= 0,1 is a group within a specific route r= 6,7. The term ζ rigt is air traveler i’s idiosyncratic
tastes for the nests g = 0,1 within the individual routes from inland routes, and it captures
route specific unobservables. This nested error term is defined over non-stop flights that fly
a specific route and is constant within the route. The j = 0,1, . . . ,J flights on a route are
nested as two exhaustive and mutually exclusive nests. I consider the specification that only
two nests, g= 0,1 are present for each route r= 6,7. respectively. Thus, route specific flights
j = 0,1, . . . ,J are nested two into segments. I categorize inside goods group g = 1 as one
nest, and an outside good group g = 0 as another nest in which only the non-buying option,
j = 0 is available. Individuals’ heterogeneity enters the model through the random part of
utility
[
ζ rigt +(1−σr)εi jt
]
and in particular the term (1−σr)εi jt captures the idiosyncratic
preference for direct flight j. The nesting parameter σr lies between 0 and 1, which measures
the correlation of the air passengers’ utilities across flights compared with the potential fliers
who didn’t choose air travel at time t. As σr goes to 1, flights operated by different carriers
are perceived as perfect substitutes. The variable εi jt is an individual i specific unobservable.
The specification of the demand in this discrete choice model is finished with an out-
side good. By construction, in the current framework, the relative prices along with flight
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attributes, such as aircraft size and flight frequency, and/or brand reputation determine the
probabilities of choosing a given flight conditional upon the decision to fly. The outside good
j = 0 is assumed to be the only member of g= 0 and the existence of the outside good allows
air passengers to choose none of the inside goods. The outside good serves as a unit of ac-
count to measure the worth of different inside goods relative to one another; for instance, it is
a numeraire good and is used in normalizing the mean utility level of flight j = 0,1, ......,J.
I define a market as a nonstop route air travel market at time t; therefore, there are route
specific outside goods which vary over time. Especially, I define the route specific outside
goods that are proportional to population and Gross Regional Domestic Product (GRDP) per
capita of origin cities, and enplanement of the route (Table 2.1).
Given the functional form assumptions that if both εi jt and
[
ζ rigt +(1−σr)εi jt
]
follow a
type I extreme value distribution with 0 < σ < 1,8 the discrete choice route specific market
share function is derived9
s jt =
exp(δ rInland, jt/1−σr)
Dσrg
[
∑g=0,1g D
(1−σr)
g
] (5)
where g = 1 represents making the choice to fly on a specific route, g = 0 represents a no
flying decision and Dg ≡ ∑g=0,1j∈g exp(δ rInland, jt/(1−σr)). δ rInland, jt = X rInland, jtβr−αr prjt +ξ jt is
the mean utility for non-stop flights j = 1, . . . ,J. In order to apply the standard instrumental
variable method, a linearly transformed demand equation proposed by Berry (1994) is used
with the data for each city pair route ∀r = 6,7, separately.
ln
(
s jt
)− ln(s0t) = X rInland, jtβr−αr prjt + γrzit +σrln(s jt/gt)+ξ jt (6)
where s jt is the market share of flight j at time t and s0t is the market share for the outside
good. s jt/gt is the within the flying, g= 1, nest share of flight j and is calculated dividing total
8Air passengers are assumed to purchase the flight that gives the highest utility in time t.
9See Berry [1994] for a complete version of this derivation.
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passengers carried by each airline carrier by the total passengers of the flying inside goods.
X rInland, jt includes the observed product characteristics such as aircraft size, airtime duration,
and service flight frequency. prjt is the air fare of flight j and a socio-economic variable zit
describes characteristics of the decision makers, air traveler i. Here, I use Gross Regional
Domestic Product (GRDP) per capita of origin cities in order to capture regional consumer
heterogeneity.
The correlation of prjt with ξ jt , the econometric error term, suggests the use of instru-
ments for prices. In addition, there is another endogenous variable in the demand: ln
(
s jt/gt
)
,
the within group market shares, by construction. The set of instruments and their validity are
discussed in a later section.
2.2.3 Joint Constraints Jeju island, Inland, and All Routes
First, if there are a priori expectations of no differences in terms of demand sensitivity to
price within the Jeju island routes, I would expect the fare coefficient α to be the same
across the Jeju island routes. The null hypothesis, H0 : α1 = α2 = α3 = α4 = α5, a common
sensitivity to price, αJe ju = αr, ∀r = 1,2,3,4,5 for the Jeju island routes in eq(3), will be
tested in a later section.
Second, if there are a priori expectations of different air travel demand sensitivities to
flight characteristics, such as flight frequency, aircraft size, and airtime duration within the
Jeju island routes, I would expect the flight characteristics to have different effects for differ-
ent routes. In particular, the null hypothesis, H0 : β1 = β2 = β3 = β4 = β5, will also be tested
in a later section.
Third, if there are a priori expectations of no differences in terms of demand sensitivity
to price within the inland routes, I would expect the fare coefficient α to be the same across
the inland routes. The null hypothesis, H0 :α6 =α7, a common sensitivity to price, αInland =
αr, ∀r = 6,7 for the inland routes in eq(6), will be tested in a later section.
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Forth, if there are a priori expectations of different air travel demand sensitivities to flight
characteristics, such as flight frequency, aircraft size, and airtime duration within the inland
routes, I would expect the flight characteristics to have different effects for different routes.
In particular, the null hypothesis, H0 : β6 = β7, will also be tested in a later section.
Finally, the Jeju island routes and the inland routes have different alternative transporta-
tion modes and types of travelers. For the inland routes, alternatives include bus, rail, and
automobile transportation. To get to Jeju island, however, the ferry is really not a viable op-
tion. And with respect to types of travelers, the Jeju island routes are primarily for vacation
travelers, and the inland routes attract a greater number of business travelers. Even though
there are a priori expectations of different air travel demand sensitivity to price between the
Jeju island routes and the inland routes, the joint equality test for the fare coefficients across
the Jeju island routes and the inland routes, H0 :α1 =α2 =α3 =α4 =α5 =α6 =α7 (αJe ju =
αInland = αr ∀r = 1,2,3,4,5,6,7) will be conducted for completeness.
2.2.4 Instruments
The potential correlation of prjt with ξ jt , the econometric error term, suggests the use of in-
struments for prices prjt . We construct two sets of instruments based on two strategies used
in the literature. In addition, there is one more endogenous variable in the demand specifi-
cation: ln
(
s jt/gt
)
, the within group market shares, by construction. The ideal instrumental
variables in the nested logit demand are ones that shift costs but do not directly enter the
demand equation (3) for the Jeju island routes (route specific αr and βr), and the demand
equation (6) for inland routes (route specific αr and βr). There are two different sets of
instruments: Berry, Levinsohn, and Pakes (BLP) style and Hausman panel style instruments.
First, the physical characteristics of the products can be adapted as BLP style instru-
ments (SeeVerboven [1996], Bresnahan et al. [1997], and Petrin [2002]). All observed
product characteristics are exogenous with respect to the unobservable product character-
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istics. If airline carriers are assumed to choose the attributes of some route specific fea-
tures, for example, the service flight frequency and aircraft size first, and then set the prices
later, the product characteristics can be assumed to be exogenous given that the researchers
only observe the price-setting decisions. Given this assumption that the unobserved prod-
uct characteristics ξ jt are only observed by both air passengers and airline carriers (not
observed by researchers), the characteristics of other firms’ flights k, X rJe ju,kt for the Jeju
island routes, or X rInland,kt for the inland routes, such as flight frequency, airtime duration
and aircraft size, are appropriate instruments. These are adequate because they are excluded
from the utility function for taking flight j while they are correlated with prices through
the markups in the pricing equation. The indirect utility of air passenger i from flight j by
different airline carriers in time t entirely depends on mean utility levels for direct flight j,
not flight k (δ rJe ju, jt = X rJe ju, jtβr−αr prjt + ξ jt , ∀r = 1,2,3,4,5 for the Jeju island routes or
δ rInland, jt = X
r
Inland, jtβr−αr prjt +ξ jt , ∀r = 6,7, for the inland routes).
Second, Hausman panel style instruments, first introduced by Hausman et al. [1994],
are considered as well. It appears quite a few papers use these types of instruments. The
main idea of Hausman instruments is that prices in other geographic markets in the panel
can be employed as instruments for prices in a particular geographic market, as underlying
cost shocks ought to affect prices in all geographic locations. An obvious underlying costs
variable would be fuel costs or climate changes, creating the necessary exogenous variation
in prices. The prices of the other Jeju routes r = 2,3,4,5 are considered to be correlated with
the price of a route r = 1 flying to and from Jeju island and similarly for each of the other
four Jeju island routes. It is also reasonable to believe that the prices of the other inland route
r = 7 would be instrumenting for price of an inland route r = 6 and vice-versa.
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2.2.5 Panel Fixed Effect Estimator for Unobserved Product Character-
istics, ξ jt
Each flight operated by different carriers will be assumed to have a characteristic that in-
fluences demand, but that either is not observed by the researcher or cannot be quantified
into a variable, such as brand reputation of specific airline carriers f = 1, ....,F . The model
that is used with the data is a static panel data model where airline carrier- and time-specific
characteristics can be controlled. The error term ξ jt = ξ f + ξt +∆ξ jt has an error compo-
nent structure: individual airline carrier effects, ξ f , and simultaneity effects, ξt . In the panel
data structure, the airline carrier specific terms ξ f absorb any firm fixed effects, for example,
brand reputation or images associated with each airline carriers, which are assumed to be
constant across times. Furthermore, the set of time dummies in the model ξt controls for the
time invariant effects. Thus, the remaining error term is ∆ξ jt = ξ jt−ξ f −ξt . This error term
varies across time and individual products j = 0,1 . . . ,J and is assumed to be serially un-
correlated. The two endogenous variables, prjt and ln
(
s jt/gt
)
, need to be instrumented given
their potential correlation with this remaining error term.
2.3 Data
I merged data from several sources.10 The data consist of monthly fares and total monthly
passengers of domestic city pair non-stop flights of each route during the 52 months between
June 2006 and Oct 2010. Airfares are different across peak or off-peak periods and airline
carriers are required by law to announce fare information in advance. For the same route
served by the same airline carrier, fares are lower during off-peak seasons than during peak-
seasons. Peak-seasons also can be categorized into two types: August and semi-peak months
10Korea Airports Corporation (KAC) www.airport.co.kr
Statistics Korea www.kostat.go.kr
Jeju Special Self-Governing Provincial Tourism Association www.hijeju.or.kr
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of January, April, May, July and October.11
The dataset was then completed by information on aircraft size (number of available seats
per plane), airtime duration in minutes, aircraft types, turbo prop or not, and total monthly
service flight frequency. These additional data were collected from each carrier’s website.12
In order to capture regional consumers’ income, monthly Gross Regional Domestic Product
(GRDP) per capita of origin cities are collected, because all city pair routes of the Jeju island
routes (Seoul, Busan, Cheongju, Daegu, and Gwangju) are flying to Jeju island and those
of the inland routes (Busan, Gwangju) are flying to Seoul and vice versa. In particular,
the dataset for the Jeju routes was supplemented with monthly meteorological data for Jeju
island such as precipitation (mm), average temperatures, and number of snow days, thus
controlling for seasonality in Jeju airline travel demand.
Recall the demand equation for the Jeju island routes, r = 1,2,3,4,5 in equation (3) and
that for the inland routes, r = 6,7 in equation (6). The only differences between X rJe ju, jt
(explanatory variables for flight j flying the Jeju routes, ∀r = 1,2,3,4,5) and X rInland, jt (ex-
planatory variables for flight j flying the inland routes, ∀r = 6,7) are the meteorological
factors of Jeju island. For the Jeju island routes, I would expect the meteorological factors
to capture strong seasonality effects of the air travel demand and also capture Jeju specific
effects along with time fixed effects. Unlike the Jeju island route, these additional Jeju island
explanatory variables should not have effects on the inland routes. Table 2.2 describes the
available variables. Along with the lunch ClusterDIFF13variable discussed in chapter 1, all
11January and October are holiday season. July and August are summer vacation/tourist season.
Elementary school, middle school, and high school schedule educational field trips in April and May. Data
source: Jeju Special Self-Governing Provincial Tourism Association
12Korean Air http://kr.koreanair.com/
Asiana Air http://flyasiana.com/
Hansung Air (Hansung Air ceased operation).
Jeju Air http://www.jejuair.net/
Yeongnam Air (Yeongnam Air ceased operation).
Jin Air http://www.jinair.com/
Air Busan http://www.airbusan.com/
Eastar Jet http://www.eastarjet.co.kr/
Tway Air http://www.twayair.com/
13See Tables 1.2 and 1.3 in section 1.1.4.
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variables defined in Table 2.2 are taken to estimation.
Table 2.2: Descriptions of the explanatory variables (time subscripts and route superscripts
are omitted)
Variable Description
 Average monthly air fares including fuel surcharges expressed in 2005 dollars (US $).
 Fares do not incorporate any coupons or discounts.
 Monthly market shares for each flight j  on a route are computed as total passengers
 divided by the market size, inside good plus outside good.
 Within market shares are computed dividing total passengers 
 carried by each airline carrier by the total passengers of a route.
Flights frequency  Monthly total flights by each airline carrier on a specific route
Flight air time duration  Flight duration in minutes for a route
Aircraft (A/C) size  Average number of available seats per plane on flight j  of airline k  on a route
August dummy  1 if August, 0 otherwise
Semi-peak dummy  1 if Jan, April, May, July, and October, 0 otherwise
Regional GRDP per capita  Monthly GRDP per capita in US $ of origin cities
Meteorological variables  Monthly precipitation (mm), number of snow days
Fare
jts
jt gts
Market shares are defined using a quantity variable, which depends on the context. The
most important consideration in choosing the quantity variable is the need to define a market
share for the outside good. For each non-stop route, I define a market as a route in time
t. Market size is defined as the number of passengers (the inside good) plus potential fliers
making a no flight decision (outside good). This varies across time and routes. Based on
the yearly reports by the Jeju Special Self-Governing Provincial Tourism Association, the
average volume of air travelers given each route is calculated first. Thus, a time- and route-
specific outside good is proportional to the average volume of air travelers for a specific route
and population size.14
14The demand estimation results are qualitatively insensitive to the choice of time- and route-specific outside
goods, at 0.01% to 0.5% of population for origin cities. That is, the choice of time- and route- specific outside
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Greater choices of flights frequency would give higher utility for air travelers. The shorter
air time duration is, the more an air traveler would enjoy the service. The longest flight
in Korean domestic routes is the one flying the Jeju-Seoul route and it only takes about 65
minutes for jet airplanes and 75 minutes (Dash 8-Q400) or 90 minutes (ATR72) for turboprop
airplanes. Except for the Jeju-Seoul route, flight time durations are either less than or equal to
70 minutes for even turboprop airplanes. Aircraft that use turboprop engines are suitable for
short-haul flights with aircraft capacity ranging up to 100 passengers, but turboprop aircraft
are considered unsafe among air passengers. Before the Deregulation Act of May 2008, non-
scheduled air service carriers were only allowed to operate aircraft with less than 80 available
seats per airplane. These restrictions on non-scheduled air service carriers greatly limited
their aircraft availability and selection, and forced them to use small turbo-prop aircraft.
Prior to deregulation most of the independent LCCs were non-scheduled air service carriers
which were subject to this regulated market policy.
Tables 2-3 and 2-4 provide route-by-route summary statistics for Jeju routes and inland
routes, respectively from two perspectives; pre and post deregulation. Data show how the
characteristics in terms of fare level, monthly flight frequency, aircraft size, and airtime
duration of full service legacy carriers and low cost carriers (LCCs) differ.15
goods only affect the size and significance level of airline carrier-specific fixed effects, and the relative size of
the carrier-specific fixed effects does not change over the chosen percentages, 0.01% to 0.5%, of populations
for origin cities. In our context, the welfare evaluation in chapter 6 will proceed with the chosen percentage
(0.1%) of populations for origin cities.
15For each type of carriers (i.e. major, dependent LCCs, and independent LCCs), time varying market share
weighted average values across different carriers within the same type are presented.
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Table 2.3: Route-by-route descriptive statistics (average) for the Jeju island routes: pre- and
post-deregulation (unbalanced panel, June 2006-October 2010)
Fare ACsize Duration Fare ACsize Duration
(US $) (# seats) (minutes) (US $) (# seats) (minutes)
Major 70.25 1365 215 65 71.02 1340 216 65
Dependent LCCs 57.09 602 189 65
Independent LCCs 53.19 504 76 82 61.25 476 135 70
Major 54.22 446 193 55 59.09 393 201 55
Dependent LCCs 45.81 381 162 55
Independent LCCs 40.18 183 78 60 52.88 137 119 59
Major 61.66 230 176 60 62.57 230 186 60
Dependent LCCs
Independent LCCs 52.26 194 72 68 52.25 150 114 63
Major 59.78 240 180 60 61.17 246 188 60
Dependent LCCs
Independent LCCs 63.63 48 109 65
Major 50.21 249 177 45 56.67 234 180 45
Dependent LCCs
Independent LCCs
NA
Jeju-Daegu NA NA
NA
Jeju-Gwangju NA NA
NA NA
Jeju-Seoul NA
Jeju-Busan NA
Jeju-Cheongju NA
Route Carriers
Pre-deregulation (before May 2008) Post-deregulation (after May 2008)
Flights Flights
Table 2.4: Route-by-route descriptive statistics (average) for the inland routes: pre- and
post-deregulation (unbalanced panel, June 2006-October 2010)
Fare Acsize Duration Fare Acsize Duration
(US $) (# seats) (minutes) (US $) (# seats) (minutes)
Major 62.21 881 170 55 72.15 751 171 55
Dependent LCCs 55.72 472 165 55
Independent LCCs 48.82 129 78 55
Major 54.94 233 174 50 61.41 209 173 50
Dependent LCCs
Independent LCCs
Route Carriers
Pre-deregulation (before May 2008) Post-deregulation (after May 2008)
Flights Flights
Seoul-Busan NA
NA
Seoul-Gwangju NA NA
NA NA
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Before the Deregulation Act of May 2008, the two legacy carrier airlines, KAL and
AAR, operated several jet aircraft including Boeing 737s and Airbus A330s. Unlike these
two major airlines, the independent LCCs operated three turboprops (3 ATR72s, Hansung
Air (HAN)) or four turboprops and two jet aircraft (4 Dash 8-Q400s and 2 Boeing 737s, Jeju
Air (JJA)) while no dependent LCCs had emerged yet.
The most interesting feature here is the structural change of the Deregulation Act of May
2008. Of the four independent LCCs, two successfully have established their positions in do-
mestic routes, while the other two, HAN and ONA, failed. In the post-deregulation period,
even LCCs operated jet aircraft whose seat capacities exceeded 80 seats. These jet aircraft
generally fly much faster than propeller-powered aircraft (turboprop aircraft with less than
80 seats), which enabled LCCs to carry more passengers, obtaining market competitiveness.
For example, new independent LCC, Eastar Jet (ESR), launched its first flight from Jeju to
Seoul with Boeing 737s on Jan 2009 and chose a single aircraft type fleet which allowed
for greater efficiency in maintenance, following the low-cost structure pioneered by South-
west Airlines and EasyJet. ESR expanded its fleet up to six Boeing 737s in March 2010,
increasing the daily flight frequency on some routes. The remaining independent LCC, JJA,
was restructured by expanding capacities. JJA permanently removed all four Dash 8 Q400s,
turboprop aircraft with 78 available seats per airplane, in June 2010. In 2011, continuing to
consolidate around a single aircraft type, it added to capacity by purchasing another B737.
It also plans to add three more B737s this year and another in 2013. HAN, however, ceased
operations in Nov 2008 due to weak demand and budgetary constraints. Another indepen-
dent LCC, ONA, launched in July 2008 with a single Fokker 100 (turboprop aircraft), ceased
operations in December of the same year.
In response to these restructuring efforts of LCCs, the two legacy carriers, KAL and
AAR, also launched their own subsidiary LCCs (dependent LCCs) in July 2008 (Jin Air
(JNA) of KAL) and October 2008 (Air Busan (ABL) of AAR). ABL took its second delivery
of a Boeing 737 in October 2008, and a third delivery of a Boeing 737 in November 2008.
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As of July 2011, the ABL fleet consists of one Airbus A321 and six Boeing 737s. Another
dependent LCC, JNA, began operations in July 2008 with four Boeing 737s from its parent
company, KAL, seating 189 passengers of a single class.
As of July 2008, two months after the Deregulation Act of May 2008, the two major
airlines, KAL and AAR started to impose airline specific fuel surcharges $14 on all domestic
flights in response to rising oil and jet fuel prices. Prior to July 2008’s announcement,
fuel surcharges were only imposed on international routes. Airline specific fuel surcharges
are re-assessed every two months, which are directly linked with Mean of Platts Singapore
(MOPS), a measure of fuel oil pricing in Singapore.
In August 2008, the independent LCCs also imposed fuel surcharges, in the amounts of
$13 (ONA), $10 (HAN), and $11 (JJA) on all flights. JNA, a wholly owned subsidiary LCC
of KAL, imposed a fuel surcharge of $12.80 in September 2008, which was lower than the
$16 of the two major airlines, but slightly higher than the $12.50 average of the independent
LCCs’ surcharges during the same time period. The dependent LCC, ABL, a partially owned
subsidiary LCC of AAR, imposed a fuel surcharge of $11 in October 2008.
The introduction of fuel surcharges to offset rising fuel costs has had a negative impact on
the pricing strategies of LCCs in the post-deregulation time period. Fare is a key competitive
factor for LCCs because their success is based on providing air transport services to air
passengers at lower fares. However, as shown in Tables 2-3 and 2-4, the route-wide average
fares are higher in real terms than those from the pre-deregulation period in the Jeju-Seoul
route and in the Seoul-Busan route. It is important to note that the fares of independent LCCs
increased far more than those of the two rival major airlines on the Jeju-Seoul route and the
Jeju-Busan route, the two largest domestic routes in Korea.
The consequences of implementing fuel surcharges on all domestic route flights had dif-
ferent impacts on Jeju island routes and inland routes. As shown in Figure 2.3,16 no sub-
16Every route flying Jeju island shows a similar pattern.
See appendix Figure 3 (Jeju-Busan route), Figure 4 (Jeju-Cheongju route), Figure 5 (Jeju-Daegu route), and
Figure 6 ( Jeju-Gwangju route).
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stantial drop in monthly enplanements on Jeju island routes is observed even at a time when
all airline carriers, including the major airlines and LCCs, implemented fuel surcharges. In
fact, there is an overall increasing tendency in enplanements on Jeju island routes during
the sample period, from June 2006 to October 2010. By contrast, for the inland routes, a
huge decrease in monthly enplanements is observed after airline carriers imposed high fuel
surcharges (during July 2008 -January 2009) in Figure 2.4.17
Figure 2.3: Average monthly fares (in US $) and enplanements: Jeju-Seoul route
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17See appendix Figure 7 (Seoul-Gwangju route).
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Figure 2.4: Average monthly fares (in US $) and enplanements: Seoul-Busan route
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2.4 Demand Results
The ideal instrumental variables in the nested logit demand are ones that shift costs but
do not directly enter the demand equation (3) for Jeju routes or (6) for the inland routes.
There are two different types of instruments: Berry, Levinsohn, and Pakes (BLP) style and
Hausman panel style. Based on two sets of instruments, I present three different demand
model specifications that only differ in the instruments. The BLP style instruments are used
in column (i), the Hausman style instruments are used in column (ii), and the combined
instruments of BLP and Hausman style are used in column (iii) specifications. The validity
of the instruments along with robustness in point estimates requires comparing results from
several sets of instrumental variables.
I provide route-by-route estimation results. For each route (five Jeju and two inland
routes) there is a table showing results from each of the three different instrumental vari-
ables specification for that route. As in Bresnahan et al. [1997], the set of instruments in
column (i), BLP style, are given by the observed exogenous characteristics, excluding fares
from other airline carriers so that potentially endogenous regressors are not included; the
count of airline carriers in the route; the mean of the observed exogenous characteristics of
all the other airline carriers in the route; the mean of the observed exogenous characteris-
tics of all the other flights on the other routes from the same airline carrier.18 The second
specification of the demand model uses Hausman style instruments in column (ii) and the
set of instruments are given by the count of routes operated by the same airline carrier on the
other Jeju island routes (the other inland routes); the mean of the fares from all the other Jeju
island routes (the other inland routes) of the same airline carrier. The last specification of the
demand model (column (iii)) uses the combined instruments of BLP and Hausman styles.
The three different demand model specifications are compared.19 Some physical char-
18Alternative functions of the observed characteristics have been used as instruments but results do not
qualitatively change.
19Cragg and Donald (1993) have proposed a test statistic that can be used to test for weak instruments. A
test for weak identification-which means that the instruments are correlated with endogenous regressors, but
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acteristics of flights such as airtime duration and aircraft size on some routes either didn’t
vary or only changed slightly over time. Thus, BLP style instruments are probably weak for
routes with these characteristics in this context. The Hausman style instruments may also be
questioned when there are national demand shocks.
2.4.1 Route by Route Estimates
Another consideration in air travel demand estimation is capacity constraints. Even if an air-
line carrier changes its fare, demand may not respond when a capacity limit has already been
reached. For example, a change in fare would have no impact on total quantity demanded
in a capacity constrained route and this would generate a downward bias in the fare coeffi-
cient estimates. To capture this effect, I estimate the demand model for all months excluding
August (based on the average load factor, which is the percentage of seats occupied, August
seems to face a capacity constraint problem), when demand is high relative to the number of
flights or seat offered.20 Results do not qualitatively change. The current demand model is
robust to the capacity problem.
not highly correlated-is performed using Stata 11 and is interpreted using Stock and Yogo (2005).
20I limit this capacity constraint problem to the Jeju island routes only.
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2.4.1.1 Jeju-Seoul Route ( r = 1 ) (αr > 0)21
Table 2.5: Results with Nested Logit Demand Instrumental variable (IV) two-stage least
squares (2SLS) regression: Jeju-Seoul route ( r = 1)
Dependent variable, ln(s jt)− ln(s0t)
1. Jeju-Seoul route ( r = 1 ) (1) (2) (3)
Explanatory variable BLP Hausman Mix
0.144*** 0.0572* 0.0917***
(0.041) (0.024) (0.024)
0.775*** 0.755*** 0.730***
(0.064) (0.101) (0.077)
0.481*** 0.584** 0.619***
(0.139) (0.211) (0.163)
4.562*** 3.931*** 4.117***
(0.268) (0.201) (0.204)
0.0639* 0.045 0.0557*  
(0.026) (0.024) (0.025)
-0.118*** -0.120** -0.130***
(0.033) (0.045) (0.039)
0.322*** 0.245*** 0.267***
(0.045) (0.034) (0.035)
0.0921*** 0.0777*** 0.0773***
(0.017) (0.020) (0.018)
-0.0149*** -0.0149*** -0.0138***
(0.003) (0.004) (0.003)
0.366** 0.636*** 0.571***
(0.125) (0.110) (0.112)
-0.790*** -1.266*** -1.149***
(0.223) (0.198) (0.205)
N observation 288 288 288   
First stage partial R square: Fare 0.217 0.463 0.550
First stage partial R square: ln(sjt/gt) 0.112 0.041 0.151
Robust standard errors in parentheses; * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001
Airtime duration
Fare
ln(sjt/gt)
Flight frequency
Lunch ClusterDIFF
Aircraft size
August (Peak)
Semi-peak 
Meteorological variable_snowfall
GRDP per capita of Seoul
Constant
The coefficient on price enters with a negative sign in equation (3), meaning that a posi-
tive alpha (αr > 0) indicates a negatively sloped demand curve. The Jeju-Seoul route and the
Jeju-Busan routes are the two largest domestic routes for LCCs. For the Jeju-Seoul route,
most coefficients of product attributes are of the expected sign. The coefficients for fare
21The demand equation is ln(s jt)− ln(s0t) = X rJe ju, jtβr−αr prjt + γrzit +σrln
(
s jt/gt
)
+ξ jt eq(3).
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are statistically significant across all three specifications. The point estimates results sug-
gest that greater choices for flights during a day and evenly scheduled flights during lunch
hours increase the utility for the air travelers on the Jeju-Seoul route. Passengers would
gain more utility from larger aircraft and shorter airtime duration. Strong seasonality effects
are observed: higher demand in August and the semi-peak period. Year dummy variables
and airline specific dummy variables are also included for controlling time-fixed effects and
firm-fixed effects, respectively, but are not displayed in the table.
The first stage partial R2 statistics for the fare variable are higher than those for the
within group share variable, ln
(
s jt/gt
)
. All three instruments are less effective in explaining
the within group share variable, ln
(
s jt/gt
)
. In particular, the BLP instruments are weaker
in explaining the fare variable than either the Hausman instruments in column (ii) or the
combined instruments of BLP and Hausman in column (iii). The key assumption for the
BLP instruments is that observed characteristics are uncorrelated with the unobserved com-
ponents. However, once a carrier specific dummy variable is included in order to control
firm-specific fixed effects, a potential problem originates from this type instruments. Unless
there is a variation in either the number of products offered in a market or product attributes,
there is less variation in the BLP style instruments.22
22See Appendix Figure 8 for testing for weak instruments. According to test results, there is no strong
evidence to reject any of the three null hypotheses, H0 : The BLP type instruments are weak, H0 : The Hausman
type instruments are weak, and H0 : A mix of both BLP type and Hausman type instruments is weak. The results
on the primary coefficient of interest, Fare, are insensitive to the choice of instruments so despite the low first
stage R2 on ln
(
s jt/gt
)
, the results look sufficiently reliable for our analysis, especially given that the Fare results
for this route are similar to those for the other routes.
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2.4.1.2 Jeju-Busan Route (r = 2) (αr > 0)23
Table 2.6: Results with Nested Logit Demand Instrumental variable (IV) two-stage least
squares (2SLS) regression: Jeju-Busan route ( r = 2)
Dependent variable, ln(s jt)− ln(s0t)
2. Jeju-Busan route ( r = 2 ) (1) (2) (3)   
Explanatory variable BLP Hausman Mix   
0.159** 0.0982*** 0.0824***
(0.049) (0.025) (0.025)
0.779*** 0.966*** 0.738***
(0.059) (0.119) (0.063)
0.847*** 0.344 0.901***
(0.154) (0.305) (0.158)
1.713*** 1.865*** 1.939***
(0.477) (0.463) (0.462)
0.125** 0.068 0.155***
(0.040) (0.053) (0.040)
-0.324*** -0.244*** -0.312***
(0.053) (0.061) (0.053)
0.319*** 0.310*** 0.268***
(0.050) (0.047) (0.041)
0.136*** 0.149*** 0.129***
(0.013) (0.015) (0.014)
-0.0163*** -0.0204*** -0.0165***
(0.003) (0.004) (0.003)
-1.46 -2.119* -1.53
(0.859) (0.917) (0.795)
0.474 0.765* 0.524
(0.363) (0.383) (0.333)
N observation 219 219 219   
First stage partial R square: Fare 0.164 0.773 0.856
First stage partial R square: ln(sjt/gt) 0.346 0.106 0.404
Robust standard errors in parentheses; * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001
August (Peak)
Semi-peak 
Meteorological variable_snowfall
GRDP per capita of Busan
Constant
Aircraft size
Airtime duration
Fare
ln(sjt/gt)
Flight frequency
Lunch ClusterDIFF
The coefficient on price enters with a negative sign in equation (3), meaning that a pos-
itive alpha (αr > 0) indicates a negatively sloped demand curve. For the Jeju-Busan route,
most coefficients of flight attributes are of the expected sign, but the coefficients for flight fre-
quency and aircraft size are not significant under the second specification using the Hausman
type instruments. One possible explanation for this insignificance is due to low first stage
23The demand equation is ln(s jt)− ln(s0t) = X rJe ju, jtβr−αr prjt + γrzit +σrln
(
s jt/gt
)
+ξ jt eq(3).
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fit for the within group share variable ln
(
s jt/gt
)
. In the presence of weak instruments, this
endogenous variable remains significant at the 5% level with a much greater point estimate
(0.966) than in the other two columns. This estimate may be associated with measurement
error in the first stage correlation with some of the airline characteristics. In common with the
Jeju-Seoul route, evenly scheduled flights over lunchtime would provide more utility on the
Jeju-Busan route. August dummy and semi-peak dummy are positive and also significant.
Year dummy variables and airline specific dummy variables are also included for controlling
time-fixed effects and firm-fixed effects, respectively, but not displayed in the table.
In a rough way, the BLP type instruments in column (i) tend to explain the within group
share variable ln
(
s jt/gt
)
well while the Hausman type instruments are strong in explaining
the fare variable in column (ii).24
24See Appendix Figure 8 for testing for weak instruments. Testing for weak instruments led to rejecting the
null hypothesis, H0 : A mix of both BLP type and Hausman type instruments is weak. There is no statistical
evidence to reject the null hypotheses, H0 : The BLP type instruments are weak and H0 : The Hausman type
instruments are weak.
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2.4.1.3 Jeju-Cheongju Route ( r = 3 ) (αr > 0)25
Table 2.7: Results with Nested Logit Demand Instrumental variable (IV) two-stage least
squares (2SLS) regression: Jeju-Cheongju route ( r = 3)
Dependent variable, ln(s jt)− ln(s0t)
3. Jeju-Cheongju route ( r = 3 ) (1) (2) (3)
Explanatory variable BLP Hausman Mix
0.158*** 0.0677** 0.0748***
(0.039) (0.023) (0.021)
0.508*** 0.357*** 0.475***
(0.097) (0.105) (0.077)
2.730*** 3.668*** 3.121***
(0.595) (0.770) (0.613)
-0.0726*  -0.0543 -0.0585
(0.031) (0.033) (0.031)
0.406*** 0.539*** 0.467***
(0.066) (0.081) (0.067)
0.010 0.012 0.013
(0.022) (0.024) (0.022)
0.288*** 0.209*** 0.220***
(0.043) (0.034) (0.034)
0.0960*** 0.0821*** 0.0856***
(0.013) (0.014) (0.014)
-0.00242 -0.0000447 -0.00078
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
2.264 4.443* 4.237*  
(1.675) (1.812) (1.692)
-0.246 -0.387** -0.381** 
(0.127) (0.138) (0.129)
N observation 229 229 229
First stage partial R square: Fare 0.288 0.930 0.970
First stage partial R square: ln(sjt/gt) 0.510 0.297 0.518
Robust standard errors in parentheses; * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001
August (Peak)
Semi-peak 
Meteorological variable_snowfall
GRDP per capita of Cheongju
Constant
Airtime duration
Fare
ln(sjt/gt)
Flight frequency
Lunch ClusterDIFF
Aircraft size
The coefficient on price enters with a negative sign in equation (3), meaning that a pos-
itive alpha (αr > 0) indicates a negatively sloped demand curve. For the Jeju-Cheongju
route, most coefficients of product attributes are of the expected sign. Greater choices of
flight frequency during a day and larger aircraft would provide higher utility for air trav-
elers. And, although the positive coefficients on airtime duration in all columns are not of
25The demand equation is ln(s jt)− ln(s0t) = X rJe ju, jtβr−αr prjt + γrzit +σrln
(
s jt/gt
)
+ξ jt eq(3).
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expected sign, these are statistically insignificant. One possible explanation for this insignif-
icance is due to small variation for the airtime duration variable across airline carriers. The
impacts of the lunch ClusterDIFF variable on passengers’ utilities are all negative across
columns (i)− (iii) and only statistically significant under the column (i) specification using
the BLP type instruments. Thus, the point estimates results would not support the prediction
Departure flight schedules around lunchtime (10AM-4PM) are more evenly distributed in
the Jeju island routes than in the inland routes. As vacationers’ most preferred departure
times are concentrated into lunchtime, I expected to find the positive coefficient on the lunch
ClusterDIFF . Strong seasonality effects are also observed on the Jeju-Cheongju route. Year
dummy variables and airline specific dummy variables are also included for controlling time-
fixed effects and firm-fixed effects, respectively, but not displayed in the table.
With regard to the first stage partial R2 statistics for two endogenous variables, fare prjt
and within group share ln
(
s jt/gt
)
, the BLP type instruments in column (i) tend to explain the
within group share variable well while the Hausman type instruments are strong in explaining
the fare variable in column (ii) .26
26See Appendix Figure 8 for testing for weak instruments. Testing for weak instruments led to rejecting
each of three null hypotheses, H0 : The BLP type instruments are weak, H0 : The Hausman type instruments
are weak, and H0 : A mix of both BLP type and Hausman type instruments is weak.
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2.4.1.4 Jeju-Daegu Route ( r = 4 ) (αr > 0)27
Table 2.8: Results with Nested Logit Demand Instrumental variable (IV) two-stage least
squares (2SLS) regression: Jeju-Daegu route ( r = 4 )
Dependent variable, ln(s jt)− ln(s0t)
4. Jeju-Daegu route ( r = 4 ) (1) (2) (3)   
Explanatory variable BLP Hausman Mix   
0.0808** 0.0960*** 0.0968***
(0.025) (0.023) (0.023)
1.036*** 0.934*** 0.843***
(0.261) (0.140) (0.185)
3.166* 3.594*** 3.916***
(1.249) (0.807) (0.787)
0.246*** 0.237*** 0.232***
(0.045) (0.039) (0.040)
0.917*** 0.891*** 0.889***
(0.208) (0.199) (0.197)
0.219*** 0.226*** 0.225***
(0.036) (0.037) (0.038)
0.0979*** 0.0954*** 0.0926***
(0.016) (0.014) (0.014)
­0.00930*** ­0.00922*** ­0.00918***
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
0.681 0.617 0.687
(0.731) (0.696) (0.707)
­0.215 ­0.2 ­0.216
(0.179) (0.171) (0.174)
N observation 161 161 161
First stage partial R square: Fare 0.494 0.973 0.983
First stage partial R square: ln(sjt/gt) 0.042 0.092 0.104
Robust standard errors in parentheses; * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001
Semi-peak 
Meteorological variable_snowfall
GRDP per capita of Daegu
Constant
Fare
ln(sjt/gt)
Flight frequency
Lunch ClusterDIFF
Aircraft size
August (Peak)
The coefficient on price enters with a negative sign in equation (3), meaning that a pos-
itive alpha (αr > 0) indicates a negatively sloped demand curve. For the Jeju-Daegu route,
airtime duration variable cannot be included in the estimation equation because there is no
variation in the airtime duration across airline carriers. Most coefficients of flight attributes
are of the expected sign in the column (ii) and (iii) specifications, but not in the column (i)
specification using only the BLP style instruments. In particular, the nesting parameter σr
27The demand equation is ln(s jt)− ln(s0t) = X rJe ju, jtβr−αr prjt + γrzit +σrln
(
s jt/gt
)
+ξ jt eq(3).
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is estimated to be larger than 1 (1.036). Note that this estimate should satisfy the necessary
restriction for the nested logit model to be consistent with utility maximization: significantly
less than 1 and greater than 0, that is, there is a segmentation between the inside good, g = 1
air travel choice, and the outside good, g = 0. Thus, the specification using only the BLP
style instruments (column (i)) is not consistent with random utility maximization theory. At
the same time that the estimate forσr is outside of the reasonable zone bounded above by 1,
it remains significant at the 5% level.
Passengers would gain more utility from greater choices of flights during a day and
evenly scheduled flights around lunch hour. Larger aircraft would provide higher utility
for passengers. Strong seasonality effects are also observed on the Jeju-Daegu route. Year
dummy variables and airline specific dummy variables are also included for controlling time-
fixed effects and firm-fixed effects, respectively, but not displayed in the table. All three type
instruments are less effective in explaining the within group share variable, ln
(
s jt/gt
)
because
s jt/gt would potentially drop out with airline fixed effects.28
28See Appendix Figure 8 for testing for weak instruments. There is no strong evidence to reject any of the
three null hypotheses, H0 : The BLP type instruments are weak, H0 : The Hausman type instruments are weak,
and H0 : A mix of both BLP type and Hausman type instruments is weak. One need not examine this more
closely because the primary coefficient of interest, on Fare, is insensitive to the choice of instruments.
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2.4.1.5 Jeju-Gwangju Route ( r = 5) (αr > 0)29
Table 2.9: Results with Nested Logit Demand Instrumental variable (IV) two-stage least
squares (2SLS) regression: Jeju-Gwangju route ( r = 5 )
Dependent variable, ln(s jt)− ln(s0t)
5. Jeju-Gwangju route ( r = 5 ) (1) (2) (3)   
Explanatory variable BLP Hausman Mix   
0.0940* 0.0658** 0.0704** 
(0.038) (0.023) (0.022)
0.438** 0.884** 0.419** 
(0.150) (0.317) (0.151)
3.769*** 2.566** 3.844***
(0.612) (0.933) (0.609)
-0.106 -0.0509 -0.131
(0.113) (0.130) (0.116)
-0.245 -0.407 -0.226
(0.236) (0.280) (0.236)
0.150*** 0.146*** 0.138***
(0.033) (0.030) (0.028)
0.0677*** 0.0725*** 0.0660***
(0.013) (0.013) (0.013)
-0.00742*** -0.00773*** -0.00739***
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
-0.556 -0.455 -0.127
(1.225) (1.149) (1.165)
0.0221 0.0101 -0.0445
(0.198) (0.187) (0.190)
N observation 156 156 156
First stage partial R square: Fare 0.346 0.959 0.975
First stage partial R square: ln(sjt/gt) 0.754 0.216 0.766
Robust standard errors in parentheses; * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001
Semi-peak 
Meteorological variable_snowfall
GRDP per capita of Gwangju
Constant
Fare
ln(sjt/gt)
Flight frequency
Lunch ClusterDIFF
Aircraft size
August (Peak)
The coefficient on price enters with a negative sign in equation (3), meaning that a pos-
itive alpha (αr > 0) indicates a negatively sloped demand curve. For the Jeju-Gwangju
route, where no entrant was observed, the airtime duration variable could not be included
in the estimation equation given that this route has only been operated by the two major
airlines, Korean Air (KAL) and Asiana Airlines (AAR), creating no variation in airtime du-
ration across airline carriers. The negative coefficients for aircraft size are not of expected
29The demand equation is ln(s jt)− ln(s0t) = X rJe ju, jtβr−αr prjt + γrzit +σrln
(
s jt/gt
)
+ξ jt eq(3).
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sign, but are not significant across all three specifications. Passengers would gain utility
from greater choices of flights during a day. The coefficients on the lunch ClusterDIFF
are neither positive nor statistically significant. The point estimates results for the lunch
ClusterDIFF variable would not support the prediction Departure flight schedules around
lunchtime (10AM-4PM) are more evenly distributed in the Jeju island routes than in the in-
land routes. As vacationers’ most preferred departure times are concentrated into lunchtime,
I expected to find the positive coefficient on the lunch ClusterDIFF . Year dummy variables
and airline specific dummy variables are also included for controlling for time-fixed effects
and firm-fixed effects, respectively, but are not displayed in the table.
In a rough way, the BLP type instruments in column (i) tend to explain the within group
share variable well while the Hausman type instruments are strong in explaining the fare
variable in column (ii).30
30See Appendix Figure 8 for testing for weak instruments. Testing for weak instruments led to rejecting
each of three null hypotheses, H0 : The BLP type instruments are weak, H0 : The Hausman type instruments
are weak, and H0 : A mix of both BLP type and Hausman type instruments is weak.
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2.4.1.6 Seoul-Busan Route ( r = 6) (αr > 0)31
Table 2.10: Results with Nested Logit Demand Instrumental variables (IV) two-stage least
squares (2SLS) regression: Seoul-Busan route ( r = 6 )
Dependent variable,ln(s jt)− ln(s0t)
6. Seoul-Busan route ( r = 6 ) (1) (2) (3)
Explanatory variable BLP Hausman Mix
0.0627* 0.0816*** 0.0884***
(0.028) (0.015) (0.015)
0.989*** 0.869*** 0.873***
(0.033) (0.090) (0.075)
0.052 0.263 0.255*  
(0.071) (0.147) (0.122)
8.979*** 9.737*** 9.634***
(2.463) (2.452) (2.502)
-0.161 -0.0696 -0.0767
(0.127) (0.180) (0.169)
0.012 0.0321* 0.0354*  
(0.019) (0.016) (0.017)
0.0261** 0.0264** 0.0272** 
(0.010) (0.010) (0.010)
-0.516 -0.357 -0.453
(0.505) (0.516) (0.444)
0.238 0.164 0.202
(0.206) (0.214) (0.183)
N observation 168 168 168   
First stage partial R square: Fare 0.175 0.773 0.796
First stage partial R square: ln(sjt/gt) 0.327 0.063 0.379
Robust standard errors in parentheses; * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001
Semi-peak 
GRDP per capita of Busan
Constant
Fare
ln(sjt/gt)
Flight frequency
Lunch ClusterDIFF
Aircraft size
August (Peak)
The coefficient on price enters with a negative sign in equation (6), meaning that a posi-
tive alpha (αr > 0) indicates a negatively sloped demand curve. For the Seoul-Busan route,
the largest inland route for LCCs, the airtime duration variable cannot be included in the
estimation equation because there is no variation in airtime duration across airline carriers.
One possible explanation is that there are special differences between very short-haul routes
and routes which are longer-haul (in fact it only takes less than 60 minutes for most of the
31The demand equation is ln(s jt)− ln(s0t) = X rInland, jtβr−αr prjt + γrzit +σrln
(
s jt/gt
)
+ξ jt , eq(6).
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inland routes). The coefficients for flight frequency are insignificant under the first two spec-
ifications, but are of expected sign. The coefficients for aircraft size are not significant across
all three specifications. The positive impacts of the lunch ClusterDIFF on consumers’ util-
ities are not expected since the inland routes are primarily for business travelers with a less
strong preference for evenly scheduled flights at lunchtime than for the Jeju island routes.The
point estimates results imply that evenly distributed flights over lunch hours would provide
higher utility for passengers due to greater choices of departure flight times. In this context,
the estimation results on the Seoul-Busan route would not support the prediction Departure
flight schedules around lunchtime (10AM-4PM) are more evenly distributed in the Jeju is-
land routes than in the inland routes. The August dummy effect are relatively weak when
compared with the Jeju island routes. This is not surprising given that business travel is less
likely to be seasonal than vacation travel.
The BLP type instruments are weak in explaining the fare variable. In fact most physical
flight characteristics, i.e., aircraft type and airtime duration, are constant over time, thus
would be probably weak in this context. Possibly as a consequence of weak instruments,
the fare variable is less significant in the final stage (at the 5% significance level of the test)
whereas it is highly significant in the other two specifications. This finding is consistent with
the expected positive correlation between fares and unobserved flight quality that would
generate a downward bias in the fare coefficient estimate in column (i). On the other hand,
the Hausman type instruments are weakly correlated endogenous regressor, the within group
share variable, ln
(
s jt/gt
)
, having a poor fit of the first stage partial R2, 0.063. In the presence
of weak instruments, this endogenous variable remains significant at the 5% level of the
test.32
32See Appendix for testing for weak instruments. According to testing for weak instruments, there is no
strong evidence to reject any of the three null hypotheses, H0 : The BLP type instruments are weak, H0 : The
Hausman type instruments are weak, and H0 : A mix of both BLP type and Hausman type instruments is weak.
The results on the primary coefficient of interest, Fare, are insensitive to the choice of instruments and are
similar to the Fare coefficient in the other inland route and the five Jeju island routes. So despite not being able
to reject the weak instruments null hypotheses, the result look reasonable for our analysis.
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2.4.1.7 Seoul-Gwangju Route (r = 7) (αr > 0)33
Table 2.11: Results with Nested Logit Demand Instrumental variables (IV) two-stage least
squares (2SLS) regression: Seoul-Gwangju route ( r = 7)
Dependent variable, ln(s jt)− ln(s0t)
 7. Seoul-Gwangju route ( r = 7 ) (1) (2) (3)   
Explanatory variable BLP Hausman Mix   
0.033 0.0892*** 0.0823***
(0.111) (0.018) (0.016)
0.488** 0.527* 0.654***
(0.188) (0.214) (0.144)
4.089*** 4.068*** 3.457***
(1.215) (1.061) (0.785)
0.295** 0.309*** 0.291***
(0.099) (0.071) (0.068)
2.793 3.782 5.021** 
(1.797) (2.369) (1.744)
­0.0479 ­0.0207 ­0.0181
(0.046) (0.014) (0.013)
­0.00341 ­0.000143 0.00173
(0.011) (0.010) (0.010)
­1.36 ­2.608*** ­2.510***
(2.455) (0.712) (0.699)
0.255 0.449*** 0.433***
(0.385) (0.119) (0.117)
N observation 156 156 156   
First stage partial R square: Fare 0.022 0.821 0.876
First stage partial R square: ln(sjt/gt) 0.217 0.181 0.251
Robust standard errors in parentheses; * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001
Semi-peak 
GRDP per capita of Gwangju
Constant
Fare
ln(sjt/gt)
Flight frequency
Lunch ClusterDIFF
Aircraft size
August (Peak)
The coefficient on price enters with a negative sign in equation (6), meaning that a pos-
itive alpha (αr > 0) indicates a negatively sloped demand curve. For the Seoul-Gwangju
route, where only the two major airlines fly, the airtime duration variable could not be in-
cluded in the estimation equation because there is no variation in airtime duration across
airline carriers. Most coefficients of flight attributes are of the expected sign. Under the
BLP type instruments in column (i) Fare, an endogenous variable, is statistically insignifi-
cant with a much lower point estimate (0.033) than in the other two columns. The BLP type
33The demand equation is ln(s jt)− ln(s0t) = X rInland, jtβr−αr prjt + γrzit +σrln
(
s jt/gt
)
+ξ jt , eq(6).
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instruments are very weak in explaining the Fare variable, prjt , specifically the first stage R
2
for the Fare variable has a poor fit of only 0.022. In the presence of weak instruments, car-
rier specific unobserved quality or brand reputation could be possibly correlated to prices,
causing the point estimate to drop. Possibly as a consequence of the poor first stage fit, the
Fare variable is not significant in the second stage estimation.
In a similar way in the Seoul-Busan route, the positive impacts of the lunch ClusterDIFF
on consumers’ utilities are not expected since the inland routes are primarily for business
travelers with a less strong preference for evenly scheduled flights at lunchtime than for the
Jeju island routes. The point estimates results the lunch ClusterDIFF imply that evenly dis-
tributed flights over lunch hours would provide higher utility for passengers due to greater
choices of departure flight times. In this context, the estimation results on the Seoul-Busan
route would not support the prediction Departure flight schedules around lunchtime (10AM-
4PM) are more evenly distributed in the Jeju island routes than in the inland routes. The
August dummy and semi-peak dummy variable capture the effects of seasonality in air travel
demand. The effects are statistically insignificant, but this is not surprising given that busi-
ness travel is less likely to be seasonal than vacation travel. In a rough way, the BLP type
instruments in column(i) tend to explain the within group share variable well while the Haus-
man type instruments are strong in explaining the fare variable in column(ii).34
In summarizing the route-by-route demand estimation results, three different specifica-
tions are compared. First, the primary coefficient of interest, Fare, are insensitive to the
choice of instruments for the Jeju island routes. One can reject the hypothesis that instru-
ments are weak in the first stage estimation for at least one column in the demand estimation
results tables of the three routes: Jeju-Busan (r = 2), Jeju-Cheongju (r = 3), and Jeju-Gwangju
(r = 5). It would imply that we can reject weak instruments may be generating undesirable
34See Appendix Figure 8 for testing for weak instruments. Testing for weak instruments led to rejecting the
null hypotheses, H0 : The Hausman type instruments are weak and H0 : A mix of both BLP type and Hausman
type instruments is weak. There is no statistical evidence to reject the null hypothesis H0 : The BLP type
instruments are weak. One need not examine this more closely because coefficient results on fare are robust.
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biases in point estimation results for these three routes. Given that the Fare results for other
two Jeju island routes (Jeju-Seoul (r = 1) and Jeju-Daegu (r = 4)) are robust within each of
these two routes, and are similar to those of other three Jeju island routes mentioned earlier,
the Jeju island air travel demand estimation results look reliable for our analysis. The BLP
type instruments - the observed exogenous flight characteristics, excluding fares, from other
airline carriers within each route - are effective in explaining the within group share variable
in the first stage estimation. On the other hand, the Hausman type instruments are more ef-
fective in explaining the Fare variable in the first stage estimation in that the prices in other
Jeju island routes of the same airline carrier are used as the instruments.
Second, for the inland routes, the estimates results on Fare are less robust on the Seoul-
Gwangju route (r = 7). In the presence of weak instruments, the point estimate under the BLP
type instruments is insignificant at 5% significance level. Less variation in flight attributes,
i.e., the airtime duration variable has no variation across carriers, would result in less varia-
tion in the BLP type instruments. One can reject the hypothesis that instruments are weak in
the first stage estimation for at least one column in the demand estimation results tables of
the Seoul-Busan route (r = 6). Since the coefficient on the fare variable, our primary focus,
is mostly robust, we proceed using these estimates. Like the Jeju island routes, the BLP
type instruments are effective in explaining the within group share variable in the first stage
estimation while the Hausman type instruments are effective in explaining the Fare variable
in the first stage estimation.
Indeed for most flight characteristics variables the other coefficients are robust across all
7 routes including five Jeju island routes and two inland routes. These are estimated to have
expected effects. Frequent flights, shorter airtime duration, and larger aircraft would provide
higher utility for air travelers. But, evenly scheduled flights over lunchtime are estimated
to have route-specific effects across all 7 routes. Strong seasonality is observed on the Jeju
island routes while weak seasonality is observed on the inland routes.
54
2.4.2 Do Routes Look Similar
2.4.2.1 Jeju Island Routes
Table 2.12 provides the main parameters of interest for the Jeju island routes r = 1,2,3,4,5,
αr and σr, which determine the estimated price elasticities and price cost markups. Note
that these estimates using the Hausman type instruments (column (ii) in Tables 2.5, 2.6, 2.7,
2.8, and 2.9 for each of the five Jeju island routes) satisfy the necessary restrictions for the
nested logit model to be consistent with utility maximization. Air passengers respond to a
price increase by reducing demand ( αr > 0 ∀r = 1,2,3,4,5).35 Since the nesting parameter
σr, the parameter of within group share variable ln
(
s jt/gt
)
, is less than 1 and significantly
greater than 0 for all five Jeju island routes,36 there is a segmentation between the “inside
good” group, g = 1, and the “outside good” group, g = 0.
Table 2.12: Estimates of main parameters of interest (αr > 0) for the Jeju island routes
r = 1,2,3,4,5 from the demand specification using the Hausman type instruments only
Jeju-Seoul Jeju-Busan Jeju-Cheongju Jeju-Daegu Jeju-Gwangju 
0.0572* 0.0982*** 0.0904*** 0.096*** 0.0658**
(0.024) (0.025) (0.024) (0.023) (0.023)
0.755*** 0.966*** 0.303* 0.934*** 0.884**
(0.101) (0.119) (0.119) (0.140) (0.317)
Dependent LCCs JNA   ABL,JNA None None None
Independent LCCS HAN,ONA,ESR,TWB JJA,ONA, JJA, ESR ONA None
Robust standard errors are in round parenthesis; Significance levels are *5%,**1%,***0.1%. 
# of entrants
Explanatory variable Parameter
Jeju island route
Fare
ln(sjt/gt)

jeju
r
r
r
First, if there are a priori expectations of no differences in terms of demand sensitivity to
price within the Jeju island routes, I would expect the fare coefficient α to be the same across
35The coefficient on price enters with a negative sign in equation (6), meaning that a positive alpha (αr > 0)
indicates a negatively sloped demand curve.
36The null hypothesis that σr = 1 is tested for each of the Jeju island routes. One can reject the null hypothesis
for the Jeju-Seoul route and the Jeju-Cheongju route respectively at 5% significance level. One can reject the
null hypothesis for the Jeju-Busan route at 15% significance level. However, there is no statistical evidence to
reject the null hypothesis for the Jeju-Daegu route or the Jeju-Gwangju route.
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the Jeju island routes. The Wald test, a posteriori contrast analysis, for the joint equality for
the fare coefficients is used to test the null hypothesis, H0 : α1 = α2 = α3 = α4 = α5, a com-
mon sensitivity to price, αJe ju = αr, ∀r = 1,2,3,4,5 for the Jeju island routes in eq(3).37
1. Fare coefficient
Chi2(4) = 2.56
Prob >Chi2 = 0.6334
The Chi2 value generated by the Wald test along with the associated p-value indicates that
there is no statistical evidence to reject the null hypothesis. Thus, I may assume a common
fare coefficient within the Jeju island routes,αJe ju = αr, ∀r = 1,2,3,4,5.
Second, if there are a priori expectations of different air travel demand sensitivities to
flight characteristics, such as flight frequency, aircraft size, and airtime duration within the
Jeju island routes, I would expect the flight characteristics to have different effects for dif-
ferent routes. The Wald tests for the joint equality for each flight characteristic coefficient
across the Jeju island routes, H0 : β1 = β2 = β3 = β4 = β5, are also tested, separately.38
2. Flight frequency
Chi2(4) = 108.48
Prob >Chi2 = 0.000
3. Aircraft size
Chi2(4) = 524.13
37The Wald test is performed using Stata 11’s test command.
38The Wald test is performed using Stata 11’s test command. Similarly, the null hypothesis H0 : σ1 =
σ2 = σ3 = σ4 = σ5 is tested. The Wald test can reject the null, implying that there are route-specific nesting
parameters.
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Prob >Chi2 = 0.000
4. Airtime duration
Chi2(4) = 56.45
Prob >Chi2 = 0.000
5. Lunch ClusterDIFF
Chi2(4) = 1199.08
Prob >Chi2 = 0.000
The Wald test can reject the null hypothesis, implying that air travelers respond to flight
frequency, aircraft size, and airtime duration in different ways across the Jeju routes. Thus,
the flight characteristics should be permitted to have route-specific effects. In addition, lunch
cluster flights have different effects on the routes, i.e., the benefits from evenly distributed
departure flights during lunchtime differ across the Jeju island routes.
Specifically, the joint equality tests for the coefficients for the month of August and for
the semi-peak months dummy variables across the Jeju island routes, H0 : β1 = β2 = β3 =
β4 = β5, are conducted, separately.
6. Seasonality effect: August month
Chi2(4) = 17.12
Prob >Chi2 = 0.0018
7. Seasonality effect: Semi-peak months
Chi2(4) = 9.95
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Prob >Chi2 = 0.0413
The route specific effects are also found in the August month and semi-peak months
dummy variables (seasonality effects).
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2.4.2.2 Inland Routes
Table 2.13 provides the main parameters of interest for the inland routes r = 6,7, αr and
σr, which determine the estimated price elasticities and price cost markups. Note that these
estimates using the Hausman type instruments (column (ii) in Tables 2.10 and 2.11 for each
of the two inland routes) satisfy the necessary restrictions for the nested logit model to be
consistent with utility maximization. Since the nesting parameter σr, the parameter for the
within group share variable ln
(
s jt/gt
)
, is less than 1 and significantly greater than 0,39 there
is a segmentation between the “inside good” group, g = 1, and the “outside good” group,
g = 0.
Table 2.13: Estimates of main parameters of interest (αr) for the inland routes r = 6,7 from
the demand specification using the Hausman type instruments only
Seoul-Busan Seoul-Gwangju
0.0816*** 0.0892***
(0.015) (0.018)
0.869*** 0.527*
(0.090) (0.214)
Dependent LCCs ABL, JNA None
Independent LCCS None None
Robust standard errors are in round parenthesis; Significance levels are *5%,**1%,***0.1%. 
# of entrants
Explanatory variable Parameter
 Inland route
Fare
ln(sjt/gt)
r
r
First, if there are a priori expectations of no differences in terms of demand sensitivity
to price within the inland routes, I would expect the fare coefficient α to be the same across
the inland routes. The Wald test, a posteriori contrast analysis for the joint equality for the
39The null hypothesis that σr = 1 is tested for each of the inland routes. One can reject the null hypothesis
for the Seoul-Gwangju route at 5% significance level. One can reject the null hypothesis for the Seoul-Busan
route at 15% significance level.
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fare coefficients is used to test the null hypothesis, H0 : α6 = α7, a common sensitivity to
price,αInland = αr, ∀r = 6,7 for the inland routes in eq(6).40
1. Fare coefficient
Chi2(1) = 2.37
Prob >Chi2 = 0.1236
The Chi2 value generated by the Wald test along with the associated p-value indicates that
there is no statistical evidence to reject the null hypothesis. Thus, I may assume a common
fare coefficient αInland = αr, ∀r = 6,7 for the inland routes.
Second, if there are a priori expectations of different air travel demand sensitivities to
flight characteristics, such as flight frequency, aircraft size, and airtime duration within the
inland routes, I would expect the flight characteristics to have different effects for different
routes. The Wald tests for the joint equality for each flight characteristic across the inland
routes, H0 : β6 = β7, are also tested, separately.41
2. Flight frequency
Chi2(1) = 18.77
Prob >Chi2 = 0.000
3. Aircraft size
Chi2(1) = 0.72
Prob >Chi2 = 0.3976
40The Wald test is performed using Stata 11’s test command.
41The Wald test is performed using Stata 11’s test command. Similarly, the null hypothesis H0 : σ6 = σ7 is
tested. The Wald test can reject the null, implying that there are route-specific nesting parameters.
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4. Airtime duration42
5. Lunch ClusterDIFF
Chi2(1) = 11.33
Prob >Chi2 = 0.0008
The Wald test can reject the null hypothesis, implying that air travelers respond to flight
frequency in different ways across the inland routes, but have common sensitivity with re-
spect to air craft size. The two inland routes have route-specific lunch cluster flights effects.
In addition, the joint equality tests for the coefficients for the month of August and for the
semi-peak months dummy variables across the inland routes, H0 : β6 = β7, are conducted,
separately.
6. Seasonality effect: August month
Chi2(1) = 2.24
Prob >Chi2 = 0.1347
7. Seasonality effect: Semi-peak months
Chi2(1) = 4.06
Prob >Chi2 = 0.0439
Inland travelers respond to August in the same way, but the route specific effects are found
in the semi-peak months dummy variables (seasonality effects).
42For the inland routes, airtime duration variables are time invariant given a route. So the variable is dropped.
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2.4.2.3 Joint Constraint for All Routes, ∀r = 1,2,3,4,5,6,7, Jeju Island and Inland
Routes
The Jeju island routes and the inland routes have different alternative transportation modes
and types of travelers. For the inland routes, alternatives include bus, rail, and automobile
transportation. To get to Jeju island, however, the ferry is really not a viable option. And
with respect to types of travelers, the Jeju island routes are primarily for vacation travelers,
and the inland routes attract a greater number of business travelers.
Even though there are a priori expectations of different air travel demand sensitivity to
price between the Jeju island routes and the inland routes, the joint equality test for the fare
coefficients across the Jeju island routes and the inland routes, H0 : α1 = α2 = α3 = α4 =
α5 = α6 = α7 (αJe ju = αInland = αr ∀r = 1,2,3,4,5,6,7) is conducted for completeness.43
1. Fare
Chi2(6) = 5.86
Prob >Chi2 = 0.4385
There is no statistical evidence to reject the null hypothesis of the same fare coefficients
across all routes. Thus, I may assume a common fare coefficient across all routes,α .
From the previous section (2.4.2.1. Jeju island routes), air travelers respond to flight
frequency, aircraft size, and airtime duration in different ways across the Jeju island routes.
Section 2.4.2.2. Inland routes shows that air travelers respond to flight frequency and aircraft
size in different ways across the inland routes. Thus, there are a priori expectations of route-
specific air travel demand sensitivities to flight characteristics. In short, I propose a joint
constrained model in terms of price sensitivity where the parameter α is constrained to be
the same across all seven routes, but the flight characteristics should be permitted to have
43The Wald test is performed using Stata11.
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different effects for different routes (route-specific βrs).
This chapter has carefully discussed the demand side. The nested logit model describes
the demand structure of the air travel industry. The air travel demand models for nonstop
Jeju island routes and inland routes are estimated, respectively, because these routes have
different transportation modes and types of travelers. In the presence of two endogenous
variables, three different demand model specifications that only differ in the instruments
are discussed; the BLP style instruments, the Hausman style instruments, and the combined
instruments of the BLP style and the Hausman style. Fare coefficients are estimated to be in
a range between 0.057 to 0.159 (in absolute size). Most of the estimated coefficients for the
flight characteristics have the expected sign. Greater choices of flight frequency and larger
aircraft would give higher utility for air travelers. The shorter air time duration is, the more
an air traveler would enjoy the service. Strong seasonality is observed on the Jeju island
routes while weak seasonality is observed on the inland routes.
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Chapter 3
The Supply Side
3.1 The Theoretical Model
3.1.1 Single Product Firm
In the air travel industry study with each carrier operating a differentiated flight, we present
a theoretical model of the supply side based on consumer heterogeneity. Air travelers’ pre-
ferred departure times are non-uniformly distributed around the 24-hour clock. With dif-
ferentiation by departure times, air travel demand would be non-uniformly distributed, e.g.,
given a price air passengers find the flight that is most close to their preferred departure time
convenience. This heterogeneity might show different patterns across the Jeju island routes
and the inland routes. For the Jeju island routes, air travel demand is expected to be high for
flights that either depart or arrive during lunchtime given that a time zone change effect is
irrelevant in all domestic routes in Korea and even the longest direct route between Jeju is-
land and Seoul takes less than 90 minutes. Vacationers may depart from the island before or
around 11am-noon as they have to check out of hotels by 11am. In turn, they would prefer to
fly around noon from an origin city in order to arrive at the island around 2pm-3pm because
hotel guests can check in after 3pm. For the inland routes, business travelers probably differ
64
from vacationers: their preferred departure times are expected to be concentrated into a few
hours of a day, either early morning or late evening. Thus, air travel demand for the inland
routes is expected to be lower for flights that either depart or arrive during lunchtime.
Along with the demand-driven motivation, fuel costs and capacity constraints provide an
incentive for a carrier to schedule more frequent flights for the highest-demand hours (flights
departing at lunchtime for the Jeju island routes) as opposed to less frequent flights for the
low-demand hours. Since each route is a part of a network and the plane used on one route
is in use in prior and subsequent routes, carriers strategically schedule departure flights and
allocate flight frequencies between routes, taking into account overall (all domestic routes)
profitability.
Airlines compete on prices as well as other quality factors, i.e., scheduling departure time
or the number of flights (flight frequency). Carriers charge a wide range of prices on most
routes, price discriminating by departure times. However, no disaggregated data at the route-
carrier-departure flight time-day level is available. Korea airport corporation (KAC) data
only contain aggregate information at the route-carrier-month level, including the number of
passengers and the number of flights on each route. With insufficient data, we assume that
there are J varieties of a differentiated flights offered by J different airlines, each of which
charges a single price for all flights departing on the same day regardless of the departure
times.1
At time t = 1, . . . ,T , each of J carriers is assumed to be a price setter in a static Bertrand
price competition model.2 Given the attributes and air fares of competing carrier’s flights,
airline carrier j ∈ {1, . . . , J} maximizes route and time specific profits Πrjt :
Πrjt =
(
prjt−mcrjt
)
Ms jt−Krjt
1In this set-up, the cross effects, i.e., 9:30AM flight of Korean Air competes with another flight by the same
carrier, Korean Air, i.e., 12:00PM flight on a route, drawing fliers off each other, are not captured.
2I assume that there exists a pure strategy interior equilibrium. A unique pure strategy equilibrium for the
Bertrand game exists. Caplin and Nalebuff (1991)
65
where prjt is the observed air fare, mc
r
jt is constant marginal cost, s jt is the market share of
flight j, and Krjt is fixed costs.
3 M is the potential market dimension.4
Route and time specific first order conditions satisfying the existence of a pure-strategy
interior equilibrium for non-stop flight j operated by airline carrier j in time t are:
∂Πrjt
∂ prjt
= s jt +(prjt−mcrjt)
∂ s jt
∂ prjt
= 0
Then, a single product Bertrand Nash equilibrium (hereafter SBNE) is given by the sys-
tem of J first order conditions, i.e., for each j on the route. The pricing equation (1) can be
solely derived using the estimates from the demand side.
(prjt−mcrjt) =−s jt
1
∂ s jt
∂ prjt
(prjt−mcrjt) =
prjt∣∣∣ηrj j,t∣∣∣ (7)
where
∣∣∣ηrj j,t∣∣∣ = ∣∣∣ prjts jt ∂ s jt∂ prjt ∣∣∣ = ∣∣∣− α1−σr prjt (1−σrs jt/gt− (1−σr)s jt)∣∣∣ is route and time specific
own price elasticities of air travel demand for flight j with respect to price change in flight
j.5
Following standard assumptions in this literature, we assume that our data reflect firms
competing in short run (period by period) Nash equilibria and our (nested logit) demand
structure reflects consumer behavior. That is, our maintained hypotheses include the as-
sumption of short run Nash equilibria and nested logit demand.
3For simplicity, mcrjt is assumed to be independent of output levels.
4In the demand model, specification is completed with an outside good, no flying choice. In particular, I
define the route specific outside goods that are proportional to population and Gross Regional Domestic Product
(GRDP) per capita of origin cities, and enplanement of the route. Thus, the potential market dimension for the
Korean domestic air travel market is assumed to be proportional to those as well.
5There is no statistical evidence to reject the null hypothesis of the same fare coefficients across all routes in
chapter 2. Thus, I assume a common fare coefficient across all routes, α . I propose a joint constrained model
in terms of price sensitivity where the parameter α is constrained to be the same across all routes.
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From the maintained hypothesis of nested logit demand we can find firm level demand
elasticities in each time period. With firm level demand elasticities and the maintained hy-
pothesis of short run Nash equilibria along with the data on price and the demand elasticities
we can solve for the price markup over marginal costs, which means we can solve for the
level of marginal costs under these assumptions.
The price-cost markups in equation (7) are calculated using the parameters of the demand
system and the equilibrium price vector. Marginal cost of flight j, thus, can be directly
solved with the estimates from the fare coefficient α , the nesting parameter coefficient σr
and the level of variables, prjt , s jt and s jt/gt .
6 All observed product characteristics, i.e., aircraft
size, airtime duration and service flight frequency, affect both market shares s jt and within
nest share s jt/gt . Therefore, the implied markups and marginal costs clearly are related to
the assumed functional form for the demand specification. The pricing equation (1) would
predict lower markup for a flight having a higher own price elasticity demand in equilibrium
while it would predict a higher markup for a flight having a lower own price elasticity of
demand. The carrier’s ability to price its flight over marginal cost depends on the extent of
its market power given rivals’ prices. The size of markup is inversely related to own price
elasticities faced by the firm.
For the Jeju island routes, ηrj j,t is calculated using the estimates from demand equation
(3) (ln(s jt)− ln(s0t) = X rJe ju, jtβr−α prjt +γzit +σrln(s jt/gt)+ξ jt). For the inland routes, ηrj j,t
is calculated using the estimates from demand equation (6) (ln(s jt)− ln(s0t) = X rInland, jtβr−
α prjt + γz jt +σrln(s jt/gt)+ξ jt).
6s jt is the market share of flight j at time t. s jt/gt is the within the flying nest (g = 1) share of flight j and is
calculated by dividing total passengers carried by each airline carrier by the total passengers of the flying inside
goods.
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3.1.2 Multiproduct Firms (Joint Ownership between Major Airlines
and their Own Subsidiary LCCs)
Given that a hub-and-spoke system is not the optimal air transport network strategy for Ko-
rean domestic short haul routes, the two incumbents have developed new business strategies
in response to the entry of LCCs. The legacy carriers, Korean Air (KAL) and Asiana Air
(AAR), entered their own markets with LCC operations either replacing their prior service
or competing with it for some city pair routes. Asiana Air, the second largest legacy carrier,
rebadged to Air Busan (ABL), its own subsidiary LCC, for some routes while Korean Air,
the largest legacy carrier, flies some routes under both badges: Korean Air and Jin Air (JNA),
its own subsidiary LCC.
In the presence of a multiproduct firm such as KAL in which more than one variety is
offered by a single entity, the Multiproduct Bertrand-Nash Equilibrium concept (hereafter
MBNE, the term used by Garcia-Callego and Georgantzia (2001)) needs to be differenti-
ated from the Single-product Bertrand-Nash Equilibrium (hereafter SBNE).7 According to
the MBNE concept, incumbents would develop a large variety of products and occupy gaps
in the market that potential entrants and/or existing competitors may have exploited, thus
showing a direct competitive response. Under the multiproduct oligopoly set-up, a multi-
product firm selling X and Y may find a rise in price for X profitable if lost sales induced
by this increase are diverted to product Y, thereby potentially compensating for the lost sales
of X. If the multiproduct firms’ products are close substitutes for each other relative to other
alternatives sold by rival firms, a substantial amount of the lost sales in product X will be
diverted to product Y.8 As a consequence, the multiproduct firm may have an incentive to
charge higher prices than those predicted by the SBNE.
Let us describe the industry configuration where both a multiproduct firm and a single
7See García-Gallego and Georgantzís [2001].
8In addition, diversion ratios have been widely used in many competition cases including merger investi-
gation/simulations studies. Diversion ratios were part of the evidence in the Ryan air/Aer Lingur merger case,
after which the European Commission blocked the merger.
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product firm co-exit. Assume that there are J varieties of differentiated flights offered by
J−1 airlines during t = 1, . . . , T periods. In particular, suppose that KAL maximizes route-
specific profit at each moment in time t, choosing the prices of both KAL flights and JNA
flights which take into account the prices set by all their competitors in a static Bertrand
Nash equilibrium model.9 For each month t, Korean Air f schedules a subset Qrf t = {m, l }
of j = 1, ..m, l, .., J flights to maximize route and time specific profits:
Πrf t = (p
r
mt−mcrmt)Msmt +(prlt−mcrlt)Mslt−Krmt−Krlt
where prmt is the observed air fare for a KAL flight m, p
r
lt is the observed air fare for a
JNA flight l, mcrmt is constant marginal cost for a KAL flight m, mc
r
lt is constant marginal
cost for a JNA flight l, smt is the market share of a KAL flight m, slt is the market share of a
JNA flight l. Krmt is fixed cost for a KAL flight m and K
r
lt is fixed cost for a JNA flight l. M
is the potential market dimension.
The route and time specific first order condition satisfying the existence of a pure-strategy
interior equilibrium for a KAL flight m operated by Korean Air f in time t is
∂Πrf t
∂ prmt
= smt +(prmt−mcrmt)
∂ smt
∂ prmt
+(prlt−mcrlt)
∂ slt
∂ prmt
= 0 (8)
The route and time specific first order condition satisfying the existence of a pure-strategy
interior equilibrium for a JNA flight l operated by Korean Air f in time t is
∂Πrf t
∂ prlt
= (prmt−mcrmt)
∂ smt
∂ prlt
+ slt +(prlt−mcrlt)
∂ slt
∂ prlt
= 0 (9)
In assessing the pricing strategy of a multiproduct firm, a diversion ratio would illustrate
and predict how the firm, Korean Air in our context, strategically charges different prices for
9A unique pure strategy equilibrium for the Bertrand game exists. Caplin and Nalebuff (1991).
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its own flights (KAL flights, m) and its subsidiary LCC flights (JNA flights, l). Diversion
ratios based on the demand estimation are calculated from own- and cross- price elasticities
of demand for each product. Specifically, in a discrete choice demand model specification, a
diversion ratio can be directly calculated.
For example, KAL flights (m) to JNA flights (l) is measured by the ratio of the cross-
price elasticity of demand for JNA flights (l) (with respect to KAL flights’ price change) to
the own-price elasticity of demand for KAL flights (m) multiplied by the ratio of the market
share for JNA flights (l) to the market share for KAL flights (m).
diversion ratioml =
ηml
|ηmm| ·
sl
sm
where ηml = ∂ sl∂ pm ·
pm
sl
is cross-price elasticity of demand for flight l with respect to flight
m′s price change. Flights m and l are assumed to be substitutes for each other, thus having
positive cross-price elasticities.10 |ηmm| =
∣∣∣ ∂ sm∂ pm · pmsm ∣∣∣ is own-price elasticity of demand for
flight m with respect to its own price change.11 The diversion ratio ranges from a high of 1
to a low of 0, with the value of 1 meaning that all the lost sales for KAL flights (m) go to
JNA flights (l). That is, this quantifies how much of the demand for KAL flights switches
to JNA flights in response to the increase in price for KAL flights. Similarly, it measures
the proportion of air passengers choosing KAL flights who would consider JNA flights their
second best choice when the price for KAL increased. The higher the diversion ratio between
KAL flights and JNA flights, the closer substitutes they are.
In the same manner, the diversion from JNA flights (l) to KAL flights (m) as a result of
a price increase for JNA flights (l) can be expressed as the product of the ratio of the cross-
price elasticity to the own-price elasticity and the ratio of the demand for KAL flights (m) to
the demand for JNA flights (l) when Korean Air f raises the price for JNA flights (l).
10On the demand side, each air passenger is assumed to choose a flight which would provide the highest
utility. In this context, it is reasonable to consider flights m and l substitutes rather than complements.
11The own price elasticity is negative for normal good.
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diversion ratiolm =
ηlm
|ηll| ·
sm
sl
where ηlm = ∂ sm∂ pl ·
pl
sm
is cross-price elasticity of demand for flight m with respect to flight
l′s price change. |ηll| =
∣∣∣ ∂ sl∂ pl · plsl ∣∣∣ is own-price elasticity of demand for flight l with respect
to its price change.
Using these diversion ratios, the optimal pricing rules for each variety of Korean Air
selling two products, KAL flights (m) and JNA flights (l), are reduced to equations (8
′
) and
(9
′
).
prmt−mcrmt =
prmt
|ηmm| +(p
r
lt−mcrlt)
ηml
|ηmm|
sl
sm
(8′)
prlt−mcrlt =
prlt
|ηll| +(p
r
mt−mcrmt)
ηlm
|ηll|
sm
sl
(9′)
These pricing equations for each variety of a multiproduct firm, Korean Air f , should be
differentiated from that of a single product firm, since it captures the degree of the multi-
product firm activity. Korean Air f will charge a different price for each flight under distinct
badges, taking into account the cross price effects among them interacting on the air travel
demand. In contrast to the optimal pricing rules under the SBNE, the pricing equations (8
′
)
and (9
′
), derived under the MBNE, have additional terms involving multiproduct firm activ-
ity. These equations consist of two parts: An own product-specific effect and a multiproduct
firm-specific effect. The first term is identical to the markup term of the pricing equation (7)
under the SBNE. It is inversely proportional to its own price elasticity. The second term’s
multiproduct firm-specific markups of equations (8
′
) and (9
′
) are only relevant under the
MBNE. With regard to the equation (8
′
), this additional markup term can be expressed as
the price-cost margin for JNA flights (l) which are multiplied by KAL flights (m)’s diversion
ratio to JNA flights (l). Given that all varieties are substitutes for each other, the pricing
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equation (8
′
) under the MBNE predicts a higher markup by the amount of the additional
markup term than the SBNE. The more diversion to JNA flights (l) there are, the more likely
it is for Korean Air to be able to hedge the loss in KAL flights sales with a larger multiprod-
uct firm-specific markup. In a similar manner to equation (8
′
), the additional markup term
in equation (9
′
) can be expressed as the price-cost margin for KAL flights (m) which are
multiplied by JNA flights (l)’s diversion ratio to KAL flights (m). In the presence of these
additional markup terms, the MBNE are constructed to predict a higher markup for each
product of Korean Air f than the SBNE.
On the other hand, the route- and time-specific profit Πrjt of a single-product firm j is
given by:12
Πrjt =
(
prjt−mcrjt
)
Ms jt−Krjt
where prjt is the observed air fare, mc
r
jt is constant marginal cost, s jt is the market share
of flight j, Krjt is fixed costs. M is the potential market dimension.
The route- and time-specific first order conditions satisfying the existence of a pure-
strategy interior equilibrium for single flight firm’s flight j is
∂Πrjt
∂ prjt
= s jt +
(
prjt−mcrjt
) ∂ s jt
∂ prjt
= 0
The system of J first order conditions for time t can be stacked in the following way:
p− c =Ω−1s
where s is a J× 1 vector containing s jt terms, p− c is a J× 1 vector containing (prjt −
mcrjt) terms, and Ω is a J× J matrix whose ml th element is given by:
12Each airline carrier other than Korean Air is treated as a single-product firm, operating its own flight.
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Ωml =− ∂ slt∂ prmt if m and l are produced by the legacy carrier f , Korean Air
Ωml = 0 otherwise
The pricing equations and the demand equation(3) (equation(6)) for the Jeju island
routes (for the inland routes) can be either simultaneously estimated or separately estimated
when demand parameters are obtained first and then inserted in the pricing equation. Since
no cost data are available, price cost margins are recovered after the estimation of demand
parameters.13
3.1.3 Legacy Carrier Behavior
Many studies on deregulation in the airline industry have analyzed price effects and capacity
expansion effects. One would expect that an introduction of a new entrant induced by dereg-
ulation would lead to decreases in the prices of incumbent airlines. In response to the entry
of LCCs, incumbents may significantly reduce fares. On the other hand, incumbents might
increase capacity, i.e., flight frequency, in order to deter entry.14
Over the recent past few years the Korean legacy carriers have been faced with challenges
from LCC growth and unexpected high fuel costs. It is difficult to differentiate the survival
strategies from responses to price-driven competition from independent LCCs. In particular,
the two established full service carriers in Korea adapted strategies in response the emergence
of independent LCCs, where one of the possible responses was the creation of a dependent
LCC in the deregulated period. The two legacy carriers, Korean Air (KAL) and Asiana
Air (AAR), created their own subsidiary LCCs in order to compete with independent low
cost operators on some domestic routes. KAL’s multi-brand strategy and AAR’s rebadging
strategy were limited to the routes having either Seoul or Busan, the two largest metropolitan
13See Nevo 2000a.
14Dynamic considerations such as strategic excess capacity modeling or limit pricing modeling are not cap-
tured by either the single (3.1.1) or multiple static equilibria (3.1.2) presented in previous section.
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areas in South Korea, as an end point city.
Furthermore, these two legacy carriers show different strategies in response to the inten-
sified competition by independent LCCs. The KAL’s strategy of responding with a start-up
subsidiary, Jin air (JNA), has had only limited success as of Oct 2010 ( Figure 3.1). JNA was
launched in July 2008 and competed with its parent company, KAL, on the routes where both
KAL and JNA operated flights under their own badges, i.e., Jeju-Seoul, Seoul-Busan, and
Busan-Jeju. Other than the Jeju-Seoul route, JNA only flew few months on the Seoul-Busan
route (Jan 2009 - March 2009) and the Jeju-Busan route (April 2009-Nov 2009).
Figure 3.1: Joint strategy of Korean Air and Jin Air
Seoul 
Jeju 
Busan 
Jun 2006 – present 
Korean Air presence 
Jun 2006 – present 
Korean Air presence 
Jun 2006 – present 
Korean Air presence Busan 
Jeju 
Apr 2009 – Dec 2009 
Jin Air presence 
Seoul 
Jan 2009 – Mar 2009 
Jin Air presence 
Jul 2008 – present 
Jin Air presence 
Air Busan (ABL) operated out of Busan airport, its base airport, and shared service with
its parent company, AAR, in the form of a code-share operation system, yielding remarkable
synergies.15 Since the launch of its business in Oct 2008, ABL, AAR’s subsidiary, began
flight service between Busan and Seoul, operating the Jeju-Busan route two months later
(Figure 3.2).
15See chapter 4. I provide the estimates of the Lerner indices and market shares for AAR and ABL in chapter
4. As of October 2010, ABL continues to fly the routes out of Busan, showing considerable growth of market
share over the past few years.
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Figure 3.2: Joint strategy of Asiana Air and Air Busan
Seoul 
Jun 2006 – present 
Asiana Air presence 
Jeju 
Busan 
Jun 2006 – Nov 2008 
Asiana Air presence 
Jun 2006 – Oct 2008 
Asiana Air presence 
Seoul 
Oct 2008 – present 
Air Busan presence 
Dec 2008 – present 
Air Busan presence 
Jeju 
Busan 
3.1.3.1 Jeju Island Routes
After Korea officially established a five day work week system in 2004, peoples’ leisure ac-
tivities changed greatly. With having increased leisure hours, employees are highly enthused
by the new system, in looking forward to their personal time. A five day work week system,
combined with the emergence of LCCs, has prompted more people to fly due in part to a sub-
stantial reduction in fares. It has also pushed the legacy carriers to adjust in order to dominate
air transport service even in the post-deregulation period. In particular, competition among
the two legacy carriers and independent LCCs for the Jeju island routes has intensified due
to the dominance of air transportation for travel to and from Jeju island, the country’s largest
island and tourist destination.16
Within the Jeju island routes, air travel demands for five direct routes (r = 1,2,3,4,5) are
estimated in chapter 2, respectively: Jeju-Seoul (r = 1), Jeju-Busan (r = 2), Jeju-Cheongju
(r = 3), Jeju-Daegu (r = 4), and Jeju-Gwangju (r = 5) route. For the Jeju-Gwangju route,
where no entrant was observed, there is no point in looking at legacy carrier strategic behav-
ior in response to the entry of LCCs.
16To get to Jeju island the ferry is really not a viable option and the Jeju island routes are primarily for
vacation travelers.
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1. Jeju-Seoul Route (r = 1)
Jeju-Seoul is the largest domestic sector for LCCs. KAL, the country’s largest legacy carrier,
launched its own LCC, Jin Air (JNA) and started service from Jeju to Seoul, and vice versa,
in July 2008, two months after the Deregulation Act of May 2008. Several LCCs have been
established over the last three years: two independent LCCs, Eastar Jet (ESR) and Jeju Air
(JJA), as well as one dependent LCC, Jin Air, while two independent LCCs ceased operations
in November 2008 (Hansung Air (HAN)) and December 2008 (Yeongnam Air (ONA)) due
to intense competition, worsening economic conditions, increasing fuel costs, and difficulties
in securing additional funding. HAN was formally re-launched in September 2010 under the
changed new name, T’way Air (TWB). As of October 2010, Korean Air still continued to
fly Jeju-Seoul route under both of badges: KAL and JNA (Table 3-1).
Table 3.1: Entry/Exit during 2006-2010: Jeju-Seoul route ( r = 1 )
Time Jeju-Seoul route
(Year-Month) Airline
AAR (Major)
KAL (Major)
JJA (LCC)
2006 Oct - Entry HAN (LCC)
JNA (LCC), KAL (Major)'s subsidiary LCC, launched Jeju-Seoul service.
ONA (LCC)
2008 Nov - Exit HAN (LCC)
2008 Dec - Exit ONA (LCC)
2009 Jan - Entry ESR ( LCC)
2010 Sep - Entry HAN (LCC) re-launched under the changed name, TWB (LCC).
2006 June
Entry / Exit
2008 M ay Deregulation Act
2008 July - Entry
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Table 3.2: Competitive consequences illustrated by the entry/exit: Jeju-Seoul route ( r = 1 )
The number of flights (% change)
ENTRY Airline EXIT
year month (LCC) year month  Major Airlines Existing LCCs
Fare was 80.02% Fare was 114.30%  (i) KAL scheduled 7.01% more flights  in face of entry.
of  major airlines. of  JJA. (ii) AAR scheduled 1.52% fewer flights  in face of entry.
(i) KAL launched its own subsidary LCC, Jin Air (JNA)
  in July 2008 and flew under both badge: KAL and JNA.
Fare was 121.66%  JNA's fare was 67.76%, 102.01%, and 100.06% of
Fare was 80.42% of HAN major airlines, HAN, and JJA, respectively.
of major airlines. Fare was 118.76% The total number of flights on both KAL and JNA increased
of JJA. by 5.56% as compared to previous month's KAL.
(ii) AAR scheduled 7.24% more flights  in face of entries.
(i) KAL scheduled 4.44% fewer flights  in face of entry.
Fare was 98.35% JNA scheduled 12.18% fewer flights  in face of entry.
Fare was 81.02% of JJA. The total number of flights on both KAL and JNA decreased
of major airlines. Fare was 101.16% by 6.86% as compared to previous month.
of JNA.
(ii) AAR scheduled 8.00% fewer flights  in face of entry.
Fare was 104.66% (i) KAL scheduled  8.46% fewer flights in face of entry.
of JJA. JNA scheduled 4.26% fewer flights  in face of entry.
Fare was 87.66% Fare was 104.87% The total number of flights on both KAL and JNA decreased
of major airlines. of JNA. by 7.00% as compared to previous month.
Fare was 105.90%
of ESR. (ii) AAR scheduled 8.41% fewer flights  in face of entry.
ESR Service
1. Jeju-Seoul route
TWB
2008 May Deregulation
2008 July
2009 Jan
Air fare level of new entry
% of competing airlines
Legacy carriers respond to new entry of LCC:
2006 Oct HAN 2008 Nov
2010 Sep Service
ONA 2008 Dec
The introduction of fuel surcharges has had a negative impact on the pricing strategies of
LCCs in post-deregulation period. As of July 2008, the two major airlines started to impose
airline specific fuel surcharges $14 on all domestic flights in response to rising oil and jet fuel
prices. In August 2008, the independent LCCs also imposed fuel surcharges, in the amount
of $13 (ONA), $10 (HAN), and $11 (Jeju Air (JJA)) on all flights. As shown in Table 3.2,
the fares of the new independent LCCs increased far more than those of the two rival major
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airlines, losing price competitiveness.
In July 2008, the KAL’ dependent LCC, JNA began offering tickets at 67.7% of the
price offered by the major carriers. The air fare level of JNA was same as the two existing
independent LCCs, JJA and HAN. Total number of flights scheduled by Korean Air under
both KAL and JNA badges increased by 5.5% in face of the entry of ONA in July 2008.
Both legacy carriers decreased their flight frequency following entry of LCCs in 2009 when
only competitive independent LCCs continued to fly the Jeju-Seoul route.
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2. Jeju-Busan Route (r = 2)
Jeju-Busan is the second largest domestic sector for LCCs. In November-December 2008,
AAR, the second largest legacy carrier, rebadged to ABL, its own subsidiary LCC. In con-
trast to AAR and ABL, the joint ownership strategies of KAL and JNA, present a different
pattern. Korean Air started to fly the Jeju-Busan route under the JNA badge in April 2009,
maintaining its KAL badge as well. Korean Air only flew the route under the JNA badge for
9 months. On the contrary, Air Busan still continues to fly this route, showing considerable
growth of market share over the past few years (Table 3.3).
Table 3.3: Entry/Exit during 2006-2010: Jeju-Busan route ( r = 2 )
Time Jeju - Busan route
(Year-Month) Airline
AAR (Major)
KAL (Major)
2006 Aug - Entry JJA (LCC)
2008 July - Entry ONA (LCC)
2008 Dec - Entry AAR (Major) rebadged to ABL (LCC), its subsidiary LCC.
2008 Dec - Exit ONA (LCC)
2009 April - Entry JNA (LCC), KAL (Major)'s subsidiary LCC, launched Jeju-Busan service.
2010 Jan - Exit JNA (LCC)
2006 June
Entry / Exit
2008 M ay Deregulation Act
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Table 3.4: Competitive consequences illustrated by the entry/exit: Jeju-Busan route ( r = 2 )
The number of flights (% change)
ENTRY Airline EXIT
year month (LCC) year month  Major Airlines Existing LCCs
Fare was 73.22% (i)  KAL scheduled 7.97% more flights  in face of entry.
 of major airlines. (ii) AAR scheduled 3.61% more flights  in face of entry.
Fare was 94.24% Fare was 136.91% (i) KAL scheduled 3.65% fewer flights  in face of entry.
of major airlines.  of JJA. (ii) AAR scheduled  5.32% more flights in face of entry.
(i) KAL scheduled 16.54% fewer flights  in face of entry.
Fare was 93.08% Fare was 115.51% .
of KAL. of JJA. (ii) AAR rebadged to ABL, its own subsidiary LCC.
The total number of flights on ABL increased by 2.31%
as compared to previous month's AAR.
Fare was 80.22% Fare was 100% (i) KAL scheduled 8.51% fewer flights 
of KAL. of JJA. following the service of JNA, its subsidiary LCC.
Fare was 87.25% The total number of flights on both KAL and JNA
of ABL. increased by 42.79% as compared to previous month's KAL.
(ii) AAR's subsidiary LCC, Air Busan (ABL), scheduled
6.60% fewer flights in face of entry, JNA.
Air fare level of new entry
% of competing airlines
Legacy carriers respond to new entry of LCC:
NA
2008 May Deregulation
　Service
2008 July
2008 Dec 
2. Jeju-Busan route
ONA 2008 Dec
JJA2006 Aug
ABL
AAR rebadged to
ABL.
2009 April
KAL started to fly the route
under both badges:
KAL and JNA.
 JNA ceased the route service 
 (2010 Jan).
As seen in Table 3.4, new LCC entries including both independent and dependent LCCs
had less price competitiveness in the post-deregulation period. Yeongnam Air (ONA), in-
dependent LCC, began offering tickets at 94.2% of the prices offered by the major carriers
at times of unusually high fuel surcharges. The air fare level of ONA was 36% higher than
that of Jeju Air (JJA), another independent LCC. As a consequence, ONA only flew the Jeju-
Busan route for five months and ceased operations in December 2008 due to increasing fuel
costs and weak demand.
AAR rebadged to ABL, its subsidiary LCC, in Dec 2008. The air fare of ABL was
slightly lower than the air fare provided by KAL, the largest legacy carrier, and 15% higher
than the air fare provided by independent LCC competitor, JJA. KAL scheduled 16% fewer
flights in face of the entry of ABL in December 2008 when it started the flight services for
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the Jeju-Seoul and Seoul-Busan routes under its low cost unit, JNA.
The air fare level of JNA was lower relative to another dependent LCC, ABL, but the
same as the air fare provided by the independent LCC competitor, JJA. JNA ceased the Jeju-
Busan route service in January 2010 while another dependent LCC, ABL, had a code-share
operation with its parent company AAR, taking the largest market share in this route.
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3. Jeju-Cheongju Route ( r = 3 )
On the Jeju-Cheongju route, only two entries of independent LCCs are observed during the
full time period: Jeju Air (JJA) in June 2008 and Eastar Jet (ESR) in June 2009. Korea’s first
independent LCC, Hansung Air (HAN) ceased operations in November 2008. No subsidiary
LCCs of the two legacy carriers has started flying on the Cheongju route (Table 3.5).
Table 3.5: Entry/Exit during 2006-2010: Jeju-Cheongju route ( r = 3 )
Time Jeju - Cheongju route
(Year-Month) Airline
AAR (Major)
KAL (Major)
HAN (LCC)
2008 June - Entry JJA (LCC)
2008 Nov - Exit HAN (LCC)
2009 June - Entry ESR ( LCC)
2006 June
Entry / Exit
2008 M ay Deregulation Act
Table 3.6 illustrates legacy carrier strategic behaviors in response to the entry of inde-
pendent LCCs. JJA and ESR began offering tickets at 80% of the air fares by major airlines
in June 2008 and in June 2009, respectively. The two legacy carriers slightly decreased their
flight frequencies on the route and this would be consistent with the expectation that incum-
bents scheduled fewer frequent flights rather cutting prices substantially.
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Table 3.6: Competitive consequences illustrated by the entry/exit: Jeju-Cheongju route ( r =
3 )
The number of flights (% change)
ENTRY Airline EXIT
year month (LCC) year month  Major Airlines Existing LCCs
Fare was 80.12% Fare was 94.81% (i) KAL scheduled 3.48% fewer flights  in face of entry.
of major airlines. of HAN. (ii) AAR scheduled 3.25% fewer flights  in face of entry.
Fare was 79.00% Fare was 98.57% (i) KAL scheduled  3.23% fewer flights in face of entry.
of major airlines. of JJA. (ii) AAR scheduled 3.23% fewer flights  in face of entry.
Service2009 June
3. Jeju-Cheongju route
Legacy carriers respond to new entry of LCC:
ServiceJJA2008 June
2008 May Deregulation
ESR
Air fare level of new entry
% of competing airlines
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4. Jeju-Daegu Route ( r = 4)
Only one entry of a LCC is observed during the full time period: Yeongnam Air (ONA) on
the Jeju-Daegu route. ONA, an independent LCC, launched its flight services for the Jeju-
Seoul, Jeju-Busan, and Jeju-Daegu routes in July 2008, two months after the Deregulation
Act of May 2008, but ceased its operations in December 2008 (Table 3.7).
Table 3.7: Entry/Exit during 2006-2010: Jeju-Daegu route ( r = 4 )
Time Jeju - Daegu route
(Year-Month) Airline
AAR (Major)
KAL (Major)
2008 July - Entry ONA (LCC)
2008 Dec - Exit ONA (LCC)
2006 June
Entry / Exit
2008 M ay  Deregulation Act
Unlike the two major airlines, ONA operated only one propeller-powered aircraft, a
Fokker 100 (turboprop aircraft with less than 80 seats). ONA flew once each day on the
Jeju-Daegu route (Table 3.8).
Table 3.8: Competitive consequences illustrated by the entry/exit: Jeju-Daegu route ( r = 4 )
The number of flights (% change)
ENTRY Airline EXIT
year month (LCC) year month  Major Airlines Existing LCCs
Fare was 78.32% (i) KAL scheduled 0.76%  more flights  in face of entry.
of major airlines (ii) AAR scheduled 2.48% more flights  in face of entry.
4. Jeju-Daegu  route
ONA 2008 Dec2008 July
Legacy carriers respond to new entry of LCC:
2008 May Deregulation
NA
Air fare level of new entry
% of competing airlines
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3.1.3.2 An Inland Route
The inland route services may provide two opposing incentives for entrants to consider. First,
there are substitutable transportation modes. Alternatives include bus, rail, and automobile
transportation. For example, high-speed rail services, Korean Train eXpress (KTX), was
introduced in 2004. Second, with respect to the type of passengers, the inland routes attract
a large number of business travelers.
Within the inland routes, air travel demands for two routes (r = 6,7) are estimated in
chapter 2, respectively: Seoul-Busan (r = 6) and Seoul-Gwangju (r = 7). Like the Jeju-
Gwangju route, the Seoul-Gwangju route also has only been operated by the two legacy
carriers, KAL and AAR. Thus, I will not focus on legacy carrier behavior for the Seoul-
Gwangju route.
1. Seoul-Busan Route (r = 6)
The Seoul-Busan route is the third largest domestic route and the largest inland route. In
October - November 2008, AAR rebadged to ABL, its own subsidiary LCC. On the other
hand, KAL used a different strategy. Korean Air started to fly under both KAL and JNA
badges in January 2009, but it only flew under the JNA badge for three months (Table 3.9).17
17No independent LCCs after deregulation entered the Seoul-Busan route.
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Table 3.9: Entry/Exit during 2006-2010: Seoul-Busan route ( r = 6 )
Time Seoul-Busan route
(Year-Month) Airline
AAR (Major)
KAL (Major)
JJA (LCC)
2007 Feb - Exit JJA (LCC)
2008 Oct - Nov,  Entry AAR (Major) rebadged to ABL (LCC), its subsidiary LCC.
2009 Jan - Entry JNA (LCC), KAL (Major)'s subsidiary LCC, launched Seoul-Busan service.
2009 April - Exit JNA (LCC)
2006 June
Entry / Exit
2008 M ay  Deregulation Act
As shown in Table 3.10, the second largest legacy carrier, AAR, rebadged to ABL, charg-
ing air fare at 82.7% of KAL. It scheduled 13.4% more frequent flights than in the previous
month. Two months later, JNA, KAL’s subsidiary LCC, began offering tickets at 86% of
the air fares provided by ABL in Jan 2009. The total number of flights increased by 12.9%
compared to the previous month’s flight frequency under the KAL badge. Jin Air that started
the Seoul-Busan route service in Jan 2009 only flew on the Seoul-Busasn route for three
months and stopped the route service in April 2009. As of October 2010, ABL is the sole
LCC representative.
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Table 3.10: Competitive consequences illustrated by the entry/exit: Seoul-Busan route ( r =
6 )
The number of flights (% change)
ENTRY Airline EXIT
year month (LCC) year month  Major Airlines Existing LCCs
(i) KAL scheduled 1.85% more flights  in face of entry.
Fare was 82.68% .
of KAL. (ii) AAR rebadged to Air Busan (ABL), its own subsidiary LCC. 
(2008 Nov) The total number of flights on ABL increased by 13.45%
as compared to previous month.
Fare was 75.95% Fare was 86% (i) KAL scheduled 1.33%  fewer flights following
of KAL. of ABL. the service of JNA, its subsidiary LCC.
The total number of flights on both KAL and JNA
increased by 12.95% as compared to previous month.
(ii) ABL, AAR's subsidiary LCC, scheduled 0.18%
fewer flights in face of entry, JNA.
Air fare level of new entry
Compared to competing airlines
Legacy carriers respond to new entry of LCC:
2008 Oct
NA
2008 May Deregulation 
AAR rebadged to
ABL.
both badges: KAL and JNA.
JNA ceased the route service.
(2009 April)
6. Seoul-Busan route
2009 Jan
KAL started to fly
the route under
ABL 
3.1.3.3 Jeju Island Routes and an Inland Route
In summarizing the effects of LCCs entry on domestic routes in the post-deregulation period,
there are few successful independent LCCs: Jeju Air (JJA) and Eastar Jet (ESR), which are
not owned by either of the legacy carriers.18 In response to the intensified competition, the
two legacy carriers also launched their own subsidiary LCCs in July 2008 (JNA for KAL)
and in Oct 2008 (ABL for AAR). AAR, the second largest legacy carrier, rebadged to ABL
and had code-share operations for the Jeju-Busan and Seoul-Busan route. In contrast to AAR
and ABL, the joint ownership strategies of KAL and JNA present a different pattern. Korean
Air started to fly under the JNA badge, maintaining its KAL badge as well.
The two legacy carriers focused on the routes having either Seoul or Busan, the two
largest metropolitan areas in Korea, as endpoint cities in the post-deregulation period. As
18Hansung Air (HAN) ceased operation in 2008 and re-launched in September 2010 with a changed name,
T’way Air (TWB). T’way Air began flight service between Seoul and Jeju in September 2010.
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of October 2010, four LCCs (three independent LCCs plus one dependent LCC) were flying
the Jeju-Seoul route, two LCCs (one independent LCC plus one dependent LCC) were flying
the Jeju-Busan route, three LCCs (all three are independent LCCs) were flying the Jeju-
Cheongju route, and one LCC (a dependent LCC) was flying the Seoul-Busan route.
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Chapter 4
Integrating the Demand Side and Supply
Side
4.1 Price Elasticities and Markups
Estimates from demand equation (3) (equation (6)) for the Jeju island routes (inland routes)
in chapter 2 are used to compute route and time specific own- and cross-price elasticities.1
Price-cost markups are recovered after the demand parameters are first obtained and then
inserted in the pricing equation (7) (equations (8) and (9)) for the single product firm as-
sumption (jointly solved for the multiproduct firm assumption).
In the nested logit model, an air passenger’s utility is assumed to be correlated among
similar flights belonging to the same nest. The main consequence of this assumption involves
1Own- and cross- price elasticities for the nested logit model specification for air travel demand are:
ηrj j,t =
∣∣∣ prjts jt ∂ s jt∂ prjt ∣∣∣= ∣∣∣− α1−σr prjt (1−σrs jt/gt− (1−σr)s jt)∣∣∣
ηrjk,t =
prjt
skt
∂ skt
∂ prjt
= α1−σr p
r
jt
(
σrs jt/gt +(1−σr)s jt
)
ηrjq,t =
prjt
sqt
∂ sqt
∂ prjt
= α prjts jt
where s jt/gt
(
skt/gt
)
is the within group share for flight j (k). Flights j and k belong to the same segment while
q belongs to another segment (q means outside good option in our context). The price coefficient α enters the
demand equation as α > 0 and the nesting parameter 0 < σr < 1 measures the correlation of the air passengers’
utilities across flights compared with the potential passengers who did not choose air travel at time t.
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the pattern of cross price elasticities of demand. Higher cross price elasticities are expected
for similar flights within the same group. For example, an increase in the price of flight j
affects air passengers who currently purchase flight j in that these passengers will substitute
similar flights grouped in the same nest (air travel choice group), rather than choose the
outside option in the other nest (no flying decision).
Even though cross price elasticities are mainly driven by flight market shares,2 the nested
logit model specification can be widely used in demand and supply analyses for its computa-
tional tractability. In addition, the primary goal of an airline competition study is illustrated
in this specification in that I focus on evaluating the May 2008 Deregulation Act and the
legacy carriers’ strategic responses to the emergence of low cost carriers.
4.1.1 Jeju Island Routes
Within the Jeju Island routes, the demands for five direct routes (r = 1, 2, 3, 4, 5) are estimated
in this order: Jeju-Seoul (r = 1), Jeju-Busan (r = 2), Jeju-Cheongju (r = 3), Jeju-Daegu (r = 4),
and Jeju-Gwangju (r = 5). A wide range of air transport industry configurations are observed
for these routes over time. The strategies for the two legacy carriers that involve responding
with subsidiary LCCs are limited to two routes, Jeju-Seoul (r = 1) and Jeju-Busan (r = 2),
where Korean Air operated under two brands, KAL and JNA, and AAR replaced its prior
operation with ABL. In other words, KAL tried to establish the JNA brand separate from
its parent company, while AAR maintained the linkage between parent company and ABL
through the code-share operation. For the Jeju-Cheongju route (r = 3), where competition
between the two legacy carriers and the independent LCCs has intensified since the May
2008 Deregulation, the capability of the LCC business model in the Korean air transport
industry is testable. Thus, I limited the analysis to the three routes where independent LCCs
operated at least a half year: Jeju-Seoul, Jeju-Busan, and Jeju-Cheongju. I provide route
2Any two differentiated flights belonging to the same group with the same market shares and within group
shares have the same cross price elasticities with any third flight in the nested logit model specification.
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by route tables for these two carriers, describing price and capacity changes, with monthly
panel data from June 2006 to October 2010.
4.1.1.1 Jeju-Seoul Route ( r = 1 )
Table 4.1 provides the average values of own-price elasticities, marginal costs, and Lerner
indices (%), (
prjt−mcrjt)
prjt
× 100, for the main competitors: the two legacy carriers, KAL and
AAR, as well as LCCs (dependent LCCs and independent LCCs). Own-price elasticities
are computed using estimates for the demand specification (IV regression with brand fixed
effects and BLP type instruments) and demand side variables. Then, the markups predicted
by a (i) SBNE and a (ii) MBNE are reported. Finally, under the assumption of static profit
maximization in each time period marginal costs are implied from the estimated markups.
All values mentioned are weighted by sales (market share).3 Table 4.2 presents average val-
ues of capacity variables, number of daily flights, aircraft fleet size, load factor, and market
share for the main competitors: two legacy carriers, KAL and AAR, and LCCs (dependent
LCCs and independent LCCs).4
3For each row, the average of the time varying market share weighted average values within the carrier are
reported other than the values in the independent LCC row. For the independent LCCs, the average of the time
varying market share weighted average values across different independent LCCs are presented.
4The outside good market shares calculated from 0.01% to 0.5% of populations for origin cities flying to
Jeju island range between 0.164% and 8.211% for the Jeju-Seoul route. The demand estimation results are
qualitatively insensitive to the choice of time- and route-specific outside goods, at 0.01% to 0.5% of population
for origin cities. In our context, the chapter 4 will proceed with the chosen percentage (0.1%) of populations
for origin cities.
In the presence of the outside good, the market share for the inside good does not add up to 100%. This also
applies to the rest of the routes.
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Table 4.1: Own price elasticities, marginal costs, and Lerner indices: Pre- and post-deregulation for
the Jeju-Seoul route ( r = 1 )
Fare Own price MC  Lerner  Fare Own price MC Lerner 
(US $) elasticities (US $) index (US $) elasticities (US $) index
(i) Single­product KAL (Legacy carrier) 75.36 ­2.047 38.38 49.11% 76.24 ­3.013 50.75 33.49%
Bertrand competition JNA (Dependent LCC) 61.25 ­3.566 44.02 28.27%
AAR (Legacy carrier) 75.36 ­3.441 53.45 29.18% 76.14 ­3.685 55.44 27.30%
ABL (Dependent LCC)
Independent LCCs 55.07 ­3.362 38.62 29.95% 61.59 ­3.542 44.17 28.48%
(ii) Multi­product KAL (Legacy carrier) 75.36 ­2.047 38.38 49.11% 76.24 ­3.013 45.40 40.64%
Bertrand competition JNA (Dependent LCC) 61.25 ­3.566 30.48 50.38%
AAR (Legacy carrier) 75.36 ­3.441 53.45 29.18% 76.14 ­3.685 55.44 27.30%
ABL (Dependent LCC)
Independent LCCs 55.07 ­3.362 38.62 29.95% 61.59 ­3.542 44.17 28.48%
N/A
N/A N/A
AirlineSupply model
1. Jeju­Seoul route
N/A N/A
Pre­deregulation Post­deregulation
N/A
Table 4.2: Capacity change: Pre- and post-deregulation for the Jeju-Seoul route ( r = 1 )
Number of Aircraft Load Market  Number of Aircraft Load Market 
daily flights size factor share daily flights size factor share
(i) Single­product KAL (Legacy carrier) 25.7 261 0.806 0.573 23.4 261 0.745 0.388
Bertrand competition JNA (Dependent LCC) 10.0 189 0.685 0.112
AAR (Legacy carrier) 19.8 169 0.837 0.298 21.3 171 0.827 0.257
ABL (Dependent LCC)
Independent LCCs 10.7 78 0.792 0.102 12.5 148 0.780 0.225
(ii) Multi­product KAL (Legacy carrier) 25.7 261 0.806 0.573 23.4 261 0.745 0.388
Bertrand competition JNA (Dependent LCC) 10.0 189 0.685 0.112
AAR (Legacy carrier) 19.8 169 0.837 0.298 21.3 171 0.827 0.257
ABL (Dependent LCC)
Independent LCCs 10.7 78 0.792 0.102 12.5 148 0.780 0.225
N/A
N/A N/A
N/A N/A
1. Jeju­Seoul route Pre­deregulation Post­deregulation
Supply model Airline
N/A
Fare variables used in the data sets are deflated by the 2005 Consumer Price Index (CPI).
All estimated own-price elasticities are negative and in a range between -2.047 and -3.685.
In both periods, the flight demands for KAL are characterized as less elastic (the average
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own-price elasticity was -2.047 in the regulated period and -3.013 in the deregulated period)
than the rest of the competitors, including AAR and independent LCCs.
First, let us analyze the two legacy carries in the pre-deregulation period. Comparing the
two major airlines, KAL reached a 57.3% market share in the regulated period when both
major airlines charged the same ticket price, which was almost twice as high as the share of
its main rival, AAR. Regarding capacity, KAL’s flights were scheduled 30% more frequently
than AAR, also operating larger aircraft with 261 seats each. The larger passenger volume for
KAL was accommodated with larger aircraft, more frequent flights, and an 80.6% average
load factor. The implied short run economic marginal cost for KAL flights was lower than
the rest, including independent LCC competitors. The average Lerner indices for KAL were
49.1%, predicted by a (i) SBNE and would be consistent with a lower cost per passenger for
KAL.
In the pre-deregulation period, few independent LCCs were serving the Jeju-Seoul route,
but most of these were non-scheduled air service carriers subject to the regulated market
policies. These carriers were only allowed to operate aircraft with fewer than 80 available
seats and with restrictions on the age of the plane (requiring less than a 25-year age limit
for each aircraft). These restrictions on non-scheduled air service carriers greatly limited
aircraft availability and selection, forcing the carriers to use only small turbo-prop aircraft.
Independent LCCs offered tickets at 73% of the air fares charged by the two legacy carriers,
yet in spite of their low fares and a 79% average load factor, the independent LCCs only
reached a 10% market share, operating small-sized aircraft with a limited number of seats
(i.e., 78 seats) per plane. The average Lerner indices for independent LCCs predicted by
(i) SBNE was 30%. Moreover, the implied marginal costs were in a reasonable order of
magnitude for all flights.
The most striking findings here are the consequences of the May 2008 Deregulation Act.
Competition in the Jeju-Seoul route, dominated by KAL and AAR, has intensified since
deregulation as new independent LCCs have entered the market. As the number of carriers
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on the route increased, the average operating profits of each carrier decreased, each having
fewer passengers.
With regard to independent LCCs in the post-deregulation period, restrictions imposed on
aircraft size for the non-scheduled airlines were eliminated so that even independent LCCs
were able to operate jet aircraft with more than 100 seats per airplane. The deregulation
helped independent LCCs reach a 22.5% market share. Still, no significant change has oc-
curred in the indices of the independent LCCs. The average Lerner indices for independent
LCCs slightly decreased compared with those of the pre-deregulation period.
The divergent responses by the two legacy carriers were implemented in the deregulated
period. Asiana Air maintained its legacy carrier service under the AAR badge with a similar
level of flight frequency and aircraft size as before. The analysis of multiproduct firm activity
does not apply to AAR, with only one variety of airline service on the Jeju-Seoul route.
Consequently the average Lerner indices predicted by both a (i) SBNE and a (ii) MBNE had
the identical value of 25.7%, which were 1.8% lower than that of pre-deregulation.
In contrast, KAL’s joint ownership with start-up subsidiary JNA resulted in a successful
strategic response to the independent LCCs’ competition. Korean Air charged different ticket
prices for its KAL and JNA brands. Taking into account the fact that most LCC customers are
sensitive to price, JNA fliers were charged the same low price the independent LCCs offered.
On the other hand, KAL fliers were charged almost the same price as were AAR fliers. KAL
as a single entity operated both KAL flights and JNA flights, expanding total daily flights
to 33, which exceeded its pre-deregulation flight frequency by 20.6%. KAL took 38.8% of
the market share under the KAL badge alone while holding a fixed fleet size. JNA recorded
an 11.2% market share, operating larger jet aircraft than both AAR and all independent
LCCs. Korean Air reached a total market share of 50% through its multi-brand (two brands)
strategies between July 2008 and October 2010. Compared with its pre-deregulation market
share of 57.3%, the post-deregulation market share decreased by 18.5% for the KAL badge
alone, but only decreased by 7.3% for the two brands - KAL and JNA - operation.
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Regarding the multi-brand strategies of Korean Air in the deregulated period, the average
values for marginal cost, which are predicted by non-cooperative oligopoly equilibrium in
the two different static Bertrand competition models, show distinct results across models.
Compared with a SBNE (eq(7)), a MBNE ( jointly solving eq(8) and eq(9)) predicts a lower
marginal cost for both KAL flights and JNA flights. As a consequence, a (ii) MBNE ex-
hibits a larger number for the Lerner indices for each brand (KAL flights and JNA flights)
of Korean Air than in the alternative SBNE model. For KAL flights, the average Lerner
index predicted by a (ii) MBNE, 40.6%, was higher than 33.5% of a (i) SBNE in the post-
deregulation period. For JNA flights, the average Lerner index predicted by a (ii) MBNE,
50.4%, was higher than 28.7% of a (i) SBNE. These huge gaps between models, particu-
larly for JNA flights, could be attributed to the multiproduct firm-specific markup term in
the pricing equations (8) and (9). It can be interpreted as strong evidence for Korean Air’s
intense multiproduct activity. However, the potential problem in interpreting the results from
the MBNE may arise from the way in which the diversion ratio, a critical component of the
firm-specific term in the equations (8) and (9), is constructed.
Table 4.3 and 4.4 illustrate how the MBNE predicts the price-cost margins for KAL
flights and JNA flights based on diversion ratios taking into account the cross product effects
between varieties offered by the same firm, Korean Air, in the Jeju-Seoul route from two
perspectives: Before and after the entry of JNA in July 2008 on the Jeju-Seoul route.5
5In the presence of the outside good option, the diversion ratios in response to a rise in price do not add up
to 100%.
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Table 4.3: Illustration of diversion from KAL as a result of a 1% price increase: Jeju-Seoul
route ( r = 1 )
Jeju-Seoul route: June 2006 - June 2008
KAL AAR JNA ONA HAN JJA ESR TWB
Legacy carrier Legacy carrier Dependent LCC
Market share 0.571 0.299 N/A N/A 0.029 0.079 N/A N/A
73.71% N/A N/A 6.75% 19.14% N/A N/A
Jeju-Seoul route: July 2008 - October 2010
KAL AAR JNA ONA HAN JJA ESR TWB
Legacy carrier Legacy carrier Dependent LCC
Market share 0.383 0.254 0.112 0.004+ 0.045+ 0.118 0.130 0.036
43.37% 18.14% 0.76% 8.96% 19.91% 20.43% 5.39%
+The two independent LCCs ceased operations in November (HAN) and in December (ONA) 2008.
Diversion ratio
Price change in KAL Diversion to 
Airline
Independent LCC
Price change in KAL Diversion to 
Airline
Independent LCC
Diversion ratio
Table 4.4: Illustration of diversion from JNA as a result of a 1% price increase: Jeju-Seoul
route ( r = 1 )
Jeju-Seoul route: July 2008 - October 2010
JNA KAL AAR ONA HAN JJA ESR TWB
KAL's subsidiary LCC Legacy carrier Legacy carrier
Market share 0.112 0.383 0.254 0.004+ 0.045+ 0.118 0.130 0.036
43.81% 29.06% 0.08% 0.69% 13.59% 11.90% 0.31%
+The two independent LCCs ceased operations in November (HAN) and in December (ONA) 2008.
Airline
Independent LCC
Diversion ratio
Price change in JNA Diversion to 
Table 4.3 demonstrates a substitution pattern among flights as a result of a rise in price
for KAL flights, say 1%, based upon the demand estimates (chapter 2) and cross price elas-
ticities.6 As seen in Table 4.3, the lost sales for KAL flights following an increase in prices
for KAL flights are partly captured by JNA flights, compensating for the lost sales of KAL
flights. From June 2006 through June 2008, each numeric value for the diversion ratio in the
6See appendix Table 16 for the carrier-specific average price elasticities.
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fourth row in the first part of Table 4.3 represents the proportion of fliers who would switch
to which of the other carriers. For example, the diversion ratio to AAR is 73.3%, meaning
73 fliers who initially purchased KAL tickets would choose AAR as a second choice. In the
same way, the diversion ratio to Hansung Air (HAN) is just 6.7%, meaning at most 7 fliers
who initially flew KAL would choose HAN as a second choice. The diversion ratio to a
Jeju Air (JJA) flight is 19.1%, meaning 19 fliers who initially chose KAL would switch to
JJA. The largest diversion ratio shown in the table indicates that AAR would be the closest
substitute for KAL.
As described in Table 4.3 from July 2008 to October 2010 in the presence of JNA, the
diversion ratio from KAL to JNA is 18.1%, indicating that 18% of KAL’s lost sales induced
by its price increases would be diverted to JNA. Still, AAR, based on the diversion ratio,
would be the closest substitute for KAL, capturing 43.3% of KAL’s lost sales. Even though
JNA is not the closest substitute for KAL, it would be effectively as competitive as the two
surviving independent LCCs, at 19.9% for JJA and 20.4% for Eastar Jet (ESR), and would be
a more competitive carrier than either HAN or ONA, which ceased their operations in 2008.
Thus, the lost sales for KAL flights are partly captured by JNA flights under the MBNE
(40.6% in (ii) MBNE in Table 4.1) while those are not under the SBNE (33.5% (i) SBNE in
Table 4.1).
The results presented in Table 4.4 clearly show that the diversion ratios play an important
role in predicting high Lerner indices (50.4% in (ii) MBNE Table 4.1 vs 28.3% in (i) SBNE
Table 4.1) for JNA flights. In the similar manner for interpreting the results in Table 4.3,
Table 4.4 reports a substitution pattern among flights as a result of a rise in price for JNA
flights, say 1%, based on the econometric results (chapter 2) and the estimated cross price
elasticities. From July 2008 to October 2010 in the presence of JNA, the diversion ratio to
KAL, its parent company, is 43.8%, indicating that 44% of JNA’s lost sales induced by its
price increases would be diverted to KAL. The largest diversion ratio, shown in the table,
indicates that KAL flights would be the closest substitute for JNA flights, thus attaining
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greater market power in a highly concentrated route. The diversion ratio to AAR is 29%,
meaning 29 fliers who initially chose JNA would switch to AAR. As mentioned earlier, the
diversion ratios based on the nested logit demand structure can be potentially problematic.
In the nested logit demand model average cross-price elasticities are mainly derived by the
observed market shares of each carrier, not by the similarity between flight characteristics
across carriers. Given that a diversion ratio is designed to put more weight on a carrier
having a larger market share, and KAL recorded the largest market share, the MBNE predicts
that JNA’s lost sales would divert toward KAL rather than to independent LCCs. This is
surprising, because one may think that JNA, a subsidiary LCC unit, would be competitive
against other LCCs. Therefore, the huge markups for JNA flights predicted by the MBNE
should be interpreted as an upper bound.
As opposed to the two legacy carriers, the two independent LCC survivors which have
established themselves in the Jeju-Seoul route, JJA and ESR, have relatively low diversion
ratios at 13.6% for JJA and 11.9% for ESR. For the other three independent LCCs, ONA,
HAN, and TWB, no substantial amounts of diversion are reported.
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4.1.1.2 Jeju-Busan Route ( r = 2 )
Table 4.5 provides the average values of own-price elasticities, marginal costs, and Lerner
indices (%),(
prjt−mcrjt)
prjt
× 100, for the main competitors: the two legacy carriers, KAL and
AAR, as well as LCCs (dependent LCCs and independent LCCs). Own-price elasticities
are computed using estimates of the demand specification (IV regression with brand fixed
effects and BLP type instruments) and demand side variables. Then, the markups predicted
by a (i) SBNE and a (ii) MBNE are reported. Finally, under the assumption of static profit
maximization in each time period marginal costs are implied from the estimated markups.
All values mentioned are weighted by sales (market shares). Table 4.6 presents average val-
ues of capacity variables, number of daily flights, aircraft fleet size, load factor, and market
share for the main competitors: two legacy carriers, KAL and AAR, and LCCs (dependent
LCCs and independent LCCs).7
Table 4.5: Own price elasticities, marginal costs, and Lerner indices: Pre- and post-deregulation for
the Jeju-Busan route ( r = 2 )
Fare Own price MC  Lerner  Fare Own price MC Lerner 
(US $) elasticities (US $) index (US $) elasticities (US $) index
(i) Single­product KAL (Legacy carrier) 58.38 ­1.364 15.18 74.08% 60.02 ­2.286 33.10 44.87%
44.45 ­2.741 28.22 36.53%
AAR (Legacy carrier) 57.96 ­3.255 40.12 30.87%
ABL (Dependent LCC) 53.84 ­2.605 33.00 38.77%
Independent LCCs 43.10 ­2.914 28.29 34.45% 48.90 ­3.107 33.11 32.61%
(ii) Multi­product KAL (Legacy carrier) 58.38 ­1.364 15.18 74.08% 60.02 ­2.286 30.64 49.22%
44.45 ­2.741 13.42 69.95%
AAR (Legacy carrier) 57.96 ­3.255 40.12 30.87%
ABL (Dependent LCC) 53.84 ­2.605 33.00 38.77%
Independent LCCs 43.10 ­2.914 28.29 34.45% 48.90 ­3.107 33.11 32.61%
AAR rebadged to ABL in Dec 2008.
N/A
Bertrand competition
JNA (Dependent LCC)
JNA presence Apr 2009 ­ Dec 2009
Bertrand competition N/A
N/A
N/A
2. Jeju­Busan route Pre­deregulation Post­deregulation
Supply model Airline
JNA presence Apr 2009 ­ Dec 2009
AAR rebadged to ABL in Dec 2008.
JNA (Dependent LCC)
7The outside good market shares calculated from 0.01% to 0.5% of populations for origin cities flying to
Jeju island range between 0.233% and 11.627% for the Jeju-Busan route.
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Table 4.6: Capacity change: Pre- and post-deregulation for the Jeju-Busan route ( r = 2 )
Number of Aircraft Load Market  Number of Aircraft Load Market 
daily flights size factor share daily flights size factor share
(i) Single­product KAL (Legacy carrier) 10.2 227 0.715 0.678 7.9 242 0.703 0.477
4.0 189 0.666 0.163
AAR (Legacy carrier) 4.7 158 0.780 0.237
ABL (Dependent LCC) 8.8 134 0.873 0.342
Independent LCCs 3.1 78 0.843 0.083 3.7 130 0.849 0.144
(ii) Multi­product KAL (Legacy carrier) 10.2 227 0.715 0.678 7.9 242 0.703 0.477
4.0 189 0.666 0.163
AAR (Legacy carrier) 4.7 158 0.780 0.237
ABL (Dependent LCC) 8.8 134 0.873 0.342
Independent LCCs 3.1 78 0.843 0.083 3.7 130 0.849 0.144
N/A
Bertrand competition JNA (Dependent LCC)
JNA (Dependent LCC)
JNA presence Apr 2009 ­ Dec 2009
Bertrand competition
AAR rebadged to ABL in Dec 2008.
N/A
N/A
N/A
2. Jeju­Busan route Pre­deregulation Post­deregulation
Supply model Airline
JNA presence Apr 2009 ­ Dec 2009
AAR rebadged to ABL in Dec 2008.
Fare variables used in the data set are deflated by the 2005 Consumer Price Index (CPI).
All estimated own-price elasticities are negative and in a range between -1.364 and -3.255.
Similar to the Jeju-Seoul route, the flight demands for KAL are characterized as less elas-
tic (the average own-price elasticity was -1.364 in the regulated period and -2.286 in the
deregulated period) than the rest of the competitors, including AAR and LCCs in both pe-
riods. KAL reached a 67.8% market share in the regulated period when both major airlines
charged similar ticket price levels, which was almost three times higher than that of its main
rival, AAR. The larger market share was accommodated with larger aircraft, more frequent
flights, and 71.5% average passenger load factors. KAL had twice the flight frequency of
AAR, and it also operating large-sized aircraft with 227 seats each. The average Lerner in-
dices for KAL predicted by a (i) SBNE was 78.1%. The low marginal costs and huge market
shares would support high Lerner indices for KAL.
One independent LCC, JJA, flying the Jeju-Busan route before May 2008, operated
turbo-prop aircraft with fewer than 80 available seats per plane, offering tickets at 80% of
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the air fares charged by the two legacy carriers. Despite low air fares and a sufficiently high
average load factor of 84.3%, the independent LCC only recorded an 8.3% market share,
scheduling three daily flights and operating small-sized aircraft with a limited number of
seats (i.e., 78 seats) per plane. The implied marginal costs are within a reasonable order of
magnitude for all flights. The average Lerner indices for the independent LCC predicted by
a (i) SBNE was 34.4%.
The May 2008 Deregulation Act removed restrictions imposed on aircraft size for the
non-scheduled airlines; thus, all independent LCCs were then able to operate jet aircraft
with more than 100 seats each. As a result, independent LCCs reached a 14.4% market
share, which exceeded their pre-deregulation market share by 6.1%. The average Lerner
indices for independent LCCs rather decreased. One possible explanation for this may stem
from the introduction of fuel surcharges. The independent LCCs charged almost the same
amount of fuel surcharges as those of the two legacy carriers. As a consequence, the average
prices for the independent LCCs increased by the greatest amount of 13.5% since July 2008
and those for KAL only increased by 2.8% over the same time period. Finally, ONA only
flew the Jeju-Busan route for five months and ceased operations in December 2008 at a time
of unexpectedly high fuel prices.
The two legacy carriers have diversified their strategies in the post-deregulation period,
when they faced competition from the independent LCCs. While AAR operated under the
AAR brand alone in the Jeju-Seoul route, it responded with its own subsidiary LCC, ABL,
in the Jeju-Busan route. This joint ownership strategy between AAR and ABL was a com-
petitive response to KAL as well as independent LCCs. Extending its reputation through
the code-share operation with ABL created customer loyalty, sharing the online reservation
system for airline tickets. In other words, AAR rebadged to ABL and charged air fare 10.3%
higher than the competing independent LCCs, but 10.10% lower than KAL, which may have
been able to draw fliers off from the latter. There was strong evidence that AAR increased
capacity on the Jeju-Busan route right after its rebadging strategy. ABL scheduled a total of
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8.8 daily flights, which exceeded its pre-deregulation flight frequency under AAR operation
by 87.2%. From December 2008 to October 2010 ABL reached a 34.2% market share while
decreasing its aircraft size from 158 seats to 135 seats per airplane. This number exceeded its
market share of 23.7% under AAR operation in the regulated period. The AAR’s rebadging
strategy, i.e., replacing its prior service with ABL, does not constitute a new entry. Therefore
analysis on the multiproduct firm activity does not apply to AAR. Consequently the average
Lerner indices predicted by both a (i) SBNE and a (ii) MBNE had the identical value of
38.8%, which was 7.9% greater than that of the pre-deregulation period.
On the other hand, KAL operated under both the KAL and JNA badges for only 9 months
from April 2009 through November 2009. JNA charged air fare 10% lower than the compet-
ing independent LCCs and 21.1% lower than ABL. Korean Air scheduled 8 daily flights un-
der the KAL badge and 4 daily flights under the JNA badge. With regard to capacity change,
the total number of daily scheduled flights decreased from 10.2 in the pre-deregulation period
to 7.9 (KAL badge alone) in the post-deregulation period. During the deregulation period
(June 2008 through October 2010) KAL took 47.7% market share alone while increasing
its fleet size up to 242 seats per airplane. Between April 2009 and November 2009 Korean
Air reached a 16.3% market share under JNA badge, operating jet aircraft with 189 seats per
airplane, and recorded a 64% total market share across the two brands. KAL’s passenger
volumes slightly fell in the post-deregulation period (it recorded 67% in the pre-deregulation
period).
Regarding the multi-brand strategies of Korean Air in the deregulated period, the average
values for marginal cost, which are predicted by non-cooperative oligopoly equilibrium in
the two different static Bertrand competition models, show distinct results across models.
Compared with a SBNE (eq(7)), a MBNE (jointly solving eq(8) and eq(9)) predicts a lower
marginal cost for both KAL flights and JNA flights. As a consequence, a (ii) MBNE exhibits
a larger number for the Lerner index for each brand (KAL flights and JNA flights) of Korean
Air than in a (i) SBNE.
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For KAL flights, the average Lerner index predicted by a (ii) MBNE, 49.2%, was higher
than the 45% predicted by a (i) SBNE in the post-deregulation period. For JNA flights, the
average Lerner index predicted by a (ii) MBNE, 70%, was higher than the 36.5% of a (i)
SBNE. These huge gaps between models, particularly for JNA flights, could be attributed
to the multiproduct firm-specific markup term in the pricing equations (8) and (9). It can
be interpreted as strong evidence for Korean Air’s intense multiproduct activity. However,
the potential problem in interpreting the results from the MBNE may arise from the way in
which the diversion ratio, a critical component of the firm-specific term in the equations (8)
and (9), is constructed.
Tables 4.7 and 4.8 illustrate how the MBNE predicts the price-cost margins for KAL
flights and JNA flights based on diversion ratios taking into account the cross product effects
between varieties offered by the same firm, Korean Air, in the Jeju-Busan route from four
perspectives: Pre-deregulation period, before and after JNA entry in April 2009, and after
JNA exit in November 2009.8 In July 2008, just two months after the May 2008 Deregulation
Act, ONA entered in the Jeju-Busan route. From July to March 2009, ABL was the first
dependent LCC in this route after AAR rebadged to ABL in December 2008. From April
to November 2009 in the presence of JNA, JNA competed with not only the independent
LCCs, but also the dependent LCC, ABL. After JNA ceased the Jeju-Busan route service in
January 2010, ABL continued to fly the route as the sole representative dependent LCC.9
8In the presence of the outside good option, the diversion ratios in response to a rise in price do not add up
to 100%.
9See appendix for the carrier-specific average price elasticities. The data point (December 2009) was ex-
cluded from the data analysis. In December 2009, the passengers flying each carrier data were missing at Korea
Airports Corporation (KAC).
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Table 4.7: Illustration of diversion from KAL as a result of a 1% price increase: Jeju-Busan
route ( r = 2 )
Jeju-Busan route: June 2006 - June 2008
KAL AAR ABL JNA ONA JJA
Legacy carrier Legacy carrier Dependent LCC Dependent LCC
Market share 0.677 0.237 N/A N/A N/A 0.083
75.39% N/A N/A N/A 26.10%
Jeju-Busan route:  July 2008 - March 2009
KAL AAR ABL JNA ONA JJA
Legacy carrier Legacy carrier Dependent LCC Dependent LCC
Market share 0.579 Rebadged to ABL 0.261 N/A 0.017+ 0.142
N/A 63.15% N/A 4.21% 34.04%
+ONA ceased operation in December 2008.
Jeju-Busan route:  April 2009 - November 2009
KAL AAR ABL JNA ONA JJA
Legacy carrier Legacy carrier Dependent LCC Dependent LCC
Market share 0.391 Rebadged to ABL 0.314 0.163+ N/A 0.124
N/A 51.76% 27.29% N/A 20.70%
+JNA ceased the Jeju-Busan route service in January 2010.
Jeju-Busan route:  January 2010 - October 2010
KAL AAR ABL JNA ONA JJA
Legacy carrier Legacy carrier Dependent LCC Dependent LCC
Market share 0.436 Rebadged to ABL 0.398 N/A N/A 0.160
N/A 71.24% N/A N/A 28.52%
Airline
Independent LCC
Diversion ratio
Diversion to 
Diversion to 
Price change in KAL
Airline
Independent LCC
Diversion ratio
Price change in KAL
Price change in KAL Diversion to 
Airline
Diversion ratio
Independent LCC
Price change in KAL Diversion to 
Airline
Independent LCC
Diversion ratio
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Table 4.8: Illustration of diversion from JNA as a result of a 1% price increase: Jeju-Busan
route ( r = 2 )
Jeju-Busan route:  April 2009 - November 2009
JNA KAL AAR ABL ONA JJA
KAL's subsidiary LCC Legacy carrier Legacy carrier Dependent LCC
Market share 0.163 0.391 Rebadged to ABL 0.314 N/A 0.124
47.11% N/A 37.76% N/A 14.96%Diversion ratio
Price change in JNA Diversion to 
Airline
Independent LCC
Table 4.7 illustrates a substitution pattern among flights as a result of a rise in price for
KAL flights, say 1%, based upon the demand estimates (chapter 2) and cross price elastici-
ties.10 From June 2006 through June 2008 each numeric value in the fourth row in Table 4.7,
represents the proportion of fliers who would switch to which of the two competing carriers,
either AAR or JJA. For example, the diversion ratio to AAR is 75.4%, meaning that 75 fliers
who initially purchased KAL tickets would choose AAR as opposed to JJA. In the same way,
the diversion ratio to JJA is 26.1%, meaning 26 fliers who initially flew KAL would choose
JJA as a second best choice.11 The largest diversion ratio, shown in the table, indicates that
AAR would be the closest substitute for KAL.
From July 2008 through March 2009, the diversion ratio to ABL is 63.1%, indicating that
63% of KAL’s lost sales induced by its price increases would be diverted to ABL. Based on
the diversion ratio, ABL is the closest substitute for KAL. The diversion ratio to JJA is 34%,
meaning 34 fliers out of 100 who initially chose KAL would switch to JJA. Yeongnam Air
(ONA) which only flew five months between July 2008 and November 2008 has a diversion
ratio of only 4.2%.
In the presence of JNA (from April 2009 to November 2009), ABL still has the largest
diversion ratio of 51.7%, implying that more than half of the lost sales from KAL’s price
increases would be diverted to ABL. The diversion ratio to JNA is 27.3%, meaning 27 fliers
10See appendix Table 17 for the carrier-specific average price elasticities.
11Diversion ratio does not sum to 100% since Jeju Air (JJA) launched flights between Jeju and Busan in Aug
2006.
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out of 100 who initially chose KAL would switch to JNA as opposed to ABL or JJA. JJA
has a diversion ratio of 20.7%, meaning 20 fliers who initially purchased KAL tickets would
choose JJA as a second choice. The diversion ratios indicate that ABL would be the closest
substitute for KAL and JNA would be more likely to compete with JJA rather than ABL.
After JNA stopped its Jeju-Busan route service, the market structure is similar to that of
the pre-deregulation period. The diversion ratio to ABL is 71.2%, meaning 71 fliers who
initially purchased KAL tickets would choose ABL over JJA. In the same way, the diversion
ratio to JJA is 28.5%, meaning 28 fliers who initially flew KAL would choose JJA as a second
choice.
The results reported in Table 4.8 provide the main source for a huge gap in JNA’s Lerner
indices across two models, 36.53% for SBNE and 69.95% for MBNE. Suppose 100 fewer
fliers chose JNA when it raised air fares, say 1%. From April to November 2009, the di-
version ratio to KAL is 47.1%, indicating that 47% of JNA’s lost sales induced by its price
increases would be captured by KAL. The largest diversion ratio indicates that KAL flights
would be the closest substitutes for JNA flights, thus attaining greater market power across
two brands. The diversion ratio to ABL is 37.8%, meaning 38 fliers who initially chose JNA
would switch to ABL. Given that a diversion ratio is designed to put more weight on a carrier
having a larger market share, and KAL recorded the largest market share, the MBNE pre-
dicts that JNA’s lost sales divert toward KAL rather than to independent LCCs. Again, this
is surprising because one may think that JNA, a subsidiary LCC unit, would compete against
other LCCs. As opposed to the two legacy carriers, one independent LCC survivor, which
has established in the Jeju-Busan route, JJA, has relatively low diversion ratios of 15%.
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4.1.1.3 Jeju-Cheongju Route ( r = 3 )
On the Jeju-Cheongju route, two types of carriers competed with each other: Legacy carriers
and independent LCCs. Neither KAL nor AAR responded with its own subsidiary LCC.
The analysis of multiproduct firm activities does not apply to this route in which each carrier
supplied its own flights under one brand.
Table 4.9 provides the average values of own-price elasticities, marginal costs, and Lerner
indices (%),(
prjt−mcrjt)
prjt
× 100, for the main competitors: the two legacy carriers, KAL and
AAR, as well as independent LCCs. Own-price elasticities are computed using estimates for
the demand specification (IV regression with brand fixed effects and BLP type instruments)
and demand side variables. Then, the markups predicted by a (i) SBNE are reported. Finally,
under the assumption of static profit maximization in each time period marginal costs are
derived from the estimated markups. All values mentioned are weighted by sales (market
shares).12 Table 4.10 presents average values of capacity variables, number of daily flights,
aircraft fleet size, load factor, and market share for the main competitors: two legacy carriers,
KAL and AAR, and independent LCCs.13
12The estimated value of the nesting parameter σr is 0.508. Holding the other variables fixed, the smaller σr
is, the less own-price elasticity η j j is. For the Jeju-Cheongju route, the own-price elasticities for all flights are
calculated in a range between -1.166 and -1.596.
13The outside good market shares calculated from 0.01% to 0.5% of populations for origin cities flying to
Jeju island range between 0.006% and 3.192% for the Jeju-Cheongju route.
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Table 4.9: Own price elasticities, marginal costs, and Lerner indices: Pre- and post-deregulation for
the Jeju-Cheongju route ( r = 3 )
Fare Own price MC  Lerner  Fare Own price MC Lerner 
(US $) elasticities (US $) index (US $) elasticities (US $) index
(i) Single­product KAL (Legacy carrier) 66.15 ­1.166 9.45 85.88% 67.17 ­1.328 16.34 76.15%
Bertrand competition AAR (Legacy carrier) 66.15 ­1.327 16.22 75.76% 67.08 ­1.466 21.17 68.87%
Dependent LCCs
Independent LCCs 56.06 ­1.596 20.91 62.93% 54.64 ­1.537 19.03 65.67%
N/AN/A
3. Jeju­Cheongju route Pre­deregulation Post­deregulation
Supply model Airline
Table 4.10: Capacity change: pre- and post-deregulation for the Jeju-Cheongju route ( r = 3 )
Number of Aircraft Load Market  Number of Aircraft Load Market 
daily flights size factor share daily flights size factor share
(i) Single­product KAL (Legacy carrier) 3.8 185 0.821 0.466 3.9 194 0.767 0.402
Bertrand competition AAR (Legacy carrier) 3.9 168 0.739 0.394 3.8 178 0.721 0.339
Dependent LCCs
Independent LCCs 3.2 72 0.742 0.140 2.5 121 0.760 0.259
N/AN/A
3. Jeju­Cheongju route Pre­deregulation Post­deregulation
Supply model Airline
Fare variables used in the data sets are deflated by the 2005 Consumer Price Index (CPI).
All estimated own-price elasticities are negative and in a range between -1.166 and -1.596.
Estimated own-price elasticities are lower in absolute value for flights having larger market
shares. In both periods, the flight demand curves for KAL are characterized as less elastic
(the average own-price elasticity was -1.166 in the regulated period and -1.328 in the dereg-
ulated period) than for the rest of the competitors including AAR and independent LCCs.
In contrast to the previously analyzed other two Jeju island routes, KAL and AAR were
almost equally dominant carriers in the Jeju-Cheongju route. KAL reached a 46.6% market
share in the regulated period when both major airlines charged the same ticket price, which
was just 7.2% higher than that of its main rival, AAR. Regarding capacity, KAL scheduled
3.8 daily flights, operating larger aircraft with 185 seats each. The larger passenger volume
for KAL was accommodated with larger aircraft and 82.1% average load factors. The im-
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plied short run economic marginal cost for KAL flights was lower than the rest, including
independent LCC competitors. The average Lerner index for KAL was 85.9% under a (i)
SBNE. This would be consistent with a lower cost per passenger for KAL. AAR scheduled
3.9 daily flights with 168 seats per airplane. With 73.9% average load factors, which were
8% lower than KAL, AAR was the second largest carrier by market share. The average
Lerner index for AAR was 75.7% under a (i) SBNE.
One independent LCC, HAN, was flying the Jeju-Cheongju route before May 2008, but
it ceased operations in November 2008. HAN operated turbo-prop aircraft with 78 seats per
plane, offering tickets at 84.7% of the air fares charged by the two legacy carriers. Despite
the low air fares and average load factor of 74.2%, HAN only recorded a 14% market share,
scheduling three flights a day, which were almost the same frequency on the legacy carriers.
The implied marginal costs are within a reasonable order of magnitude for all flights. The
average Lerner index for the independent LCC predicted by a (i) SBNE was 62.9%.
The most striking findings here are the consequences of the May 2008 Deregulation Act.
Competition in the Jeju-Cheongju route, dominated by KAL and AAR, has intensified since
deregulation. New independent LCCs with price competitiveness have entered the market.
In the deregulated period when each carrier started to impose fuel surcharges on all domes-
tic flights, the average prices for independent LCCs rather fell to $54.4, implying that two
independent LCCs, JJA and ESR, had price competitiveness. Furthermore, the restrictions
imposed on aircraft size for the non-scheduled airlines were eliminated so that all indepen-
dent LCCs were able to operate jet aircraft with more than 100 seats per airplane. This caused
the average aircraft size for the independent LCCs to increase up to 121 seats per airplane.
Along with its increased fleet size, average load factors of 76% helped the independent LCCs
reach a 25.9% market share. The average Lerner indices for the independent LCCs predicted
by a (i) SBNE was 65.7%, which exceeded the Lerner index of that of 62.9%.
In response to the intensified competition from newly sprouting independent LCCs, KAL
and AAR maintained their pre-deregulation strategies. Korean Air operated under the KAL
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badge alone and Asiana Air also operated under the AAR badge alone. For both legacy
carriers, the average flight frequencies and aircraft size were kept at their pre-deregulation
levels. The average Lerner index predicted by a (i) SBNE decreased to 76.1% for KAL.
Similarly, for AAR flights the average Lerner index predicted by a (i) SBNE decreased to
68.9%.
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4.1.2 An Inland Route: Seoul-Busan
Within inland routes, air travel demands for two routes (r = 6, 7) are estimated, respectively:
Seoul-Busan (r = 6) and Seoul-Gwangju (r = 7). The Seoul-Gwangju route has only been
operated by the two legacy carriers, KAL and AAR. The strategies for the two legacy carriers
that involve responding with subsidiary LCCs are limited to the Seoul-Busan (r = 6) route
where Korean Air operated under two brands, KAL and JNA, and AAR replaced its prior
operation with ABL. However, KAL only flew under a two brands strategy for three months
between Jan 2009 and Mar 2009. In this context, I limit the main focus to the SBNE rather
than the MBNE. I provide tables, describing their price and capacity strategies, with monthly
panel data from June 2006 to October 2010.
4.1.2.1 Seoul-Busan Route ( r = 6 )
As seen in chapter 3 (section 3.1), we assume that our data reflect firms competing in short
run (period by period) Nash equilibria and our (nested logit) demand structure reflects con-
sumer behavior. That is, our maintained hypotheses include the assumption of short run
Nash equilibria and nested logit demand.
From the maintained hypothesis of nested logit demand we can find firm level demand
elasticities in each time period. With firm level demand elasticities and the maintained hy-
pothesis of short run Nash equilibria along with the data on price and the demand elasticities
we can solve for the price markup over marginal costs, which means we can solve for the
level of marginal costs under these assumptions.
Following the methodology for reporting results for the Jeju island routes, Table 4.11
would report the average values of own price elasticities and computed markups, marginal
costs and Lerner indices, (
prjt−mcrjt)
prjt
× 100, for all airlines, both pre and post deregulation.
But there appears to be a failure in one of the two maintained hypotheses, either the nested
logit or the short run profit maximization assumptions.
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For the pre-deregulation time period for KAL flights the point estimates are inconsis-
tent with the maintained hypotheses of nested logit demand and short run profit maximizing
behavior for KAL. For this period KAL’s estimated demand elasticity is less than 1 (in ab-
solute size) which is inconsistent with short run profit maximization, so (at least) one of the
maintained hypotheses fails.14 The more likely possibility is that the nested logit does not
adequately capture the true demand curve/elasticity for this airline and time period.
Why might the nested logit model fail for KAL flights and this time period? One property
of nested logits tends to become less realistic in “one sided” demand scenarios, e.g., where
one good dominates in demand. Probably this is related to the functional form for the demand
estimation based on nested logit.15 Under the nested logit specification demand elasticities
are proportional to either price, prjt , or market share through
(
1−σrs jt/gt−(1−σr)s jt
)
1−σr . In Seoul-
Busan route KAL had a dominant market share of around 80% in the pre-deregulation period.
KAL’s dominant market share may force its own-price elasticities to be small,16 even less
14The estimated elasticity less than one is inconsistent with the maintained hypotheses. The high market
share may have led to an inconsistency with the maintained hypothesis of nested-logit demand. It is also pos-
sible that nested logit is appropriate but the maintained hypothesis of shortrun profit maximization is violated.
Or alternatively, both the nested logit and the shortrun profit maximization maintained hypotheses are valid,
but simple statistical error has led to a point estimate of elasticity which is less than one. To examine this
possibility we need to ask if the estimates are consistent with the possibility of elastic demand.
Statistically, our regressions estimate αˆ = 0.0816, the coefficient on fare. An αη=1 = 0.1039 is consistent
with an elasticity, η j j, equal to one. Given our estimate of 0.0816 with a standard error of 0.0147 the t-value
for the difference (0.0223 = 0.1039-0.0816) is 1.5165 which is consistent with an elasticity greater than one
with probability of at least 0.1292. Accordingly our estimates are consistent with the maintained hypothesis of
shortrun profit maximization at this probability level.
15As seen in chapter 2, the nested logit demand structure specification is finished with an outside good. By
construction, in the current framework, the relative prices and flight characteristics, such as flight frequency,
aircraft size and other factors, determine the probabilities of choosing a flight j = 0,1, ....., J.
Holding the estimated parameter values for α and 0 < σr < 1, and prices unchanged (from the preferred
demand specification using the Hausman instruments only, α = 0.0816 and σr = 0.869 are estimated), the
formula for the own-price elasticity of flight j, ηrj j,t =
∣∣∣ prjts jt ∂ s jt∂ prjt ∣∣∣= ∣∣∣− α1−σr prjt (1−σrs jt/gt− (1−σr)s jt)∣∣∣, would
imply that a sufficiently large market share for a firm’s flight j (compared with small size of the market share
for the outside good in the current specification) may produce an own-price elasticity less than 1.
16See Petrin [2002]. The bias in the demand estimates due to a positive correlation of prices and unobserved
product qualities could lead to spurious estimates of inelastic demand. Byproducts of the low estimated demand
elasticities under OLS and instrumental variables include negative marginal costs when marginal costs are
implied by demand side estimates.
The potential sources of the bias in the demand estimates in our context, in the Seoul-Busan route, may arise
from the assumptions imposed on the demand taste parameter in chapter 2: Individual consumer i has the same
coefficients for price and flight characteristics within the nest. This means the consumer’s specific taste param-
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than 1 (in absolute size) which implies the estimated negative marginal costs over the same
time periods.17 After ABL was launched and started to fly the route in the post-deregulation
period, KAL partially lost their passengers to ABL and KAL’s market share dropped to 65%
with the estimated demand elasticities greater than 1 (in absolute size). Thus, the estimation
results for this route, at least before-deregulation period, would be inconsistent with the static
profit maximizing firm assumption. In this context, I will not focus on the Lerner indices for
the KAL flights in the pre-deregulation period.18
Despite being unable to fully follow the reporting methodology used for the Jeju routes
above, for comparability I report the rest of the results for Seoul-Busan in the same format
as the above to at least describe parts of the behavior of the various airlines over this pe-
riod. In Table 4.11 Own-price elasticities are computed using the estimates for the demand
specification (IV regression with brand fixed effects and Hausman panel type instruments)
and demand side variables. Then, the implied markups predicted by a (i) SBNE for the
airline carriers and time periods with estimated demand elasticities greater than one are re-
ported. Finally, marginal costs are implied from the estimated markups. All of the values
are weighted by sales (market shares). Table 4.12 presents the average values of capacity
variables, number of daily flights, aircraft fleet size, load factor, and market share for the
main competitors: the two legacy carriers, KAL and AAR, and LCCs (dependent LCCs and
independent LCCs).19
eters for price, αi = α , and for flight attributes, βi = β , are written as invariant across consumers, i= 1, ......, I,
conditional upon the decision to fly. Air passengers who choose the KAL flights may have strong preference for
the KAL flights, and these carrier specific unobserved quality or brand reputations could be possibly correlated
to prices, causing the point estimate to drop. Or these demand taste parameters can significantly change from
time to time, e.g., across pre- and post-deregulation, as opposed to current assumption, common parameters
across times within the route.
17For a single product firm, the inelastic demand (demand elasticity less than 1) would imply the margin
(prjt −mcrjt)> prjt or mcrjt < 0 by pricing equation (7).∣∣∣ηrj j,t ∣∣∣ is less than 1 which implies the margin (prjt −mcrjt)> prjt or mcrjt < 0, which is inconsistent with the
short run profit maximization assumption.
18The KAL flights in both a SBNE and a MBNE in post-deregulation column Tables 4.11 and 4.12 report
the average values in the periods post January 2009.
19The outside good market shares calculated from 0.01% to 0.5% of populations for origin cities flying
inland range between 0.171% and 8.544% for the Seoul-Busan route.
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Table 4.11: Own price elasticities, marginal costs, and Lerner indices: Pre- and post-deregulation
for the Seoul-Busan route ( r = 6 )
Fare Own price MC  Lerner  Fare Own price MC Lerner 
(US $) elasticities (US $) index (US $) elasticities (US $) index
(i) Single­product KAL (Legacy carrier) 63.96 ­0.806 N/A N/A 65.40 ­1.397 18.74 70.73%
Bertrand competition AAR (Legacy carrier) 63.50 ­3.264 44.04 30.73%
49.89 ­3.083 33.71 32.43%
ABL (Dependent LCC) 55.95 ­2.317 31.09 44.72%
JJA (Independent LCC) 50.98 ­3.210 35.11 31.25%
(ii) Multi­product KAL and JNA 63.96 ­0.806 N/A N/A 65.35 ­1.406 19.48 69.53%
Bertrand competition AAR and ABL 63.50 ­3.264 44.04 30.73% 58.68 ­2.520 34.50 42.21%
JJA (Independent LCC) 50.98 ­3.210 35.11 31.25% N/A
6. Seoul­Busan route Pre­deregulation Post­deregulation
Supply model Airline
AAR rebadged to ABL in Oct 2008.
JNA (Dependent LCC) N/A
JNA presence Jan 2009 ­ Mar 2009
N/A
N/A
Table 4.12: Capacity change: Pre- and post-deregulation for the Seoul-Busan route ( r = 6 )
Number of Aircraft Load Market  Number of Aircraft Load Market 
daily flights size factor share daily flights size factor share
(i) Single­product KAL (Legacy carrier) 21.2 180 0.776 0.796 16.9 182 0.699 0.654
Bertrand competition AAR (Legacy carrier) 8.2 160 0.542 0.191
3.0 189 0.154 0.029
ABL (Dependent LCC) 12.8 141 0.621 0.349
JJA (Independent LCC) 2.2 78 0.241 0.011
(ii) Multi­product KAL and JNA 21.2 180 0.776 0.796 17.3 182 0.697 0.657
Bertrand competition AAR and ABL 8.2 160 0.542 0.191 12.3 145 0.600 0.333
JJA (Independent LCC) 2.2 78 0.241 0.011 N/A
6. Seoul­Busan route Pre­deregulation Post­deregulation
Supply model Airline
AAR rebadged to ABL in Oct 2008.
JNA (Dependent LCC) N/A
JNA presence Jan 2009 ­ Mar 2009
N/A
N/A
Fare variables used in the data sets are deflated by the 2005 Consumer Price Index (CPI).
The estimated own-price elasticities for AAR and JJA are negative and in a range between
-3.210 and -3.264 in the pre-deregulation period.20 The estimated own-price elasticities for
all flights are -1.397 and -3.083 in the post-deregulation period.21
20In Seoul-Busan route JJA had an 1.1% market share in the pre-deregulation period between June 2006 and
February 2007. JJA’s small market share may force its own-price elasticities to be huge.
21See appendix for Table 18.
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KAL reached a 79.6% market share in the regulated period, which was four times higher
than that of its main rival, AAR. The large number of passenger loads was accommodated
with a 77.6% average load factor with frequent flights. Regarding capacity, KAL scheduled
13 more daily flights than AAR. The average Lerner indices for KAL predicted by a (i)
SBNE in the regulated period was not available. On the other hand, AAR took a 19% market
share, scheduling 8 daily flights. With a relatively low load factor of 54.2%, the average
Lerner index for AAR was 30.7%.
One independent LCC, JJA, was flying the Seoul-Busan route before May 2008, but it
stopped the route service in February 2007, operating turbo-prop aircraft with 78 available
seats per airplane. JJA offered tickets at 80% of those of the two legacy carriers. Despite the
low air fare, this independent LCC only recorded a 1.1% market share, scheduling two daily
flights and recording a very low load factor of 24.1%. In this context, the Seoul-Busan route
was dominated by the two legacy carriers in the pre-deregulation period. The average Lerner
indices for the independent LCC predicted by a (i) SBNE was 31.5%. The implied marginal
costs were in a reasonable order of magnitude for all flights except KAL flights.
The May 2008 Deregulation Act removed restrictions imposed on aircraft size for the
non-scheduled airlines; thus, all independent LCCs were also able to operate jet aircraft with
more than 100 seats each. However, no start-up independent LCCs began flight services
between Seoul and Busan. On the contrary, ABL began flight service between Busan and
Seoul since the launch of its business in October 2008. The joint ownership strategy between
AAR and ABL had created a competitive response to another dependent LCC, JNA. AAR
rebadged to ABL and had a code-share system with ABL. Extending its reputation through a
code-share operation created customer loyalty to ABL, sharing the online reservation system
for airline tickets. In addition, ABL charged air fare at 85.4% of KAL, which may have been
able to draw fliers off from KAL. ABL scheduled a total of 12 daily flights, with a 50%
increase in flight frequency over the pre-deregulation period, thus reaching a 33.3% market
share (the market share in the regulated period was 19.1%). The AAR’s rebadging strategy,
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i.e., replacing its prior service with ABL, does not constitute a new entry. Therefore the
analysis of multiproduct firm activities does not apply to AAR. The average Lerner indices
predicted by both a (i) SBNE and a (ii) MBNE had the identical value of 44.7%, which was
14% greater than that of the pre-deregulation period.
On the other hand, KAL operated under both badges, KAL and JNA, for only three
months between January and March 2009. JNA offered tickets at 89.3% of the air fare
provided by ABL, having a low market share of 2.9% with a load factor of 15.4%. The total
number of daily scheduled flights decreased from 21.2 in the pre-deregulation period to 19.9
(including JNA flight frequency). For KAL flights alone, the average Lerner index predicted
by a (ii) MBNE was 69.5%.
In summary, for both periods, the Seoul-Busan route has been dominated by the two
legacy carriers and/or their subsidiary LCCs. The drop in passenger volume for KAL was
mostly captured by ABL, a subsidiary LCC of AAR. Compared to the Jeju island routes,
the inland routes were characterized as duopoly airline routes even in the post-deregulation
period. Thus, both legacy carriers reaped higher yields through higher markups in the Seoul-
Busan route than in the Jeju-Busan/Seoul routes.
4.1.3 Summary
The main purpose of supply side consideration along with the demand model in the previous
chapter is an attempt to assess the benefit to air passengers and independent LCCs from the
May 2008 Deregulation Act. The point estimates from the demand specification are used
to recover the implied price-cost margins, thus marginal costs for each carrier-time-route
observation. Then, the corresponding average own- and cross- price elasticities and Lerner
indices are computed under two distinct supply model equilibrium concepts.
Within the five Jeju island routes (r = 1, 2, 3, 4, 5), the strategies for the two legacy
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carriers that involve responding with subsidiary LCCs are limited to two routes, Jeju-Seoul
(r = 1) and Jeju-Busan (r = 2), where Korean Air operated under two brands, KAL and JNA,
and AAR replaced its prior operation with ABL. For the Jeju-Cheongju route (r = 3), where
competition between the two legacy carriers and the independent LCCs has intensified since
the May 2008 Deregulation, the capability of the LCC business model in the Korean air
transport industry is testable. Thus, I limited the analysis to the three routes out of five Jeju
island routes where the LCCs operated at least a half year: Jeju-Seoul, Jeju-Busan, and Jeju-
Cheongju. Regarding the inland routes (r = 6, 7), the Seoul-Gwangju route has only been
operated by the two legacy carriers, KAL and AAR. The strategies for the two legacy carriers
that involve responding with subsidiary LCCs are limited to the Seoul-Busan (r = 6) route
where Korean Air operated under two brands, KAL and JNA, and AAR replaced its prior
operation with ABL. However, there appears to be a failure in one of the two maintained
hypotheses, either the nested logit or the short run profit maximization assumptions, for the
KAL flights, at least, in the pre-deregulation period. Therefore, the results and implications
in this chapter are limited to the three Jeju island routes out of seven routes.
The supply side considerations under static oligopoly competition models, i.e., SBNE
and MBNE, provide the following implications for two routes out of seven routes across the
Jeju island routes and the inland routes: Jeju-Seoul route (r = 1) and Jeju-Busan route (r =
2). The optimal pricing equations are reduced to price-cost margins involving equilibrium
prices and demand parameters, thus depending on the structure imposed on the nested logit
structure. The results on Lerner indices seem consistent with the patterns of average price
elasticities predicted by nested logit models. As expected, the highest Lerner indices cor-
respond to KAL flights having least elastic demand. According to the context, the Lerner
indices - predicted by two different concepts - the SBNE and the MBNE - are compared.
The MBNE is designed to predict a larger number of Lerner indices than the SBNE due to
additional multiproduct firm-specific markup terms and potential diversion to the alternative
produced by the same firm. During the post-deregulation period, the largest carrier, KAL,
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lost some sales to emerging LCCs, partly capturing the sales loss through its JNA operation.
KAL’s responding strategy with its own subsidiary LCC seems to be effective only in the
Jeju-Seoul route. For the Jeju-Busan route, the MBNE indicates that substantial numbers of
passengers would divert to ABL rather than JNA, where AAR rebadged to ABL and charged
lower prices than KAL. As opposed to KAL, AAR recorded a larger market share and a
higher Lerner index through its repositioning brand strategy to ABL in the Jeju/Seoul-Busan
routes after deregulation.
On the contrary, the average Lerner indices increased for independent LCCs in the Jeju-
Cheongju route in which two types of carriers – legacy carriers and independent LCCs -
competed with each other for both time periods: Pre- and post- deregulation. For example,
neither KAL nor AAR responded with its subsidiary LCC in the Jeju-Cheongju route. Inde-
pendent LCCs, which operated small propeller aircraft with less than 80 seats per airplane
in the regulated period, were restructured by expanding their capacities, i.e., increasing their
fleet size up to more than 100 seats per airplane. Deregulation helped independent LCCs
reach a 26% market share in the Jeju-Cheongju route, which exceeded their pre-deregulation
market share by 12%.
In short, for both periods, the two legacy carriers still were characterized as dominant
firms through joint ownership with their subsidiary LCC operations, i.e., either replacing
their prior services with its an LCC badge or operating under both badges. I find weak
evidence of benefits to independent LCCs from the May 2008 Deregulation Act. Post-act
changes in the air craft sizes (measured in the number of available seats per airplane) are
responsible for most of the increased market share for independent LCCs. Deregulation has
not resulted in drastic changes in market share and Lerner indices for the independent LCCs
although it has promoted new LCCs to enter the market and engage in competition.
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Chapter 5
The Supply Side: Airline Flight
Scheduling
Airlines compete via various qualities, e.g., departure times as well as prices. Since each
route is part of a network and the plane used on one route is in use in prior and subsequent
routes, carriers strategically schedule departure flights, maximizing overall route profitabil-
ity.
5.1 Inter-Firm Departure Times Differentiation: BtwnDIFF
Index
A spatial competition framework may be used to analyze airline routes where the air trav-
eler’s preferred departure times are non-uniformly distributed, and airline departure flights
are differentiated over a time scale (i.e., a day). Theoretical models of spatial product dif-
ferentiation indicate that firms face two opposing incentives: (1) minimize differentiation
in order to steal customers from competitors, and (2) maximize differentiation in order to
reduce price competition (Borenstein and Netz 1999). The former is consistent with the case
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where each carrier schedules its flights more closely to its rivals’ flights, while the latter is
consistent with the case where each carrier schedules its flights farther away from its rivals’
flights.
In order to capture how an airline carrier chooses departure flight times, competing with
not only its rivals’ flights, but also its own flights, the measure used here, BtwnDIFF,1 is
adapted from a measure used by Borenstein and Netz [1999]. BtwnDIFF is the ratio of the
inter-firm differentiation to the overall differentiation on a route. The value for BtwnDIFF
can be larger than 1, implying the inter-firm differentiation is greater than the overall dif-
ferentiation between all flights on a route, thus, greater than the intra-firm differentiation.2
Departure times of all non-stop flights on a route are used to calculate BtwnDIFF .3
1There are n daily direct flights on a route, which depart at d1, . . . , dn minutes. Each departing time,
d1, . . . , dn, is expressed as minutes after 24AM (midnight). For example, if one flight is scheduled at 8AM
and another is scheduled at 9AM, |d1−d2| = |480−540| = 60 is the time distance between the first and sec-
ond flight during a day, 24-hour clock.
The average distance between flights are measured as:
AV GDIFF =
2
n(n−1)
n
∑
i=1
n−1
∑
j>1
[
min
{∣∣di−d j∣∣ , 1440− ∣∣di−d j∣∣}]α , 0 < α < 1 (5.1)
where 1440 denotes the number of minutes in a day. AV GDIFF is minimized at zero when all flights depart
at the same time. AV GDIFF is maximized when flights on a route are evenly distributed over a day, 24-hour
clock. The power of α denotes the marginal effect of changes in time differences between flights on a route. I
arbitrarily choose α = 0.5, and the results do not qualitatively change across alternative values of α .
BtwnDIFF is the ratio of the average time distance between all flights scheduled by different carriers (apply-
ing eq(1) to the subset of flight differences,
∣∣di−d j∣∣ , where the carriers scheduling flights departing at di and d j
are different) to the average time distance among all flights (i.e., AV GDIFF). The between-firm differentiation
index is abbreviated as BtwnDIFF .
2A ratio less than one for BtwnDIFF implies a ratio greater than one for the intra-firm differentiation, since
the overall differentiation between all flights, AV GDIFF , is the same for all possible allocations of the given
departure times across carriers. See footnote 24 Borenstein and Netz (1999). On monopoly routes, BtwnDIFF
is not defined.
3From 10PM to 4AM, I don’t observe any flights so I drop these 6 hours from 24 clocks cycle. The values
for BtwnDIFF do not qualitatively change.
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It is of interest to investigate the two opposing incentives in the airline flight scheduling
competition (Figure 5.1) and how BtwnDIFF would illustrate the configuration of the market
structure: the number of carriers - flight frequency combination (Figure 5.1, 5.2 and 5.3).
Figure 5.1: Two opposing incentives in 2-2 market structure
A2= 7AM 
A1= 6AM B1= 6PM 
B2= 7PM 
Case (i) 
 
B1= 7AM 
A1= 6AM A2= 6PM 
B2= 7PM 
Case (ii) 
 
As seen in Figure 5.1, in Case (i) carrier A schedules two flights in the morning (dA1 =
6AM, dA2 = 7AM ), and carrier B schedules two flights in the evening (dB1 = 6PM, dB2 =
7PM), while in Case (ii) each carrier A and B schedules one morning (dA1 = 6AM, dB1 =
7AM ) and one evening flight (dA2 = 6PM, dB2 = 7PM ). For both cases, the average time
distances among all four flights are the same, but each carrier schedules its own flight times
far from its competitor’s flights, making a cluster by carrier in Case (i) (clustered flights in the
morning for carrier A and clustered flights in the evening for carrier B). As a consequence,
BtwnDIFF has a larger value in Case (i), 1.3072, than in Case (ii), 0.8321.4 The value larger
4For case (i) , AV GDIFFcase(i) is the average time distance between each pairs of four flights, |dA1−dA2|=
|6AM−7AM|, |dA1−dB1| = |6AM−6PM|, |dA1−dB2| = |6AM−7PM|, |dA2−dB1| = |7AM−6PM|,
|dA2−dB2|= |7AM−7PM|, |dB1−dB2|= |6PM−7PM|.
The average time distance between all flights scheduled by different carriers is calculated by |dA1−dB1| =
|6AM−6PM|, |dA1−dB2|= |6AM−7PM|, |dA2−dB1|= |7AM−6PM|, and |dA2−dB2|= |7AM−7PM|.
When α = 0.5, BtwnDIFFcase(i) =
1
4×(7200.5+7800.5+6600.5+7200.5)
1
6×(600.5+7200.5+7800.5+6600.5+7200.5+600.5)
= 26.26120.089 = 1.307.
For case (ii) , AV GDIFFcase(ii) is the average time distance between each pairs of four flights, |dA1−dA2|=
|6AM−6PM|, |dA1−dB1| = |6AM−7AM|, |dA1−dB2| = |6AM−7PM|, |dA2−dB1| = |6PM−7AM|,
|dA2−dB2|= |6PM−7PM|, |dB1−dB2|= |7AM−7PM|.
The average time distance between all flights scheduled by different carriers is calculated by |dA1−dB1| =
|6AM−7AM|, |dA1−dB2|= |6AM−7PM|, |dA2−dB1|= 6PM−7AM, and |dA2−dB2|= |6PM−7PM|.
When α = 0.5, BtwnDIFFcase(ii) =
1
4×(600.5+7800.5+6600.5+600.5)
1
6×(600.5+7200.5+7800.5+6600.5+7200.5+600.5)
= 16.71820.089 = 0.832.
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than 1 implies that carriers schedule departure flight times far from their rivals’ flights rather
than closely, and the value less than 1 indicates the opposite.
Figures 5.2 and 5.3 show how BtwnDIFF may illustrate different market structures.
First, BtwnDIFF would predict higher values as the number of carriers increases on the
route, while holding the flight frequency and the flight schedule configuration fixed in Figure
5.2. Second, compared to Figure 5.1, Figure 5.3 presents carriers A and B scheduling one
additional flight, respectively. The more inter-firm differentiation there is, the larger the
BtwnDIFF .
Figure 5.2: 3-3 market structure vs 2-2-2 market structure
Case (iii) 
 
 
B2= 7PM 
B1= 6PM 
A2= 7AM 
A1= 6AM 
A3=12PM B3=1PM 
Case (iv) 
 
B2= 7PM 
B1= 6PM 
A2= 7AM 
A1= 6AM 
C1=12PM C2=1PM 
Case (iii) in Figure 5.2 shows that two carriers A and B schedule three flights, dA1 =
6AM, dA2= 7AM, and dA3= 12PM for carrier A, and dB1= 6PM, dB2= 7PM, and dB3=
1PM for carrier B. For Case (iv), let’s suppose that a third carrier C starts the route service,
scheduling two flights, dC1 = 12PM and dC2 = 1PM, around lunchtime far from its rivals’
flights. BtwnDIFF is greater than one in both cases, but has a slightly larger value in Case
(iv), where BtwnDIFFcase(iv)=1.1461, than in Case (iii), where BtwnDIFFcase(iii)=1.1420.5
5See appendix section.Calculation for the inter-firm departure flight times differentiation index, BtwnDIFF
for calculation.
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Figure 5.3: 3-3 market structure and BtwnDIFF
Case (iii) 
 
 
B2= 7PM 
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A2= 7AM 
A1= 6AM 
A3=12PM B3=1PM 
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B1= 6PM 
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B3=8PM 
Given the same market structure, i.e., where both the total number of flight frequency and
carriers are fixed, BtwnDIFF maps the carrier’s strategic behaviors. The impact of changing
from a 2-2 market structure in Case (i) in Figure 5.1 to 3-3 market structure (either Case (iii)
or (v)) in Figure 5.3 reflects the degree of inter-firm differentiation. A movement from a 2-2
market structure in Case (i) in Figure 5.1 to 3-3 market structure in Case (iii) in Figure 5.3
decreases the index to 1.1420 while a movement from a 2-2 market structure in Case (i) in
Figure 5.1 to 3-3 market structure in Case (v) in Figure 5.3 increases the index to 1.3575. For
both Cases (iii) and (v), the two carriers locate their third flight farther from each other rather
than more closely to each other, but the departure time schedules in Case (v) crowd together
a carrier’s own flights. The Case (v) configuration simply leads to market segmentation by
carriers: Clustered flights in the morning for carrier A and clustered flights in the evening for
carrier B. However, the departure flight schedules contain three cluster groups in Case (iii):
Clustered flights in the morning for carrier A, clustered flights at lunchtime, and clustered
flights in the evening for carrier B. BtwnDIFF is greater than 1 in both cases. BtwnDIFF
has a value of 1.3575 in Case (v), which exceeds 1.1420 in Case (iii).6
6See appendix section.Calculation for the inter-firm departure flight times differentiation index, BtwnDIFF
for calculation.
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5.2 Predictions
A few independent low cost carriers had flown Jeju island routes before May 2008, but
most of these were non-scheduled air service carriers subject to regulated market policy.
These restrictions on non-scheduled air service carriers, combined with irregular flights ser-
vice, greatly limited their aircraft availability and selection. The May 2008 Deregulation
Act removed restrictions imposed on aircraft size for the non-scheduled airlines; thus, all
independent LCCs were then able to operate jet aircraft with more than 100 seats each.
Several LCCs (including both dependent and independent LCCs) have been established
over the last three years, although two of the independent LCCs have since ceased opera-
tions. The remaining independent LCCs were restructured by expanding their capacities.
For example, Jeju Air (JJA) permanently removed all four Dash 8 Q400s, turboprop aircraft
with 78 available seats per airplane, in June 2010, and took delivery of one Boeing 737 in
2011 on top of its existing fleet of five B737s. Another independent LCC, Eastar Jet (ESR)
expanded its fleet up to six Boeing 737s in March 2010. In addition, they increased their
daily flight frequency on some routes (Jeju-Cheongju/Seoul).
In response to the creation of the independent LCCs the two established full service car-
riers could establish subsidiary LCCs of their own, either replacing their prior services with
them or competed with them. For example, AAR replaces its service on some routes with
its own LCC, ABL, and KAL’s LCC subsidiary LCC, JNA, competed with KAL flights on
some routes. As a result, major airlines could schedule their departure flight times strategi-
cally either farther from or closer to independent LCC flights in response to the intensified
competition from LCCs. Moreover, LCCs competed by means of non-price (e.g., quality)
product differentiation strategies. It is therefore of interest to investigate whether the pattern
for scheduling departure flight times has changed since the 2008 Deregulation Act.
• Hypothesis In the post-deregulation period, carriers strategically schedule their depar-
ture flight times either farther from or closer to their rivals’ flight times.
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As shown in Tables 4.1, 4.5, 4.9, and 4.11 in chapter 4, the average prices for major airlines
slightly increased in real terms. Average prices for independent LCCs only slightly changed
(decreased in the Jeju-Cheongju route, but increased in the other two Jeju island routes) in
real terms after deregulation. With small variations in prices within carriers, carriers would
have engaged in non-price dimension competition. Thus, which incentive - two opposing
incentives: (1) minimized/(2) maximized departure times differentiation across carriers on
a route - would dominate in the post-deregulation period is testable. When prices are set
exogenously, then it follows that carriers would minimize departure time differentiation in
the absence of price competition. On the other hand, carriers might increase departure time
differentiation in order to soften price competition in the presence of potential intensive price
competition. Since the prices are not set exogenously in the Korean airline industry, and
consumers are not uniformly distributed, the Hotelling’s conjecture (i.e., carriers minimize
departure time differentiation in order to steal passengers from each other) cannot be directly
applied to the data.
• Deregulation period: Deregulation
I posit that carriers strategically schedule their flight times either farther from or closer to
their rivals’ flight times on the routes where new entry of independent LCCs are present in
the post-deregulation period. Deregulation is equal to one for the post-deregulation period
and is equal to 0 for the period prior to deregulation.
• Degree of competition: HHI
To test the hypothesis, the Herfindahl Index, HHI, is defined as a measure of the degree of
competition among carriers on a route, ranging from zero to one. This index is calculated
as the sum of squares of the flight frequency shares of all airlines. A higher HHI number
indicates that the route is less competitive, while a lower HHI number indicates the opposite.
The values of HHI reflect the number of carriers as well as inequality in market shares across
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carriers on a route. It decreases as the number of carriers increases, given a constant flight
frequency number. The value of HHI would be greater if the inequalities in market shares
between carriers are larger while holding a fixed number of carriers.
• Load factor: Load f actor
The load factor on a route, which is the percentage of seats occupied, would affect the de-
gree of between-firm differentiation. The Load f actor variable is supposed to have opposing
effects on the inter-firm differentiation with respect to the departure times. From the supply
side perspective, the incentive (or ability) for carriers to compete on departure time would
be reduced on the routes with high load factors when flights are almost full capacity. Con-
sequently, there might be no reason for each carrier to schedule its flights closer to its rivals’
flights in order to steal air passengers from rivals. In this context, Loadfactor is expected to
have positive effects on the inter-firm departure flight times differentiation, leading to more
product differentiation between carriers when the average load factors are high. With regards
to the demand-driven incentive, Loadfactor might have negative effects on the inter-firm de-
parture flight times differentiation. Load factors are high during peak-demand season/hours,
meaning that demand is high relative to the number of seats offered. Carriers would sched-
ule their flight times closer to their rivals’ flights in order to capture the high demand on
peak-hours during a day, stealing air passengers from competitors.
• Lerner index: Lerner
The route-specific profitability would drive carriers to schedule flight times either more
closely to or farther from their rivals’ flights. The Lerner index, or price-cost margin, can
be used as a measure of the firms’ market power. This index ranges from a high of one to
a low of zero, with higher numbers implying greater market power.7 The Lerner variable
is hypothesized to have opposing effects on the inter-firm differentiation with respect to the
7The assumption that the price charged on flight service is never less than the carrier paid to create it, cost,
holds under the static profit maximizing model.
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departure times. On a route with higher Lerner indices as exogenous, a carrier would have
a greater incentive to schedule flight times closer to each other’s flights, drawing passengers
off from the most nearby flights from rivals. In other words, there is less incentive for carri-
ers to schedule their flights closer to their rivals’ flights in order to steal customers when the
average price-cost margins on the route are low.
On the other hand, carriers might try to differentiate their departure flight times farther
from each other when the route-specific average profitability per passenger is high, avoiding
potentially intense price competition. Since Lerner variables used in data are recovered after
the demand parameters are first obtained and then inserted in the pricing equation (7) (equa-
tions (8) and (9)) for under the single product firm assumption (for under the multiproduct
firm assumption), the implied markups clearly depend on the assumed functional form for
the demand specification. That is, the size of markups is inversely proportional to own price
elasticities. Thus, at a time when the average route-specific Lerner indices are high, carri-
ers would have more to lose by concentrating on price competition, i.e., price cuts in order
to gain additional passenger load if they seek to increase revenues since demand for flight
services are less elastic at those times.
With regards to the relationship between market structure and BtwnDIFF , both the num-
ber of carriers and daily flight frequency on a route are included in the regression analysis.
• The number of carriers on a route: Carrier
The measure for the inter-firm departure flight time differentiation, BtwnDIFF , increases
with the number of carriers, holding a constant number of total flight frequencies and the
flight schedule configuration fixed on a route. As shown in Case (iii) and (iv) in Figure 5.2,
BtwnDIFF has a larger value when three carriers, A,B, and C, operated on a route than
two carriers, A and B, did, while holding the flight schedule configuration fixed. Thus, the
number of carriers on a route is expected to have a positive effect on BtwnDIFF .
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• The number of total daily flights on a route: Flight
The total flight frequency on a route controls for the market size. Holding a fixed number of
carriers, the number of total flight frequency scheduled by each carrier illustrates the degree
of inter-firm differentiation. Compared to Case (i) in Figure 5.1, each carriers A and B
schedules a third additional flight at lunchtime in Case (iii) in Figure 5.3, and even farther
from the rivals’ flights in Case (v) in Figure 5.3. Case (v) has a larger value of BtwnDIFF
than Case (i), and Case (iii) has a lower value of BtwnDIFF than in Case (i). That is,
carriers try to differentiate their departure flight times farther from each other more in Case
(v) than in Case (iii). Therefore, moving from 2-2 market structure (in Figure 5.1) to 3-
3 market structure (in Figure 5.3) BtwnDIFF would demonstrate the degree of inter-firm
differentiation as each carrier expands flight frequency, e.g., Flight variable might have a
positive effect on BtwnDIFF in Case (v), but have a negative effect on BtwnDIFF in Case
(iii).
5.3 Model
To provide empirical test results, I present two different model specifications that differ in
their sets of explanatory variables.8 Model 1 controls for a route-specific capacity constraint,
Load f actor. Instead, Model 2 controls for route-specific profitability per passenger, Lerner.
I assume a log-log relationship.
8The present Models 1 and 2 consider the impact of each independent variable in an additive way, assuming
that the marginal effect of competition, HHI, on inter-firm flight times differentiation, BtwnDIFF , is the same
for any time period.
Given that the estimated effect of competition might depend on deregulation, we can account for this intuition
with an interaction term, LnHHIt ∗Deregulationt . In the estimation results for each of the routes, however, the
point estimates for the LnHHIt ∗Deregulationt variable are insignificant at 5% level, implying that there would
be no significant difference in the marginal effect of competition on BtwnDIFF across the two time periods,
pre- and post- deregulation.
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• Model 1
The following equation (10) addresses Model 1. I observe t = 1, . . . ,T time period (June
2006 to October 2010) on routes r = 1,2,3,4,5,6,7. All explanatory variables are assumed
to have route-specific effects. The error term ε is assumed to be i.i.d
LnBtwnDIFFt = β r0+β
r
1LnHHIt+β
r
2Deregulationt+β
r
3LnLoad f actort+β
r
4LnFlightt+β
r
5LnCarriert+εt (10)
where LnBtwnDIFFt is the logarithm of the between-firm differentiation index, BtwnDIFFt ;
LnHHIt is logarithm of the Herfindahl index based on flight frequency shares among all car-
riers; Deregulationt is a dummy variable, indicating the observations following the May
2008 deregulation; LnLoad f actort is logarithm of the load factors; LnFlightt is logarithm
of the total flight frequency; LnCarriert is logarithm of the number of carriers.
• Model 2
Equation (11) addresses Model 2. I observe t = 1, . . . ,T time periods (June 2006 to October
2010) on routes r = 1,2,3,4,5,6,7. All explanatory variables are assumed to have route-
specific effects. The error term ε is assumed to be i.i.d.
LnBtwnDIFFt = β r0 +β
r
1LnHHIt +β
r
2Deregulationt +β
r
3LnLernert +β
r
4LnFlightt +β
r
5LnCarriert + εt (11)
where LnBtwnDIFFt is the logarithm of the between-firm differentiation index, BtwnDIFFt ;
LnHHIt is logarithm of the Herfindahl index based on flight frequency shares among all car-
riers; Deregulationt is a dummy variable, indicating the observations following the May
2008 deregulation; LnLernert is logarithm of the Lerner indices; LnFlightt is logarithm of
the total flight frequency; LnCarriert is logarithm of the number of carriers.
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5.4 Data and Estimation Results: Route-by-Route Estimates
Here I provide route-by-route estimation results. The two explanatory variables, Flight and
Load f actor, are weighted by each carrier’s flight frequency shares on a route and Lerner
is weighted by each carrier’s passenger load shares on a route. From July 2006 to October
2010, a total of 52 months were observed.
To provide an econometric analysis, two demand specifications that only differ in one
explanatory variable are compared: Load f actor in Model (1) controls for the route-specific
capacity constraints that may affect the departure times scheduling strategy, and Lerner in
Model (2) controls for the route-specific profitability per passenger that may affect the de-
parture times scheduling strategy. Each column in all tables for each route below will show
estimation results from Model (1) and Model (2), respectively.
One potential problem can arise here due to endogeneity. The two variables, Load f actor
and Lerner, would be correlated to the error term if the error term incorporates unobserved
seasonal effects or cyclical fluctuations. Load f actor in Model (1) may be endogenous with
respect to the error term, but the specification test does not reject the null hypothesis that
Load f actor is exogenous. The same specification test is conducted for Lerner in Model (2),
and again, it does not reject the null hypothesis that Lerner is exogenous. Thus, Load f actor
and Lerner are assumed to be exogenous in each model specification.
5.4.1 Jeju Island Routes
Within the Jeju island routes, the demands for five direct routes (r = 1,2,3,4,5) were esti-
mated in an earlier chapter. In this chapter the analysis is limited to only three routes because
only three routes had significant competition (e.g., over half a year) from independent LCCs:
Jeju-Seoul (r = 1), Jeju-Busan (r = 2), and Jeju-Cheongju (r = 4).
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5.4.1.1 Jeju-Seoul Route ( r =1 )
Jeju-Seoul is the largest domestic sector for LCCs. KAL, the country’s largest legacy car-
rier, launched its own subsidiary LCC, JNA, and started the route service in July 2008, two
months after the May 2008 Deregulation Act. On the Jeju-Seoul route, several LCCs have
been established over the last three years: two independent LCCs, ESR and JJA, as well
as the dependent LCC, JNA. On the other hand, two other independent LCCs ceased oper-
ations in 2008 – HAN in November and ONA in December - due to intense competition,
worsening economic conditions, increasing fuel costs, and difficulties in securing additional
funding. The emergence and failure of LCCs are linked to changes in market structure,
thus competition level, among carriers. Consequently carriers are likely to diversify their
competition strategies, i.e., responding with strategic departure flight times scheduling.
Table 5.1 presents summary statistics for the main explanatory variables, average monthly
values of the between-firm differentiation indices and the Herfindahl indices from two per-
spectives: Pre- and post-deregulation.9 The values of indices in each observation are derived
from all direct flights on a directional route, from Seoul to Jeju.10
Table 5.1: Descriptive statistics: Jeju-Seoul route ( r = 1 )
1.Jeju-Seoul route
Variable Mean Std. Dev Min Max Mean Std. Dev Min Max
BtwnDIF F 0.9943 0.0058 0.9876 1.0013 0.9939 0.0018 0.9922 0.9977
HHI 0.3326 0.0426 0.2880 0.4340 0.2351 0.0269 0.1890 0.2940
Number of carriers 3.8 0.4 3.0 4.0 5.1 0.5 4.0 6.0
Flight frequency 61.4 8.7 47.6 81.8 77.8 8.0 57.8 92.1
Lerner indices 0.4001 0.0283 0.3457 0.4710 0.2979 0.0242 0.2661 0.3897
Load factor 0.8113 0.0751 0.6702 0.9598 0.7750 0.0803 0.6441 0.9557
Pre-deregulation Post-deregulation
It is not clear to see whether the carriers’ departure flight times scheduling patterns
have significantly changed since the deregulation in May 2008. No significant changes
9Time subscripts are omitted. The numbers are rounded.
10I also compared the value with Jeju to Seoul observation, but the results are qualitatively insensitive. The
same result applies to the rest of routes.
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in BtwnDIFF were reported, displaying moderate variation over time. BtwnDIFF had a
1.0013 maximum value during the regulated period, implying that the average inter-firm
differentiation was more than the average overall differentiation between all flights on the
route, thus, more than the average intra-firm differentiation. BtwnDIFF decreased in the
deregulated period, having the index values less than 1 with smaller standard deviation.
Unlike BtwnDIFF , the average values for all explanatory variables substantially changed
in the post-deregulation period. The degree of competition, measured by the Herfindahl in-
dices, rose, indicating that the Jeju-Seoul route service had become more competitive. In ad-
dition, the number of carriers, as well as the route-wide total flight frequencies increased. A
slight decrease in BtwnDIFF mentioned earlier, combined with a decrease in HHI, may pro-
vide weak evidence that carriers would tend to schedule their flight times closely to nearby
flights located by the rivals as competition between firms intensifies over time.
Regarding the variables that also depend on the demand-driven concerns, data showed
a drop in both Lerner and Load f actor. Average values for Lerner substantially decreased,
possibly due to the fact that several new independent LCCs started to fly the Jeju - Seoul
route, but two of them ceased operations, causing the average price-cost markups to drop.
In a similar way, average values for Load f actor slightly declined, showing a larger standard
deviation than the pre-deregulation period.
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Table 5.2: OLS estimation of log-log specification: Jeju-Seoul route ( r = 1 )
1. Jeju­Seoul route
Explanatory variable Model (1) Model (2)
­0.00007 ­0.00125
(0.004) (0.006)
­0.0071*** ­0.0073*
(0.002) (0.003)
­0.0249***
(0.004)
­0.0043
(0.010)
0.0197*** 0.0135*
(0.005) (0.006)
0.0007 0.0015
(0.001) (0.001)
­0.1744*** ­0.1263**
(0.035) (0.040)
N 52 52
adj. R­sq 0.591 0.239
Robust standard errors in parentheses
* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001
Dependent variable LnBtwnDIFF
LnHHI
LnLoadfactor
LnFlight
Deregulation
Constant
LnLerner
Number of carriers
As shown in the Table 5.2, the primary conclusions from summary statistics mostly
hold up in the OLS regression results. The negative coefficient estimates for LnHHI in
both specifications are not of expected sign.11 I expected to find a positive relationship
between LnBtwnDIFF and LnHHI, showing the associated movements in the same direc-
tion. Its virtually zero coefficients are not close to the 5% significance level. The impacts
of Deregulation on the degree of inter-firm departure time differentiation are all negative
and robust across models. The smaller gaps among carriers’ flight times were found in the
deregulated period.
The coefficient estimate for LnLoad f actor is negative in Model (1) and statistically sig-
nificant. This is not surprising because the Jeju-Seoul route is characterized as the highest
load factor route with a 95.98% maximum value of average load factors. The negative sign
11In order to see whether carriers strategically schedule their departure flight times either farther from or
closer to their rivals’ flight times, the null hypothesis that H0 : The coefficient for LnHHI is equal to zero
(against the alternative hypothesis H1 : The coefficient for LnHHI is not equal to zero) was tested for Models
1 and 2, respectively. According to the two-tailed t statistics for this hypothesis, there is no statistical evidence
to reject the null hypothesis.
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indicates that high load factors would lead to a minimum departure flight times differentia-
tion between competitors. In other words, the result on LnLoad f actor accounts for departure
times crowding into peak-demand hours/months, which would be associated with less depar-
ture times differentiation.
The route-specific flight service profitability, Lerner, in Model (2) has a negative effect
on BtwnDIFF , but is insignificant, implying that the higher the profitability per passenger,
the smaller the BtwnDIFF . The minimum differentiation incentive may drive the carriers
to schedule their flights more closely to their rivals’ flights, drawing off passengers from
nearby flights. With regards to the impact of market structure on the degree of inter-firm
departure time differentiation, both the departure flight frequency and the number of carriers
are controlled. The coefficient estimates for both LnFlight and LnCarrier are all positive;
however, the results on LnCarrier are not significant. The more frequent flights, given a
fixed number of carriers on the Jeju-Seoul route, would provide larger values of BtwnDIFF .
Similar to interpreting the estimation results for LnFlight, more varieties of carriers, given a
constant number of flight frequency on the Jeju-Seoul route, would generate larger values of
BtwnDIFF . This finding is consistent with the example (recall Cases (iii) and (iv) in Figure
5.2).
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5.4.1.2 Jeju-Busan Route ( r =2 )
Jeju-Busan is the second largest domestic route for LCCs. The two major airlines actively en-
gaged in competition, responding with their own subsidiary LCCs. In November-December
2008, AAR established ABL, and replaced its prior services with it. AAR minimized switch-
ing costs for their passengers through the code-share operation system with ABL, charg-
ing air fare higher than the competing independent LCCs, but lower than KAL. Moreover
AAR/ABL scheduled a total of 8.8 daily flights, which exceeded its pre-deregulation flight
frequency by 87.2%. AAR reached a 32.5% market share through its ABL operation, which
exceeded the market share of 23.7% in a regulated period. In contrast to AAR’s reposition-
ing brand strategy KAL flew under the JNA badge in the Jeju-Busan route between April
and November 2009, maintaining its KAL badge as well.
Table 5.3 reports the available variables.12 The data consist of route-specific average
monthly inter-firm departure flight times differentiation indices, the Herfindahl indices, and
other explanatory variables from two perspectives: pre- and post-deregulation. The values of
indices in each observation are derived from all nonstop flights on a directional route, from
Busan to Jeju.
Table 5.3: Descriptive statistics: Jeju-Busan route ( r = 2 )
2. Jeju-Busan route
Variable Mean Std. Dev Min Max Mean Std. Dev Min Max
BtwnDIF F 0.9825 0.0048 0.9713 0.9888 0.9809 0.0068 0.9694 0.9934
HHI 0.4369 0.0474 0.4010 0.5620 0.3467 0.0492 0.2630 0.4040
Number of carriers 2.9 0.3 2.0 3.0 3.5 0.5 3.0 4.0
Flight frequency 17.7 1.5 15.0 20.0 20.9 3.0 14.5 25.8
Lerner indices 0.6047 0.0631 0.4895 0.7399 0.4055 0.0475 0.3459 0.6023
Load factor 0.7529 0.0886 0.6146 0.9275 0.7848 0.0874 0.6303 0.9448
Pre-deregulation Post-deregulation
In all 52 months observations, BtwnDIFF is less than 1, implying that the average
inter-firm differentiation is less than the average overall differentiation between all flights
12Time subscripts are omitted. The numbers are rounded.
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on the route, therefore, less than the average intra-firm differentiation. The average values
for BtwnDIFF are more dispersed in the post-deregulation period, having a slightly larger
standard deviation.
The average values for all explanatory variables significantly differ between the two time-
periods, pre- and post-deregulation. HHI decreased over time, indicating that competition
intensified on the Jeju-Busan route. The number of carriers, as well as the route-wide total
flight frequencies increased. A huge drop in the average values for Lerner is found in the
post-deregulation. The change in the market structure would demonstrate this enormous drop
in Lerner. Prior to the May 2008 Deregulation, the route was dominated by the two legacy
carriers, KAL and AAR, recording their total passenger load shares of 91.7%. KAL reached
a 67.8% market share, which was almost three times higher than the share of its main rival,
AAR. Since May 2008, new LCCs started to fly the route, drawing passengers off from the
major airlines. As a consequence, Lerner, calculated using passenger load shares among all
carriers, dropped sharply in the post-deregulation period. Load f actor increased, meaning
a higher load factors for average carriers. One possible explanation for this is due to the
emergence of effectively competitive entrants with high load factors in the Jeju-Busan route.
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Table 5.4: OLS estimation of log-log specification: Jeju-Busan route ( r = 2 )
2. Jeju­Busan route
Explanatory variable Model (1) Model (2)
0.009 0.007
(0.009) (0.011)
­0.007*** ­0.006*
(0.001) (0.002)
­0.015*
(0.006)
0.007
(0.007)
0.030*** 0.027***
(0.005) (0.004)
0.007* 0.008**
(0.003) (0.003)
­0.245*** ­0.222***
(0.034) (0.027)
N 52 52
adj. R­sq 0.576 0.51
Robust standard errors in parentheses
* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001
LnHHI
LnLoadfactor
Number of carriers
Constant
Dependent variable LnBtwnDIFF
Deregulation
LnLerner
LnFlight
Point estimates are similar across Models (1) and (2), supporting the primary conclu-
sions from descriptive statistics. The coefficient estimates for LnHHI are all positive, but
not close to the 5% significance level.13 The positive effects suggest the associated move-
ments between degree of competition and the resulting pattern on route-specific scheduling
patterns moved in the same direction. This would imply that for each carrier the minimum
differentiation incentive as opposed to the rival’s flight times outweigh the maximum dif-
ferentiation incentive when competition intensifies on the Jeju-Busan route. The estimated
impacts of Deregulation on the degree of inter-firm departure flight times differentiation are
negative and robust across models. The size of the gaps between carriers’ departure flight
times may be less in the post-deregulation period.
13In order to see whether carriers strategically schedule their departure flight times either farther from or
closer to their rivals’ flight times, the null hypothesis that H0 : The coefficient for LnHHI is equal to zero
(against the alternative hypothesis H1 : The coefficient for LnHHI is not equal to zero) was tested for Models
1 and 2, respectively. According to the two-tailed t statistics for this hypothesis, there is no statistical evidence
to reject the null hypothesis.
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The coefficients for other time varying factors are significant. First, the coefficient es-
timate for LnLoad f actor is negative in Model (1) and statistically significant. Similar to
the Jeju-Seoul route, the Jeju-Busan route is characterized as a high load factor route with a
94.48% maximum value of average load factors. The negative sign indicates that high load
factors would lead to minimum differentiation between competitors, taking into account de-
parture time crowding into peak-demand times.
Unlike the Jeju-Seoul route, Lerner has a positive effect on BtwnDIFF in Model (2),
implying that the higher the profitability per passenger, the greater BtwnDIFF . The positive
estimated coefficient for Model (2) can be interpreted as the carriers’ desire to maximize
differentiation from the rivals’ flights, avoiding severe price competition.
Furthermore, the estimated impacts of both LnFlight and LnCarrier are more robust.
The coefficient estimates for these two variables are all positive and highly significant. The
more frequent flights, given a fixed number of carriers on the Jeju-Busan route, would pro-
vide larger values of BtwnDIFF . Similar to interpreting the estimation result for LnFlight,
more varieties of carriers, given a constant number of flight frequency on the Jeju-Busan
route, would produce larger values of BtwnDIFF .
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5.4.1.3 Jeju-Cheongju Route ( r = 3 )
The carriers on the route have been characterized by two types: the two major airlines and
independent LCCs. Neither KAL nor AAR launched their own subsidiary LCCs on the Jeju-
Cheongju route. Only two entries of independent LCC are observed during full time period:
JJA and ESR.
Table 5.5 describes the average values for the main variables.14 The data consist of
route-specific average monthly inter-firm departure flight times differentiation indices, the
Herfindahl indices, and other explanatory variables, from two perspectives: pre- and post-
deregulation. The values of indices in each observation are derived from all nonstop flights
on a directional route, from Cheongju to Jeju.
Table 5.5: Descriptive statistics: Jeju-Cheongju route ( r = 3 )
3. Jeju­Cheongju route
Variable Mean Std. Dev Min Max Mean Std. Dev Min Max
BtwnDIFF 0.9481 0.0075 0.9440 0.9690 0.9594 0.0104 0.9430 0.9800
HHI 0.3369 0.0021 0.3340 0.3410 0.2866 0.0332 0.2540 0.3440
Number of carriers 3.0 0.0 3.0 3.0 3.8 0.4 3.0 4.0
Flight frequency 10.9 0.6 9.5 12.0 11.9 1.3 9.9 14.7
Lerner indices 0.5614 0.0298 0.4887 0.6035 0.5472 0.0450 0.4342 0.6168
Load factor 0.7676 0.0914 0.5857 0.9145 0.7496 0.0901 0.5868 0.8958
Pre­deregulation  Post­deregulation
Data strongly support the structural change since the Deregulation Act of May 2008. It
is clear to see whether the departure flight scheduling patterns have significantly changed
after May 2008. In all 52 months of observations, BtwnDIFF is less than 1, with a strong
tendency to increase in the deregulated period. The index values less than 1 indicate that
the inter-firm differentiation is less than the overall differentiation between all flights on the
route. The Herfindahl indices decreased, implying that the level of competition increased
14Time subscripts are omitted. The numbers are rounded.
139
on the Jeju-Cheongju route. The number of carriers increased, reflecting the entries of two
independent LCCs, JJA in June 2008, and ESR in June 2009. The route-wide total flight
frequencies increased as well. Average values for both Lerner and Load f actor declined
slightly.
Table 5.6: OLS estimation of log-log specification: Jeju-Cheongju route ( r = 3 )
3. Jeju­Cheongju route
Explanatory variable Model (1) Model (2)
­0.1049*** ­0.1171***
(0.026) (0.032)
­0.00089 ­0.00074
(0.002) (0.002)
­0.0034
(0.008)
0.0154
(0.014)
0.0516*** 0.0537***
(0.009) (0.008)
­0.0126 ­0.0154
(0.007) (0.008)
­0.4740*** ­0.4848***
(0.055) (0.052)
N 52 52
adj. R­sq 0.763 0.771
Robust standard errors in parentheses
* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001
LnHHI
LnLoadfactor
LnFlight
Number of carriers
Constant
Dependent variable LnBtwnDIFF
Deregulation
LnLerner
As shown in the Table 5.6, the coefficient estimates for LnHHI in Model (1) and (2)
are negative and statistically significant.15 Its negative impacts on LnBtwnDIFF indicate a
tendency for competition towards greater inter-firm differentiation in departure flight times.
The magnitude of the effect is considerably larger (in absolute values) than the other two
Jeju island routes. The negative and highly significant coefficients are due to the industry
competition configuration. Independent LCCs would distinguish their flights from the two
15In order to see whether carriers strategically schedule their departure flight times either farther from or
closer to their rivals’ flight times, the null hypothesis that H0 : The coefficient for LnHHI is equal to zero
(against the alternative hypothesis H1 : The coefficient for LnHHI is not equal to zero) was tested for Models
1 and 2, respectively. Based on the two-tailed t statistics, one can reject the null hypothesis.
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legacy carriers by means of product differentiation strategy. At the same time major airlines
would tend to schedule their departure flight times more strategically (i.e., farther from their
rivals’ flight times in our context) in response to the intensified competition from LCCs.
Thus, the incentive to adjust departure flight times to compete with their rivals attracts the
carriers including both the two legacy carriers and independent LCCs, yielding a relatively
large size of coefficient.
The negative coefficients for Deregulation are not of expected sign, and statistically in-
significant.16 This virtually zero coefficient could be biased downward given that the error
term and deregulation dummy variable are negatively associated.
The point estimation results on LnLoad f actor and LnLerner are statistically insignifi-
cant. The coefficient estimate for LnLoad f actor is negative in Model (1). Similar to the
other two Jeju routes, the Jeju-Cheongju route is also characterized as a high load factor
route with a 91.5% maximum value of load factors. This negative sign indicates that high
load factors lead to minimum differentiation between competitors, taking into account de-
parture time crowding into peak-demand times. Similar to interpreting the estimation result
in the Jeju-Busan route, LnLerner has a positive effect on BtwnDIFF in Model (2), im-
plying that the higher the profitability per passenger, the greater the BtwnDIFF . In other
words, carriers try to differentiate their departure flight times farther from each other when
the route-specific average profitability per passenger is high, reducing potentially intense
price competition.
With regards to the impact of market structure on the degree of inter-firm departure time
differentiation, both the departure flight frequency and the number of carriers are included.
The coefficient estimates for LnFlight are all positive and robust in both specifications. The
more frequent flights, given a fixed number of carriers on the Jeju-Cheongju route, would
16I tested the null hypothesis that H0 : The coefficient for Deregulation is equal to zero (against the al-
ternative hypothesis H1 : The coefficient for Deregulation is either greater than or equal to zero) given that
inter-firm differentiation increases with competition in the Jeju-Cheongju route. According to the one-tailed
t-test statistics results, there is no statistical evidence to reject the null hypothesis.
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predict a larger value of BtwnDIFF . The coefficient estimates for LnCarrier are negative,
but the estimated impacts are not significant.
5.4.2 An Inland Route
For the inland routes, air travel demands for two routes (r = 6,7) were estimated in an earlier
chapter, but the Seoul-Gwangju route has only been operated by the two legacy carriers,
KAL and AAR. The analysis of whether carriers strategically schedule their departure flight
times either far from or more closely to their rivals’ flights in the post-deregulation period is
limited to the Seoul-Busan route (r = 6).
5.4.2.1 Seoul-Busan Route ( r = 6)
The Seoul-Busan route is the third largest domestic route for LCCs and the largest inland
sector for LCCs. In October-November 2008, AAR rebadged to ABL. By contrast, KAL
flew under both KAL and JNA badge, only for three months between January 2009 and
March 2009.
Table 5.7 presents summary statistics for the average values of the inter-firm departure
flight time differentiation indices, the Herfindahl indices, and the other explanatory vari-
ables,17 from two perspectives: Pre- and post-deregulation.18 The values of indices in each
observation are derived from all nonstop flights on a directional route, from Busan to Seoul.
17See chapter 4 section 4.1.2. and chapter 6 section 6.3.1.
Since Lerner variables used in data are recovered after the demand parameters are first obtained and then
inserted in the pricing equation (7) (equations (8) and (9)) for the single product firm assumption (for a multi-
product firm assumption), the implied markups under the static profit maximization assumption clearly depend
on the assumed functional form for the demand specification. That is, the size of markups is inversely propor-
tional to own price elasticities. As seen in section 4.1.2.1 and section 6.3.1, the KAL flights’ were estimated
to be inelastic at least prior to deregulation.These estimated own-price elasticities led to estimated negative
marginal costs for the KAL flights, thereby, unrealistic Lerner indices over the same time period. In this con-
text, the nested logit structure may not suitably describe air travel demand of the Seoul-Busan route in that
period. Thus, the OLS estimation results using the Lerner variable in Model 2 may also be inconsistent with
the static profit maximization assumption. Thus, I will limit the analysis to Model (1) only.
18Time subscripts are omitted. The numbers are rounded.
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Table 5.7: Descriptive statistics: Seoul-Busan route ( r = 6 )
6. Seoul-Busan route
Variable Mean Std. Dev Min Max Mean Std. Dev Min Max
BtwnDIF F 0.9831 0.0069 0.9766 0.9931 0.9748 0.0010 0.9735 0.9780
HHI 0.5750 0.0399 0.4730 0.6120 0.5169 0.0363 0.4490 0.5910
Number of carriers 2.3 0.5 2.0 3.0 2.1 0.4 2.0 3.0
Flight frequency 30.1 1.9 26.9 35.2 29.7 1.8 27.5 33.2
Lerner indices 0.6348 0.0825 0.5068 0.8071 0.6262 0.1159 0.4853 0.8288
Load factor 0.7015 0.0524 0.5572 0.7734 0.6583 0.0697 0.5309 0.8060
Pre-deregulation Post-deregulation
In all 52 months observations, BtwnDIFF is less than 1, and the values dropped in the
post-deregulation period. It would indicate that the inter-firm differentiation is less than
the overall differentiation between all flights on the Seoul-Busan route and carriers tend to
schedule their flight times more closely to their rivals’ flight over time. The Herfindahl
indices decreased, indicating that the level of competition increased on the Seoul-Busan
route. This preliminary evidence supports the statement that on average, carriers schedule
their flight times more closely to their rivals’ flight as the degree of competition increases
with deregulation.
Average values for both the number of carriers and the route-wide total flight frequen-
cies decreased since May 2008. Lerner slightly decreased, being more dispersed in the
deregulated period. Load f actor declined as well, showing a larger standard deviation than
in the pre-deregulation period. Compared to the Jeju island routes, the Seoul-Busan route
recorded a relatively lower load factor with a smaller standard deviation. The less variation
in Load f actor is not surprising because the inland routes attract a greater number of busi-
ness travelers rather than vacationers, having less seasonality effect, thereby less cyclical
variation.
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Table 5.8: OLS estimation of log-log specification: Seoul-Busan route ( r = 6 )
6. Seoul­Busan route  Dependent variable LnBtwnDIFF
Explanatory variable Model (1)
0.0191*
(0.009)
­0.0044*
(0.002)
0.0147**
(0.005)
0.0285*
(0.012)
0.0039
(0.002)
­0.2209*
(0.083)
N 52
adj. R­sq 0.472
Robust standard errors in parentheses
* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001
Constant
LnHHI
Deregulation
LnLoadfactor
LnLerner
LnFlight
Number of carriers
As shown in the Table 5.8, the primary conclusions from summary statistics hold up in
the OLS regression results for Model (1). The coefficient estimate for LnHHI is positive and
significant at 5% level,19implying that carriers schedule their departure flight times closer to
each other as competition increases on the route. The impacts of Deregulation on the degree
of inter-firm departure time differentiation are all negative as expected and robust across
models.20 This can be interpreted as support for a minimum differentiation incentive to steal
customers as the degree of competition increases with deregulation.
Surprisingly, the coefficient estimate for LnLoad f actor is positive in Model (1) and sta-
tistically significant. I would expect to find negative effect of load factors on BtwnDIFF due
19In order to see whether carriers strategically schedule their departure flight times either farther from or
closer to their rivals’ flight times, the null hypothesis that H0 : The coefficient for LnHHI is equal to zero
(against the alternative hypothesis H1 : The coefficient for LnHHI is not equal to zero) was tested for Models
(1). Based on the two-tailed t statistics, one can reject the null hypothesis.
20I tested the null hypothesis that H0 : The coefficient for Deregulation is equal to zero (against the alternative
hypothesis H1 : The coefficient for Deregulation is either less than or equal to zero) given that inter-firm
differentiation decreases with competition in the Seoul-Busan route. According to the one-tailed t-test statistics
results, there is statistical evidence to reject the null hypothesis.
144
to a relatively low average load factors on the Seoul-Busan route (the inland route) compared
to the Jeju island routes. In the absence of capacity constraints, the incentive to schedule de-
parture flight times far from rivals’ flights by means of a product differentiation strategy
would be strengthened.
With regards to the impact of market structure on the degree of inter-firm departure time
differentiation, both the departure flight frequency and the number of carriers are included.
The coefficient estimates for LnFlight are all positive but less robust in Model (2). The more
frequent flights, given a fixed number of carriers on the Seoul-Busan route, would predict
a larger value of BtwnDIFF . The coefficient estimates for LnCarrier are negative, but the
estimated impacts are not significant.
5.5 Conclusion: Scheduling Departure Flight Times
The results in chapter 5 contribute two new insights into the empirical study on the Korean
airline industry. Given that there have been no studies on location competition in the Ko-
rean airline industry, empirical findings in this chapter would suggest important implications
for future research. First, the model design differs from those in the U.S airline study in
that it uses time-series data from June 2006 to October 2010 for each of four routes in the
Korean airline industry, capturing the route-specific consequences caused by the May 2008
Deregulation Act. Second, I focus on the departure flight times differentiation scheduled by
different airline carriers, not the flight times differentiation between all flights.21
Results presented in this chapter imply that the effects of competition on the degree
of inter-firm departure times differentiation would have a different impact across the Jeju
island routes and the inland route (Seoul-Busan route, r = 6). The econometric analysis
21For comparison, the empirical study on the strategic departure flight times scheduling behaviors in the U.S.
airline industry suggested that the effect of competition on departure flight times differentiation was negative.
This finding was based on pooled cross-section data across all routes (data from the Department of Transporta-
tion’s Database 1A for the second quarter of 1986 in Netz & Borenstein (1999) or data from Airline Service
Quality Performance’s Database for May 2005 in Yetiskul (2010)).
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provides a route-specific effect even with the Jeju island routes. For the Jeju-Cheongju route
(r = 3) where the two legacy carriers competed with the independent LCC, the increase
in competition level is associated with greater between firms differentiation. By contrast,
this tendency is not found in the other two Jeju island routes (Jeju-Seoul route, r =1, and
Jeju-Busan route, r = 2) where the two legacy carriers have diversified their strategies by
establishing their own subsidiary LCCs. Rather, the degree of competition would appear to
have no statistically significant effects for these routes. In the absence of dependent LCCs
on the route, it can be said that the independent LCCs may try to differentiate their flight
services from those of major airlines by means of maximum product differentiation.
On the other hand, for the Seoul-Busan route, r = 6, (the inland route), the degree of
competition would be associated with less differentiation between carriers, and a stronger
tendency is observed in the deregulated period. The inland routes are commonly known as
business travelers’ routes, with a concentrated demand for a few hours per day. The empirical
finding appears to be consistent with this prior knowledge in that there will be less departure
flight times differentiation between carriers on the Seoul-Busan route.
The results for both Lerner and Load f actor are also not robust across routes. These
findings would support that the route-specific profitability is related to the two opposing
incentives: minimum differentiation and maximum differentiation. The answer to the pri-
mary question – which incentive outweighs the other – depends on specific circumstances
(e.g., business travel route). Detailed estimation results are summarized in order: Lerner and
Load f actor. The coefficients on both variables alternate in sign. On one hand, the positive
effects of Lerner on the between firm differentiation imply that the higher the profitability,
the greater gap between carriers’ flight times. Since the higher profitability is implied by the
less elastic demand under the supply model specification (chapter 3), it strengthens the in-
centive for a carrier to schedule its departure flight times far from its rivals’ flights, avoiding
the potential loss from intensive price competition (i.e., cutting prices). On the other hand,
the negative effects of Lerner on the between firm differentiation imply that the minimum
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differentiation incentive may drive carriers to schedule their flight times closer to their rivals’
flights, drawing off passengers from nearby flights.
In a similar way, Load f actor has both positive and negative effects across routes. The
negative sign would indicate that high load factors lead to a minimum departure flight times
differentiation between competitors when the demand tends to be concentrated into a few
hours during a day. In other words, the higher the load factor, the less departure time differ-
entiation between airlines. The positive effect of Load f actor on the between firm differen-
tiation imply that the incentive to steal customers by locating their flight times closer to their
rivals’ flights would be reduced when the load factors are almost full. Thus, a higher load
factor may lead to greater differentiation between carriers.
147
Chapter 6
Evaluating Deregulation and its Welfare
Effects
The economic effects generated by the policy change, i.e., the May 2008 Deregulation Act,
is the subject of this chapter. If significant welfare changes that accompany the Act are
estimated, one may question how far it improved welfare for the two types of economic
agents, consumers and producers, respectively. If there are no welfare changes, one carefully
needs to investigate the major obstacles hindering benefits from the Act change.
The welfare measure in the discrete choice model starts from the definition of the market,
thus, market size (chapter 2).1 Recall that, for each market, each consumer is assumed to
purchase only one product that gives the highest utility against all other alternatives including
the non-buying option. This assumption appears to be suitable for service goods, e.g., air
travel, so that one may calculate the magnitude of benefits from the introduction of new
product to consumers with the demand estimates for each market. In the nested logit demand
specification, particularly, gains from either product innovation or introduction of the new
good is measured by comparing the size of aggregate consumers’ utilities between two time
periods.
1Profit changes are commonly known as the welfare measure for producers’ surplus.
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Market shares are defined using a quantity variable which depends on the context. The
most important consideration in choosing the quantity variable is the need to define a market
share for the outside good. For each non-stop route, I define a market as a city pair route in
time t. Potential market size is defined as the number of passengers (the inside good) plus
potential fliers making a no flight decision (outside good). This market varies across time
and routes. All city pair routes of the Jeju island routes are flying to Jeju island, and those of
the inland routes are flying to Seoul and vice versa. In our context, route- and time (month)-
specific outside good shares are constructed to be proportional to origin city population.
For example, monthly populations for Seoul, Busan, Cheongju, Daegu, and Gwangju are
used for each city pair routes of the Jeju island routes, and in a similar manner, monthly
populations for Busan and Gwangju are used for each pair routes of the inland routes.
The outside good market shares calculated from 0.01% to 0.5% of populations for ori-
gin cities flying to Jeju island range between 0.164% and 8.211% for the Jeju-Seoul route,
0.233% and 11.627% for the Jeju-Busan route, 0.006% and 3.192% for the Jeju-Cheongju
route, 0.388% and 19.398% for the Jeju-Daegu route, and 0.213% and 10.667% for the Jeju-
Gwangju route. The outside good market shares calculated from 0.01% to 0.5% of popula-
tions for origin cities flying inland range between 0.171% and 8.544% for the Seoul-Busan
route, 0.295% and 14.736% for the Seoul-Gwangju route. The demand estimation results are
qualitatively insensitive to the choice of time- and route-specific outside goods, at 0.01% to
0.5% of population for origin cities. That is, the choice of time- and route- specific outside
goods only affect the size and significance level of airline carrier-specific fixed effects, and
the relative size of the carrier-specific fixed effects does not change over the chosen percent-
ages, 0.01% to 0.5%, of populations for origin cities. In our context, the welfare evaluation
will proceed with the chosen percentage (0.1%) of populations for origin cities.
The development of accurate measures of the welfare gains from the introduction of new
LCCs is the subject of this chapter. The primary interest of this paper is the effects of the
May 2008 Deregulation Act in S. Korea on the entry of LCCs and any corresponding welfare
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improvement. In the post-deregulation period, restrictions imposed on independent LCCs
were eliminated, thus enabling all LCCs to operate jet aircraft with more than 100 seats per
plane, and allowing more freedom in scheduling frequent flights. Throughout the 52 months
of observations, the entry of LCCs was limited to the routes either flying to Jeju island or
having the two largest metropolitan areas – Seoul and Busan – as an end point city. Other
than those routes, no entrants were observed in either the Jeju-Gwangju route (r = 5) or the
Seoul-Gwangju route (r = 6). These two routes without any LCC entry might be comparison
routes in a differences-in-difference (hereafter DD) model.2 But in fact these routes are not
a good comparison group under DD. I.e., the comparison group should not be affected by
the treatment. For it to be accurate, a comparison group differences out other confounding
factors that changed around the treatment, thereby isolating the treatment effect. As opposed
to the comparison group, only the treatment group, which comprises the routes with LCC
entry in our context, should have been subject to treatment of the May 2008 Deregulation
Act. However, since the Act’s changes are a nationwide policy, DD would not be plausible
for our research design.3
With regard to estimating economic effects of the introduction of new products, the anal-
ysis of welfare consequences is split into two parts: benefits to consumers and benefits to
producers. Given that dynamic behaviors of air passengers (demand side) and/or airline
carriers (supply side) are not modeled under the current specification, I follow the welfare
measurement approach widely used in static equilibrium models. According to an Italian
yogurt study (Giacomo [2008]), the introduction of two new brands increased consumers’
surplus, and the change in industry profits was negative.4 In this study most of the consumer
2The DD identification strategy is a version of fixed effects estimation using aggregate data. See Card and
Krueger [2000]. Card and Krueger studied the effect of the minimum wage on employment. In April 1992,
New Jersey raised the state minimum wage from $4.25 to $ 5.05 while the minimum wage in Pennsylvania
stayed at $4.25. They compared the February to November change in employment in New Jersey to the change
in employment in Pennsylvania over the same period.
3It may be arguable, if treatment effects on these two routes were negligibly small, one can use DD.
4At the end of February 2002, Yomo introduced two new brands. Total welfare increased by C30 million in
1 year after the introduction of the two new brands, while holding the market structure, i.e., number of brands,
unchanged. Both consumers’ welfare change and producers’ variable profits change based on a yearly basis
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welfare increase was due to the price reductions as a reaction to the new brands by all the
main competitors. Similarly, Petrin [2002] also suggests that consumer benefits from the in-
troduction of the minivan were large, and almost half of these benefits came from increased
price competition. A priori one could expect that the introduction of a product/brand will
lead to welfare enhancement for consumers, given that there is a reduction in prices. As
shown in the chapter 4, however, the average prices for major airlines slightly increased in
real terms, and average prices for independent LCCs either slightly decreased in the Jeju-
Cheongju route or increased in the other two Jeju island routes in real terms after deregula-
tion. With small variations in prices within carriers, one would expect to find less consumer
benefits associated with post-deregulation entry of LCCs.
6.1 Computing Consumer Welfare Gains from Entry of LCCs
First, I estimate the change in consumer welfare from entry of LCCs on a particular route.
Following the approach byTrajtenberg [1989] the point estimates for a nested logit demand
model are used to evaluate the welfare gains associated with the entry of LCCs.5 Changes
in not only the set of available carriers in each time on the route, but also observed flight
services attributes directly measure consumer surplus gains. In particular, improvements in
the qualities of flight services for each carrier, i.e., daily flight frequency, aircraft size, and
airtime duration, following the May 2008 deregulation of the airline industry are critical
components in measuring consumer surplus gains along with the variation in prices for flight
services.
One needs to compute the mean utility using the point estimates for prices and the ob-
served characteristics between pre- and post- entry of LCCs. Welfare measurements based
are calculated, respectively.
5In his paper, he separately estimated the nested logit model for every year from 1976 to 1981, and then took
differences between computed aggregate consumers’ surplus in adjacent years, using the estimated demand
coefficients for the observed characteristics and prices.
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on a product characteristics approach simply aggregate consumer surplus in each time pe-
riod, then take differences. The net consumer surplus, CS, measures the attractiveness of the
set of J flights in monetary terms after taking into account the disutility from airfare (α > 0,
coefficient for Fare variable). Using the assumptions of the nested logit model, the route
specific aggregate consumer surplus in each time moment t is
CSrt =
vrit
α
where vrit is route- and time-specific aggregate sum of the deterministic component of the
indirect utility for individual air passenger i in time t ;
vrJe ju,it = ln
(
∑g
(
∑ j∈g exp
(δ rJe ju, jt
1−σr
))1−σr)
for the Jeju island routes,
and
vrInland,it = ln
(
∑g
(
∑ j∈g exp
(δ rInland, jt
1−σr
))1−σr)
for the inland routes.
Since the price sensitivity to price change is the same across all routes (αJe ju = αInland =
α), but the nesting parameter σr and flight characteristics should be allowed to have different
effects across all routes (chapter 2), vrJe ju,it and v
r
Inland,it need to be considered, respectively.
For the Jeju island routes, vrJe ju,it = ln
(
∑g
(
∑ j∈g exp
(δ rJe ju, jt
1−σr
))1−σr)
is the sum of in-
direct utilities for air passenger i from both the inside good (g= 1, i.e., air travel choice) and
the outside good (g = 0, no-flying decision) as g represents the segment, nesting structure of
air travel demand. Route-specific flights j = 0,1, ..., J are nested into two segments: Inside
goods group g = 1 as one nest, and an outside good group g = 0 as another nest in which
only the non-buying option, j = 0 is available.6
6The utility from the outside good j = 0 is normalized to zero, δ rJe ju,0t = 0, thus, v
r
Je ju,it =
ln
(
∑g
(
∑ j∈g exp
( δ rJe ju, jt
1−σr
))1−σr)
= ln
(
1+
(
∑ j∈g=1 exp
( δ rJe ju, jt
1−σr
))1−σr)
.
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Recall the following assumptions that are used to derive route-specific market share func-
tion, s jt =
exp(δ rJe ju, jt/1−σr)
Dσrg
[
∑g=0,1g D
(1−σr)
g
] :7
- Individuals’ heterogeneity enters the model through the random part of utility
[
ζ rigt +(1−σr)εi jt
]
.
- both εi jt and
[
ζ rigt +(1−σr)εi jt
]
follow a type I extreme value distribution.
- Individual consumer i chooses the flight j that maximizes utility.
These assumptions made the closed form market share function, thereby, demand for each
flight j, only depend on flight characteristics, prices, and product level errors where δ rJe ju, jt =
X rJe ju, jtβr −α prjt + ξ jt measures route specific mean utility levels for flight j for the Jeju
island routes (demand equation (3)). The mean utility level differentiates flights, thus, the
demand model can be estimated using market level prices and quantity data (no individual
purchases data is required for the nested logit demand specification).
With regard to δ rJe ju, jt , one can differentiate the marginal effect of price on utility (α)
from the marginal effect of non-price factors, such as flight characteristics, on utility (βr).
In order to calculate the net utility for flight j, consumer welfare measure, CSrt , needs to be
modified, i.e., dividing vrJe ju, jt by α .
Then, incremental consumer surplus gains from the entry of LCCs occurring from t–1 to t
can be calculated as follows:
∆CSr(%) =
(
CSrt −CSrt−1
)
CSrt−1
×100
or
∆CSr =
(vrit− vrit−1)
α
7See chapter 2 for detailed derivation.
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The same logic applies to the inland routes as well.
vrInland,it = ln
(
∑g
(
∑ j∈g exp
(δ rInland, jt
1−σr
))1−σr)
is the sum of indirect utilities for air pas-
senger i from both the inside good (g = 1, i.e., air travel choice) and the outside good
(g = 0, no-flying decision) as g represents the segment, nesting structure of air travel de-
mand. Route-specific flights j = 0,1, ..., J are nested into two segments: Inside goods group
g = 1 as one nest, and an outside good group g = 0 as another nest in which only the non-
buying option, j = 0 is available. δ rInland, jt = X
r
Inland, jtβr−α prjt +ξ jt measures route specific
mean utility levels for flight j for the inland routes (demand equation (6)).
With regard to δ rInland, jt , one can differentiate the marginal effect of price on utility (α)
from the marginal effect of non-price factors, such as flight characteristics, on utility (βr).
In order to calculate the net utility for flight j, consumer welfare measure, CSrt , needs to be
modified, i.e., dividing vrInland, jt by α .
For the inland routes, incremental consumer surplus gains from the entry of LCCs occur-
ring from t–1 to t can be calculated as follows:
∆CSr(%) =
(
CSrt −CSrt−1
)
CSrt−1
×100
or
∆CSr =
(vrInland,it− vrInland,it−1)
α
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6.2 Change in Producers’ Surplus
Second, the changes in producers’ surplus due to the entry of LCCs for both the entrant and
pre-existing competitors are computed under two equilibrium concepts: the SBNE and the
MBNE. The route- and time-specific variable profit Πrjt of a single-product firm j is given
by:8
Πrjt =
(
prjt−mcrjt
)
Ms jt
where prjt is the observed air fare, mc
r
jt is constant marginal cost, s jt is the market share of
flight j, and M is the market size.
The route- and time-specific variable profit of Korean Air operating two of the J flights
in a route is as follow:
Πrf t = (p
r
mt−mcrmt)Msmt +(prlt−mcrlt)Mslt
where prmt is the observed air fare for KAL flight m, p
r
lt is the observed air fare for JNA flight
l, mcrmt is constant marginal cost for KAL flight m, mc
r
lt is constant marginal cost for JNA
flight l, smt is the market share of KAL flight m, slt is the market share of JNA flight l. M is
the market size.
For each route, variable profits calculated from marginal cost estimates under each of the
two supply side models, the SBNE and the MBNE, are reported in separate tables, respec-
tively. The differences between pre- and post-entry variable profits are measured in monetary
values (CPI-adjusted in 2005 year dollar) and percentage changes.
8Each airline carrier other than Korean Air is treated as single-product firms, each operating their own
flights. For some routes, Asiana rebadged to Air Busan, but it never operated under both badges: AAR and
ABL.
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6.3 Route-by-Route Estimated Welfare Effects
6.3.1 An Inland Route: Seoul-Busan Route ( r = 6 )
Within inland routes, air travel demands for two routes (r = 6, 7) were estimated, respectively,
in chapter 2: Seoul-Busan (r = 6) and Seoul-Gwangju (r = 7). The Seoul-Gwangju route
has only been operated by the two legacy carriers, KAL and AAR. That is, KAL’s multi-
brand strategy and AAR’s rebadging strategy were limited to the Seoul-Busan route: AAR
rebadged to ABL in October - November 2008, and KAL started to fly under both KAL
and JNA badges in January 2009. For the estimated welfare effects from the introduction of
LCCs, thus, I will not focus on the Seoul-Gwangju route.
As seen in chapter 4, own-price elasticities were computed using the estimates for the
demand specification and demand side variables, such as prices and market shares.9 The
estimates from demand equation (equation (6)) for the inland routes were used to compute
route and time specific own- and cross-price elasticities. The empirical modeling strategy
was to use the demand elasticity estimates to find markups and marginal costs under a SBNE
(equation (7)) and the demand elasticity estimates and cross elasticity estimates between
KAL and its LCC subsidiary JNA under a MBNE between January and March 2009 (jointly
solving equations (8) and (9)). From these, the strategy was to then estimate changes in
consumer surplus and producer surplus.
The methodology is to assume profit maximization in each time period and then using
the relationships, (prjt −mcrjt) =
prjt
|ηrj j,t| (7), for, for example, the SBNE where p jt is in the
data and ηrj j,t is from the demand estimation.
The maintained hypothesis of short run static profit maximization, however, can be re-
jected for the Seoul Busan route because the estimated elasticity in the pre-deregulation
period (and periods prior to January 2009),
∣∣∣ηrj j,t∣∣∣ is less than 1 which implies the margin
9The formula for the own-price elasticity of flight j,
ηrj j,t =
∣∣∣ prjts jt ∂ s jt∂ prjt ∣∣∣= ∣∣∣− α1−σr prjt (1−σrs jt/gt− (1−σr)s jt)∣∣∣is derived under nested logit model.
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(prjt −mcrjt) > prjt or mcrjt < 0, which is certainly not the case. The implied CSrt for the
pre-deregulation time period cannot be estimated in this case so the change in CSrt cannot be
estimated.
Why is this the case? Probably this is related to the functional form for the demand
estimation based on nested logit. Under the nested logit specification demand elasticities
are proportional to either price, prjt , or market share through
(
1−σrs jt/gt−(1−σr)s jt
)
1−σr . In Seoul-
Busan route KAL had a dominant market share of around 80% in the pre-deregulation period
(and periods prior to January 2009). Given that the two legacy carriers, KAL and AAR,
charged almost same prices to their flights (Table 4.11 in chapter 4), KAL’s dominant market
share may force its own-price elasticities to be small, even less than 1 which implies the
estimated negative marginal costs over the same time periods.
Since JNA was the only entry (January 2009) in the Seoul-Busan route throughout the
52 months,10 no estimated welfare effects analysis is available for the inland routes.
10Prior to the entry of JNA in January 2009, the KAL flights were estimated to have inelastic demand
(ηSeoul−BusanKAL,KAL,2008Dec = 0.0.894 with a dominant market share of 79%).
The AAR’s rebadging strategy to ABL in October 2008, i.e., replacing its prior service with ABL, does not
constitute a new entry.
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6.3.2 Jeju Island Routes
As seen in previous section, the current nested logit model may not suitably describe the air
travel demand structure of the Seoul-Busan (an inland route), at least, prior to the deregu-
lation period.11 Since the functional form of the average price elasticities are designed to
depend on market shares for the outside good (no flying decision) as well as market shares
for the inside good (air travel decision),12 the KAL flights’ dominant market share may lead
to unrealistically small own-price elasticities.
On the other hand, this empirical specification may well capture the right demand struc-
ture for the Jeju island routes in that the current nesting structure may fail for routes with a
dominant firm (e.g., KAL for the Seoul-Busan route in the pre-deregulation period).13 Given
that no such a dominant firm is observed in the Jeju island routes, and the estimates results in
chapters 2 and 4 satisfy the two maintained hypotheses, either the nested logit or the short run
profit max assumptions, we proceed using the demand and supply estimates in this chapter.
6.3.2.1 Jeju-Seoul Route ( r = 1 )
Table 6.1 shows the estimated change in the Jeju-Seoul route air passengers’ welfare from
the entry of LCCs in order: HAN in Oct 2006, ONA and JNA in July 2008, ESR in Jan 2009,
and TWB in Sep 2010.
11The nesting structure would not suitably describe the air travel demand of the Seoul-Gwangju route ( r =
7 ) as well. Throughout the 52 months observation, Seoul-Gwangju route had been operated by the two legacy
carriers, and AAR was a dominant firm.
12The larger market shares for the outside good imply that passengers would substitute towards the outside
good when all prices for flights (the inside good) are increased.
13A priori Jeju island routes are expected to differ from the inland routes from two perspectives: Alternative
transportation modes and types of travelers. The domestic city pair traveling on inland routes may be under-
taken using alternative travel modes such as rail or bus service, whereas there is no closely comparable ferry
service to Jeju island. And with respect to the types of travelers, Jeju island routes are primarily for vacation
travelers, while inland routes attract a great numbers of business travelers. Given that passengers would not
easily find alternative transportation modes when overall prices for flights are increased, particularly for the
Jeju island routes, a small size of the market share for the outside good are reasonable choices in our analysis
(for example, the average market share for the outside good in yogurt industry study equals 99% in Giacomo,
2008).
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Table 6.1: Consumers’ surplus change: Jeju-Seoul route ( r = 1 )
1. Jeju - Seoul
time
Entry ONA JNA
in time t Independent LCC Dependent LCC
Total CS change -0.784% -US$19,174,246 -5.359% ­US$141,490,410 -0.001% -US$24,892 1.943% US$49,918,006
Entry before-deregulation
t-1 = Sep 2006, t = Oct 2006
HAN
Independent LCC
Entries after-deregulation
t-1 = Aug 2010, t = Sep 2010
TWB
Independent LCC
t-1 = Dec 2008, t = Jan 2009
ESR
Independent LCC
t-1 = Jun 2008, t = Jul 2008
The point estimates from the demand model suggest that the TWB entry benefited air
passengers, while the two other post-deregulation entries did not. One potential explanation
for this may stem from fuel surcharges. After the point when the two legacy carriers started to
impose fuel surcharges on all domestic routes in July 2008 and all remaining LCCs imposed
fuel surcharges in August 2008, the entry of LCCs did not lead to a reduction in air fares for
all carriers. From July 2008 to January 2009, the exceptionally high fuel surcharges raised
airfares. Since the same sensitivity with respect to price within the Jeju-Seoul route across
times is assumed, the rise in airfares would generate greater disutility for passengers when
overall prices are higher than other time periods.
Table 6.2 shows the estimated change in variable profits for the Jeju-Seoul route before
and after the change in deregulation policy. The second column illustrates how the entry
of LCCs in the pre-deregulation period affected both industry-wide profits and an entrant’s
own profit, while the rest (columns 3 through 5) describe the effects of entry of LCCs in
the post-deregulation period on profits. The values in the fourth row report the estimated
industry-wide profit changes in response to each of the entries. The estimated changes in the
profits of all main competitors - both the two major airlines and pre-existing LCCs – and the
total variable profits of the introduced LCCs are reported in the cell below the fourth row
(rows 5-12).
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Table 6.2: Producers’ surplus change under SBNE: Jeju-Seoul route ( r = 1 )
1.Jeju-Seoul
time
Entry ONA JNA
in time t Independent LCC Dependent LCC
Total profits change 0.336% US$1,079,648 -6.514% ­US$17,707,955 -5.841% -US$13,659,450 -3.876% -US$8,068,950
KAL 2.332% US$5,545,552 ­12.027% ­US$21,031,104 -11.199% -US$13,528,879 -15.253% ­US$13,870,969
AAR -9.950% -US$7,490,897 ­6.032% ­US$4,580,517 -14.606% -US$10,945,536 -2.889% ­US$1,219,209
HAN Entry US$2,890,493 17.757% US$1,533,947
JJA 1.618% US$134,501 34.725% US$4,307,264 -2.119% -US$540,548 5.948% US$1,076,950
ONA Entry US$76,963
JNA Entry US$1,985,492 33.657% US$4,238,594 0.635% US$168,541
ESR Entry, US$7,116,919 6.800% US$2,065,305
TWB Entry US$3,710,432
Exit Exit
Exit
ESR
Independent LCC
Entry before-deregulation
t-1 = Sep 2006, t = Oct 2006
HAN
Independent LCC
t-1 = Dec 2008, t = Jan 2009t-1 = Jun 2008, t = Jul 2008
Entries after-deregulation
t-1 = Aug 2010, t = Sep 2010
TWB
Independent LCC
N/AN/A N/A
N/A
N/A
N/A N/A
Exit
In Oct 2006, independent LCC, HAN, entered the Jeju-Seoul route, generating a slight
gain for the estimated producers’ surplus. HAN benefited from entering the route, gaining
$2.8 million in the first month. On the contrary, the estimated change in industry profits
induced by the post-deregulation entry of LCCs is rather negative. It decreased by $17
million (-6.5%) following the entries of ONA and JNA in July 2008. Over the same time
period, the estimated variable profits for the two legacy carriers, KAL and AAR, decreased
by 12% and 6% respectively, while two other independent LCCs reaped larger profit gains
in percentages, 17.8% for HAN and 34.7% for JJA (column 3). The entry of ESR in Jan
2009 lowered the estimated industry profits by $13 million in 1 month (-5.8%) (column 4).
A sharp drop in the two legacy carriers’ estimated variable profits was reported as a result of
ESR’s entry. The estimated variable profits for JNA, KAL’s subsidiary LCC, increased by
33.6%, but it did not outweigh the estimated loss in the two legacy carriers’ profit changes.
Similarly, the entry of TWB in Sep 2010 lowered the estimated industry profits by $ 8 million
in 1 month (-3.8%) (column 5). The new entrant, TWB, benefited from entering the route,
but the estimated losses in the two legacy carriers were sizable. Results suggest that the
estimated profit gains obtained by a new carrier were not enough to offset the negative effects
160
on the estimated industry-wide profits in the post-deregulation period.
Table 6.3: Producers’ surplus change under MBNE: Jeju-Seoul route ( r = 1 )
1.Jeju-Seoul
time
Entry ONA JNA
in time t Independent LCC Dependent LCC
Total profits change 0.336% US$1,079,648 -4.264% ­US$11,591,607 -3.153% -US$8,344,725 -6.569% -US$16,801,249
KAL 2.332% US$5,545,552 ­9.703% ­US$16,966,963 -7.766% -US$10,875,251 -16.440% ­US$19,448,002
AAR -9.950% -US$7,490,897 ­6.032% ­US$4,580,517 -14.606% -US$10,945,536 -2.889% ­US$1,219,209
HAN Entry US$2,890,493 17.757% US$1,533,947
JJA 1.618% US$134,501 34.725% US$4,307,264 -2.119% -US$540,548 5.948% US$1,076,950
ONA Entry US$76,963
JNA Entry US$4,037,699 28.509% US$6,899,690 -6.388% ­US$2,986,725
ESR Entry US$7,116,919 6.800% US$2,065,305
TWB Entry US$3,710,432
N/A N/A
Exit
N/A Exit Exit
N/A
N/A
Entry before-deregulation Entries after-deregulation
t-1 = Sep 2006, t = Oct 2006 t-1 = Jun 2008, t = Jul 2008 t-1 = Dec 2008, t = Jan 2009 t-1 = Aug 2010, t = Sep 2010
N/A
HAN ESR TWB
N/A
Independent LCC Independent LCC Independent LCC
Exit
The estimated profit changes using the implied marginal costs on flight services under
MBNE are presented in Table 6.3. Column 2 remained the same as in Table 6.2, since KAL’s
multiproduct firm activity, i.e., flying under both KAL and JNA badges, was limited to the
post-deregulation period. Compared with Table 6.2, columns 3-5 in Table 6.3 only differ in
the estimated values of KAL and JNA. The estimates in Table 6.3 suggest that columns 3
and 4 report less of a profit loss (in absolute value) for KAL and larger profit gains for JNA
than the estimates of Table 6.2. On the contrary, column 5 shows the opposite: a larger profit
loss for KAL and a profit loss for JNA, as well.
In summarizing the estimated changes in consumer and producer welfare for the two time
periods, pre- and post- deregulation, results support that not all entries of LCCs following
the Deregulation Act benefited consumers significantly. It appears that the estimated total
producer surplus for the industry fell in the post-deregulation period. The absolute size of
the estimated welfare gain/loss corresponding to each entry was far larger for the consumer
side. The entry of LCC, HAN, in the pre-deregulated period is estimated to lower total
welfare by $18 million in 1 month. The sum of the estimated incremental total welfare
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changes following each of the post-deregulation entries, ONA, JNA, ESR, and TWB, is
negative under both equilibrium models: Total welfare loss of $131 million under the SBNE
and total welfare loss of $128 million under the MBNE.
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6.3.2.2 Jeju-Busan Route ( r = 2 )
Table 6.4 describes the estimated incremental consumer surplus changes from the entry of
LCCs in order: JJA in Aug 2006, ONA in July 2008, and JNA in Apr 2009. The entry
before-deregulation, JJA, was estimated to have no significant welfare effects on travelers.
The estimated results imply that, on the other hand, the two LCCs that entered in the post-
deregulation period led to sizable welfare effects on the consumer side. Dependent LCC,
JNA, substantially benefited air passengers, while independent LCC, ONA, had the opposite
effect.
Table 6.4: Consumers’ surplus change: Jeju-Busan route ( r = 2 )
2. Jeju - Busan
time
Entry
in time t
Total CS change 0.108% US$123,289 -18.476% ­US$25,376,131 7.680% US$9,860,228
Entry before-deregulation Entries after-deregulation
t-1 = Jul 2006, t = Aug 2006 t-1 = Jun 2008, t = Jul 2008 t-1 = Mar 2009, t = Apr 2009
JJA JNA
Independent LCC Dependent LCC
ONA
Independent LCC
Table 6.5: Producers’ surplus change under SBNE: Jeju-Busan route ( r = 2 )
2. Jeju-Busan
time
Entry
in time t
Total profits change 1.277% US$1,864,242 -14.138% ­US$16,103,235 -18.839% -US$16,853,458
KAL 1.997% US$2,547,905 ­21.320% ­US$19,885,051 -35.873% -US$22,509,220
AAR -6.495% -US$1,194,255 11.042% US$1,745,200
JJA US$510,592 36.512% US$1,763,161 -31.447% -US$2,879,323
ONA Entry US$273,456
ABL -10.376% -US$1,821,924
JNA Entry US$10,357,008
Rebadged to ABL in Dec 2008
N/A N/A
ONA
Independent LCC
N/A Exit
N/A N/A
JJA JNA
Independent LCC Dependent LCC
Entry before-deregulation Entries after-deregulation
t-1 = Jul 2006, t = Aug 2006 t-1 = Jun 2008, t = Jul 2008 t-1 = Mar 2009, t = Apr 2009
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Table 6.5 (Table 6.6) reports the estimated change in variable profits implied by the SBNE
(the MBNE) for the Jeju-Busan route before and after the change in deregulation policy. The
second column illustrates how the entry of an LCC in the pre-deregulation period affected
both the estimated industry-wide profits and an estimated entrant’s own profit, while the rest
(columns 3 and 4) describe the effects of entry of LCCs in the post-deregulation period on
the estimated profits. The values in the fourth row provide the estimated industry-wide profit
changes in response to each of the entries. The estimated changes in the profits of all main
competitors – both the two major airlines and pre-existing LCCs – and the total variable
profits of the introduced LCCs are presented in the cell below the fourth row (rows 5-10).
Table 6.6: Producers’ surplus change under MBNE: Jeju-Busan route ( r = 2 )
2. Jeju-Busan
time
Entry
in time t
Total profits change 1.277% US$1,864,242 -14.138% ­US$16,103,235 17.583% US$15,730,394
KAL 1.997% US$2,547,905 ­21.320% ­US$19,885,051 -4.603% -US$2,888,566
AAR -6.495% -US$1,194,255 11.042% US$1,745,200
JJA US$510,592 36.512% US$1,763,161 -31.447% -US$2,879,323
ONA Entry US$273,456
ABL -10.376% -US$1,821,924
JNA Entry US$23,320,206
Independent LCC Dependent LCC
Rebadged to ABL in Dec 2008
N/A Exit
N/A N/A
Entry before-deregulation Entries after-deregulation
t-1 = Jul 2006, t = Aug 2006 t-1 = Jun 2008, t = Jul 2008 t-1 = Mar 2009, t = Apr 2009
N/A N/A
JJA ONA JNA
Independent LCC
In Aug 2006, independent LCC, JJA, entered the Jeju-Busan route. The entry of JJA was
estimated to increase the industry wide profit gains by 1.3%. JJA benefited from entering
the route, gaining $0.5 million in the first month at the expense of AAR’s estimated profit
loss of 6.4%. On the contrary, the estimated changes in industry profits induced by the
post-deregulation entry of LCCs differ across each of the two entries.
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First, it decreased by $16 million (-14.1%) following the entry of ONA in July 2008.
The estimated results suggest that ONA recorded $0.3 million of profit in the first month,
while KAL, the largest legacy carrier, lost profits of $20 million. Over the same time period,
the estimated variable profits for AAR, the second largest legacy carrier, increased by $1.7
million (11%). JJA reaped larger profit gains in percentages of 36.5%, and $1.7 million
in monetary values (column 3). Second, the effects from the introduction of JNA in Mar
2009 are measured to be different according to the equilibrium concepts: the SBNE and
the MBNE. Under the SBNE, JNA was estimated to lower industry profits by $16.8 million
in 1 month (-18.8%), and a sharp drop in all main competitiors’ estimated variable profits
was reported as a result of JNA’s entry (column 4 in Table 6.5). Compared with Table 6.5,
columns 4 in Table 6.6 only differ in the values of KAL and JNA. Again, the estimated effect
of the entry of JNA on all main competitiors’ variable profits was negative, but the estimated
gain for JNA outweighed the estimated loss in the remaining rivals, thus, increasing the
estimated industry wide profit gain (column 4 in Table 6.6).
On the Jeju-Busan route, the entry of LCC, JJA, in the pre-deregulated period is estimated
to improve the total welfare by $1.9 million. The sum of the estimated incremental total
welfare changes following each of the post-deregulation entries, ONA and JNA, is negative
under both equilibrium models: Total welfare loss of $48.5 million under the SBNE and total
welfare loss of $15.9 million under the MBNE.
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6.3.2.3 Jeju-Cheongju Route ( r = 3 )
Table 6.7 describes how air passengers on the Jeju-Cheongju route benefited from the post-
deregulation entry of the independent LCCs in order: JJA in June 2008, and ESR in June
2009. The post-deregulation entry of the two independent LCCs was estimated to increase
consumers’ surplus gains.
Table 6.7: Consumers’ surplus change: Jeju-Cheongju route ( r = 3 )
3. Jeju - Cheongju
time
Entry
in time t
Total CS change 1.921% US$1,664,513 2.481% US$2,200,021
Entry before-deregulation Entries after-deregulation
None t-1 = May 2008, t = Jun 2008 t-1 = May 2009, t = Jun 2009
ESR
Independent LCC
JJA
Independent LCC
Table 6.8 reports the estimated change in variable profits for the Jeju-Cheongju route
after the change in deregulation policy. The columns 3 and 4 present the estimated effects
of entry of LCCs in the post-deregulation period on profits. The values in the fourth row
correspond to the estimated industry-wide profit changes in response to each of the entries.
Changes in the estimated profits of all main competitors – both the two major airlines and
pre-existing LCCs – and the estimated total variable profits of the introduced LCCs are re-
ported in the cell below the fourth row (rows 5-9).
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Table 6.8: Producers’ surplus change under SBNE: Jeju-Cheongju route ( r = 3 )
3. Jeju - Cheongju
time
Entry
in time t
Total profits change ­5.056% ­US$1,282,875 ­7.900% ­US$2,033,261
KAL ­7.420% ­US$939,377 ­14.746% -US$1,957,903
AAR ­9.843% ­US$979,854 ­12.527% -US$1,226,921
HAN ­12.225% ­US$337,461
JJA Entry US$973,818 ­7.737% -US$206,120
ESR Entry US$1,357,684
Independent LCC Independent LCC
Exit
N/A
Entry before-deregulation Entries after-deregulation
None t-1 = May 2008, t = Jun 2008 t-1 = May 2009, t = Jun 2009
JJA ESR
In June 2008, JJA entered the Jeju-Cheongju route, leading to losses in the estimated
industry wide profit of $1.3 million. JJA benefited from entering the route, gaining $0.9
million in the first month at the expense of all the competing carriers, KAL’s loss in estimated
profits of 7.4%, AAR’s loss in estimated profits of 9.8%, and HAN’s loss in estimated profits
of 12.2%. Similarly, ESR decreased the estimated industry wide profits by $2 million (-7.9%)
in June 2009, recording $1.4 million of estimated profit in the first month at the expense of
all the competing carriers. On the Jeju-Cheongju route, the sum of the estimated incremental
total welfare gains due to entry of the independent LCCs in the post-deregulation period,
JJA, and ESR, is $0.5 million. It appears that consumers’ welfare gains due to new entrants
outweigh the losses in producers’ surplus.
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6.3.2.4 Jeju-Daegu Route ( r = 4 )
Table 6.9 reports the estimated change in consumers’ surplus on the Jeju-Daegu route from
the post-deregulation entry of the independent LCC, ONA in July 2008. The estimated
effect of the entry of ONA on aggregate air passengers is negative. One needs to be careful
in interpreting the result since July 2008 is the point when the two legacy carriers started to
impose fuel surcharges on all domestic routes, thereby, the overall prices for flight services
rose sharply.
Table 6.9: Consumers’ surplus change: Jeju-Daegu route ( r = 4 )
4. Jeju - Daegu
time
Entry
in time t
Total CS change -5.845% -US$37,499,549
Independent LCC
Entry before-deregulation Entries after-deregulation
None t-1 = Jun 2008, t = Jul 2008
ONA
The introduction of fuel surcharge is also associated with a slight drop in the estimated
industry wide variable profits for the Jeju-Daegu route in the post-deregulation period (row
4 in Table 6.10). The rows 5-7 in column 3 in Table 6.10 provides the estimated changes in
variable profits for each individual airline carrier as well. In July 2008, independent LCC,
ONA, entered the Jeju-Daegu route, gaining only $0.3 million in the first month. The small
size of the estimated profit gains for the entrant was not enough to outweigh the estimated
losses in the two legacy carriers, thus, yielding larger losses for the estimated industry wide
profits. Finally, the estimated total welfare decreased by $38.1 million following the entry of
ONA.
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Table 6.10: Producers’ surplus change under SBNE: Jeju-Daegu route ( r = 4 )
4. Jeju - Daegu
time
Entry
in time t
Total profits change ­0.752% ­US$601,065
KAL ­0.140% ­US$67,420
AAR ­2.536% ­US$804,519
ONA Entry US$270,874
Independent LCC
Entry before-deregulation Entries after-deregulation
None t-1 = Jun 2008, t = Jul 2008
ONA
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6.4 The Estimated Welfare Effects: Conclusion
Chapter 5 evaluates the welfare gains due to the entry of LCCs for two time periods: pre-
and post-deregulation. A priori the welfare consequences of new entrants into markets can
be predicted under current static models, the demand side (chapter 2) and the supply side
(chapter 3). Regarding the former model (demand), the coefficients for the non-price factors,
such as flight frequency, aircraft size, and flight time duration, are estimated to have larger
effects (in absolute size) on consumers’ utilities from flight services than the point estimates
for the price variable. Unexpectedly rising oil prices and fuel prices led airline carriers to
introduce fuel surcharges on top of their list prices for flight services since July 2008, just
two months after the May 2008 Deregulation Act. If the positive effects from improvement
in non-price factors, e.g., flight service qualities, outweigh the negative effects from the rise
in price, the post-deregulation entry of LCCs could still enhance consumer welfare. As seen
in the latter model (supply), the average Lerner indices and market shares far increased for
the established independent LCCs in the routes without competitive dependent LCCs. The
flight services of the independent LCCs, either successfully restructured by expanding its
capacities after the deregulation or starting its business after the deregulation, could increase
consumers’ surplus.
The empirical findings in this chapter provide evidence of the welfare losses in the post-
deregulation on some routes. The estimated welfare effects for the consumer side and the
producer side are computed, respectively. The welfare calculations imply that a sizable con-
sumer welfare improvement is associated with the intensified competition from entry of the
successful independent LCCs only when no legacy carriers have responded with their own
subsidiary LCCs. The post-deregulation entry of LCCs from June 2008 to January 2009
(the unexpectedly high fuel surcharge period) benefited neither the consumer side nor the
industry-wide producer side. The results support that the more gains for the new entrant, the
less loss in the two legacy carriers, thereby, less industry-wide profit loss.
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The two equilibrium concepts, SBNE and MBNE, have drastically different effects on the
estimated producers’ surplus gains within the routes. Given that the maintained hypothesis
of short run profit maximization can be rejected for the Seoul Busan route, neither change in
CS nor PS due to an entry (prior to January 2009) can be estimated for the inland routes.14
For the Jeju island routes, the MBNE is designed to have larger variable profits for KAL
and JNA through multiproduct activities than those of the SBNE, when the entry of LCC
occurred during peak seasons: April (JNA, April 2009, on the Jeju-Busan route), July (ONA
and JNA, July 2008, on the Jeju-Seoul route), and January (ESR, January 2008, on the
Jeju-Seoul route). In contrast, the opposite applies to the entry of an LCC during the off-
peak-season (TWB, September 2010, into the Jeju-Seoul route).
These differences may arise from the time-varying prices. For the same route served by
the same airline carrier, fares are lower during off-peak seasons than during peak-seasons.
Peak-seasons also can be categorized into two types: August, and the semi-peak months of
January, April, May, July and October.15 The pricing equation under the MBNE is designed
to predict a higher markup (thereby, a lower marginal cost) by the multiproduct firm-specific
markup term than the SBNE. Furthermore, the markup gaps between the two concepts would
be greater during the peak-season due to higher peak-season air fares. Combining the higher
air fares and larger markups, the MBNE would lead to larger profits for KAL and JNA during
peak-season.
The following limitations apply to the welfare measurements used in this chapter. First, if
the estimates from the demand side are biased, the welfare calculations are biased as well.16
This is clear because the point estimates from the demand specification are used to recover
the implied price-cost margins, thus marginal costs for each carrier-time-route observation.
Second, the standard nested logit demand model tends to overestimate the gains from a new
14See section 4.1.2 and 6.3.1.
15January (Korean New Year) and October (Korean Thanksgiving Day) are holiday season. July and August
are summer vacation/tourist season. Elementary schools, middle schools, and high schools schedule educa-
tional field trips in April and May.
16See section 6.3.1 Seoul-Busan route results.
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product, in particular, when producers introduce a similar brand with respect to product
characteristics into a market. Third, neither dynamic responses, e.g., when and what route to
enter or expand flight capacities, nor inter-temporal profit maximizing decisions are modeled
here. Thus, it may not capture the dynamic nature of entry/exit competition.
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Appendix
Description of airline carriers
Table 11: Description of airline carriers
Airline Characteristics
Korean Air (KAL) Major Airline, the parent company of JNA
Asiana Air (AAR) Major Airline, the parent company of ABL
Hansung Air (HAN) Low cost carrier (LCC)
Jeju Air (JJA) LCC
Youngnam Air (ONA) LCC
Jin Air (JNA) LCC
Air Busan (ABL) LCC
Eastar Jet (ESR) LCC
T’way Air (TWB) LCC, Hansung Air (HAN):re-launches service under new name.
• Korean Air (KAL) is the largest airline of South Korea, with global headquarters lo-
cated in Seoul, Korea. Korean Air is among the top 20 airlines in the world in terms of
passengers carried and is also the top ranked international cargo airline. Korean Air is
a founding partner airline of SkyTeam, the world’s second largest airline alliance. Its
main rival is Asiana Airlines, the second largest South Korean carrier. Korean Air is a
major airline carrier.
• Asiana Air (AAR) is one of South Korea’s two major airlines, along with Korean Air.
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Asiana Air is one of the seven airlines to be ranked as a 5 star airline by the independent
research consultancy firm Skytax. Asiana is a major airline carrier.
• Hansung Airlines (HAN) arouse out of a collaboration between the city of govern-
ment of Cheongju and the University of Chungcheong in 2004. In 2005, Hansung
Air received its AOC, thus formally approved with the delivery of ATR-72, turboprop
aircraft which has less than 100 seats per plane. On 19 December 2005, Hansung
Air suspended all services due to budgetary constraints. On 15 February 2006, flights
could be resumed, but financial difficulties remained, resulting in the shut-down in
November 2008. Hansung Airline is an independent LCC.
• Jeju Air (JJA) is an airline based in Jeju, South Korea, offering scheduled domestic
services between Jeju and the South Korean mainland. Jeju Air was established in
January 2005 and began operations on June 2006. It is owned by the Aekyung Group
(75%) and the Jeju Provincial Government (25%). As of November 2010, the Jeju
Air fleet consists of Jet aircraft. However, in 2005, the airline placed an order for 5
Dash 8-Q400s, turboprop aircraft and these aircraft remained in the fleet for a short
time period, then the last one was withdrawn on June 2010. Jeju Air is an independent
LCC.
• Yeongnam Air (ONA) was a small regional airline of South Korea launched in July
2008. Its main base was Busan airport and Daegu airport. It flew to Jeju and Seoul
with a single aircraft, Fokker100, 100-seat aircraft. Yeongnam Air (ONA) stopped its
operations in December 2008. Yeongnam Air is an independent LCC.
• Jin Air (JNA) is a low cost airline of South Korea. It is a full subsidiary of Korean Air
(KAL), the largest airline in Korea. Jin Air began operations in July 2008 with Boeing
737s, Jet aircraft, with 189 seats from Korean Air (KAL). Jin Air is a dependent LCC.
• Air Busan (ABL) is a regional airline with its headquarters in Busan, the second largest
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metropolis after Seoul in Korea and the fifth largest port in the world. Air Busan is
a subsidiary of Asiana Air (AAR) and it launched service on October 2008. Since
the launch on the Seoul-Busan route, Air Busan filled 49.7% of its seats, while its
competitor on the same route, Korean Air (KAL) had 61.2%. About 5 months later
in March 2009, however, Air Busan (ABL)’s boarding rate exceeded that of its com-
petitor, 54.7% to 54.1%. For the Busan-Jeju route, Air Busan is also taking the lead,
filling 77.7% of its seats. It has code-share operation with its parent company Asiana
Air (AAR) for the two routes. Air Busan is a dependent LCC.
• Eastar Jet (ESR) is a scheduled low cost airline based in Seoul, South Korea. Eastar
Jet started operations in October 2008. The main share holder of Eastar Jet is the
Eastar group in South Korea. Eastar Jet is a regional airline, being organized to take
advantage of a specific gap, low cost services out of hub airports, i.e., Seoul and Jeju,
in the short-haul domestic travel market. Fortunately, Eastar Jet recorded the highest
Load Factor (about 86%) 2009 in the Seoul-Jeju route among all airlines including two
major carriers, Korean Air and Asiana Air. Eastar Jet is an independent LCC.
• T’way Air (TWB) is a scheduled low cost carrier, offering flights between Seoul and
Jeju island. T’way Air was initially established in 2005 as Hansung Air (HAN),
which launched services with three ATR-72s, turboprop aircraft (less than 100 seats
per plane). In October 2008, continuing financial difficulties resulted in shut-down of
Hansung Air (HAN). Finally, the airline was formally re-launched in September 2010
under the changed new name, T’way Air. After its first delivery of a Boeing 737-800
jet aircraft (about 180 seats per plane) in September 2010, the T’way fleet consists
of four Boeing 737-800 aircraft as of September 2011. T’way Air is an independent
LCC.
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Figure 1: Korea’s geographical features 
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Figure 2: Asia Pacific domestic LCC penetration by capacity (seats): Seven months to Jul-
2011
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For the other inland routes that were not included data set, no significant changes in the
number of flights are observed. Flights tend to evenly scheduled over either morning cluster
or evening cluster in the post-deregulation period.
Table 12: Average cluster differentiation index by route (for other inland routes)
Morning DIFF Lunch DIFF Evening DIFF Morning DIFF Lunch DIFF Evening DIFF
# of flights # of flights # of flights # of flights # of flights # of flights
0.573 0.974 0.544 0.334 0.937 0.601
1.9 4.0 2.1 1.9 4.0 2.0
0.587 0.976 0.982 0.686 0.906 0.964
2.8 5.0 5.0 3.3 4.2 5.0
0.000 0.000 0.893 0.000 0.000 0.849
1.0 0.0 2.0 1.0 0.0 2.0
0.521 0.840 0.000 0.359 0.528 0.478
1.6 2.3 0.3 1.6 2.3 0.3
# of flights are rounded.
Post-deregulation (after May 2008)
Seoul-Yeosu
Seoul-Ulsan
Seoul-Jinju
Seoul-Pohang
Route
Pre-deregulation (before May 2008)
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Fuel surcharge and enplanements trend
Figure 3: Average monthly fares (in US $) and enplanements: Jeju-Busan route ( r = 2 )
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Figure 4: Average monthly fares (in US $) and enplanements: Jeju-Cheongju route ( r = 3 )
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Figure 5: Average monthly fares (in US $) and enplanements: Jeju-Daegu route ( r = 4 )
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Figure 6: Average monthly fares (in US $) and enplanements: Jeju-Gwangju route ( r = 5 )
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Figure 7: Average monthly fares (in US $) and enplanements: Seoul-Gwangju route ( r = 7 )
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Testing for weak instruments17
The linear IV regression model with multiple endogenous regressor (n > 1) is
y = Yβ +Xγ+u (1)
and
Y = ZΠ+XΦ+ν (2)
where Y are T ×n vectors of observations on endogenous variables, X is a T ×K1 matrix
of included exogenous variables, Z is a T ×K2 matrix of instruments, and u and ν are T ×n
vectors of disturbance terms. It is assumed throughout that K2 ≥ n. The errors [ut νt ]′ are
assumed to be iid N(0,∑), where the elements of ∑ are σ2u , σuv, and σ2v .
In Stock and Yogo (2002), the concentration parameter, a K2×K2 matrix, µ2 is de-
fined to measure the strength of the instruments, µ2 = ∑
1/2′
VV Π
′Z′ZΠ∑
1/2
VV , where ∑VV is
a covariance matrix of the vector of errors ν . µ2 is relevant to the F statistic in eq(2),
the first stage F statistic. Let F˜ be the computed value of F using the true σ2v , such as
K2F˜ ∼Chi2(d f = K2) and E(F˜) = µ2/K2 + 1. If the sample size is large, then F and F˜ are
close, so E(F)=˜µ2/K2 + 1, the first-stage F statistic. In order to have a set of instruments
strong enough, the matrix µ2/K2 must be sufficiently large in the sense that its smallest eigen-
value is large. Inference about µ2 can be based on the n×n matrix analog of the first-stage
F statistic, GT = ∑ˆ
−1/2′
VV Y
′PZY ∑ˆ
−1/2
VV /K2, where ∑ˆVV = Y ′MZY/(T −K2), MZ = I−PZ , and I
is a conformable identity matrix. Under weak-instruments asymptotic, E(GT )→ µ2/K2 + I.
Cragg-Donald (1993) proposed using GT to test for identification. Accordingly, Stock and
Yogo provided tables of critical values in Table 5-2, based on the minimum eigenvalue of
GT .
17Source: Stock & Yogo (2005)
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In Stock and Yogo (2005), the definition of size of test refers to the researcher’s tolerance
for departures from the usual standards of inference. The standard normal 5% hypothesis test
is thrown off by the weak first stage estimates when the instruments are relevant but weak,
Π 6= 0 in eq(2). The tails are flatter than one would expect if one took a parameter in the
second stage and tested it as if one would test a parameter in an OLS. Then, one may think
(say) 15% is good enough to reject the null and this may correspond with an OLS calculation
of 5% given some number of first stage regressors. The size of test refers to the maximum of
the willingness rejection rate, r(%).
Figure 8: Critical values for the weak instrument test based on Two Stage Least Square
(TSLS) size ( The OLS equivalent significance level is 5%)
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1. Jeju-Seoul route: If instruments are weak, the actual rejection rate of the null hypothe-
sis, known as the test size, may be larger than the 5% level of statistical significance,α =
0.05. According to Stock and Yogo (2005), the test statistic is based on the rejection
rate tolerable to the researcher if the true rejection rate is 5%. Their tabulated val-
ues report various rejection rates. Thus, one can test the null hypothesis, H0 : The
instruments are weak, against the alternative. According to the Cragg-Donald F-test
for the multiple endogenous variables, fare prjt and within group share ln
(
s jt/gt
)
, there
is no significant evidence to reject each of three null hypotheses, H0 : The BLP type
instruments are weak, H0 : The Hausman type instruments are weak, and H0 : A mix
of both BLP type and Hausman type instruments is weak. One possible explanation
for this failure is due to a poor fit of the first stage regression for the within group
share variable, ln
(
s jt/gt
)
. The Cragg-Donald F-test, however, for multiple endogenous
variables does not specify the source of failure to reject the null hypothesis. There
may be a few strong instruments and many weak ones, resulting in a combined set of
instruments that is weak. Weak instruments may be generating undesirable biases in
point estimation results.
2. Jeju-Busan route: The Cragg-Donald Wald F statistics for the multiple endogenous
variables, fare prjt and within group share ln
(
s jt/gt
)
, indicate that one can reject the
null hypothesis, H0 : The combined instruments of the BLP and the Hausman type are
weak, if one is willing to accept a maximum rejection rate of 20% for a test at the
5% level of significance. There is no significant evidence to reject each of two null
hypotheses, H0 : The BLP type instruments are weak, and H0 : The Hausman type
instruments are weak. The Cragg-Donald F-test, however, for multiple endogenous
variables does not specify the source of failure to reject the null hypothesis.
3. Jeju-Cheongju route: The Cragg-Donald Wald F statistics for the multiple endogenous
variables, fare prjt and within group share ln
(
s jt/gt
)
, indicate that one can reject each
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of three null hypotheses, H0 : The BLP type instruments are weak if one is willing
to accept a maximum rejection rate of 25% for a test at the 5% level of significance,
H0 : The Hausman type instruments are weak if one is willing to accept a maximum
rejection rate of 10% for a test at the 5% level of significance, and H0 : A mix of BLP
type and Hausman type instruments is weak if one is willing to accept a maximum
rejection rate of 15% for a test at the 5% level of significance.
4. Jeju-Daegu route: The Cragg-Donald Wald F statistics for the multiple endogenous
variables, fare prjt and within group share ln
(
s jt/gt
)
, indicate that there is no significant
evidence to reject each of three null hypotheses, H0 : The BLP type instruments are
weak, H0 : The Hausman type instruments are weak, and H0 : A mix of both BLP
type and Hausman type instruments is weak. One possible explanation for this failure
is due to a poor fit of the first stage regression for the within group share variable,
ln
(
s jt/gt
)
. The Cragg-Donald F-test, however, for multiple endogenous variables does
not specify the source of failure to reject the null hypothesis. There may be a few
strong instruments and many weak ones, resulting in a combined set of instruments that
is weak. Weak instruments may be generating undesirable biases in point estimation
results.
5. Jeju-Gwangju route: The Cragg-Donald F-test for the two endogenous variables, prjt
and ln(s jt/gt) , can reject each of three null hypotheses, H0 : The BLP instruments are
weak if one is willing to accept a maximum rejection rate of 20% for a test at the 5%
level of significance, H0 : The Hausman type instruments are weak if one is willing to
accept a maximum rejection rate of 15% for a test at the 5% level of significance, and
H0 : A mix of BLP type and Hausman type instruments is weak if one is willing to
accept a maximum rejection rate of 10% for a test at the 5% level of significance.
6. Seoul-Busan route: According to the Cragg-Donald F-test for the multiple endogenous
variables, fare prjt and within group share ln
(
s jt/gt
)
, each of the null hypotheses (H0 :
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The BLP instruments are weak, H0 :The Hausman instruments are weak, and H0: The
combined instruments of the BLP and the Hausman are weak ) is tested. There is no
significant evidence to reject any of the three null hypotheses. One possible explana-
tion for this failure is due to a poor fit of the first stage regression for the within group
share variable, ln
(
s jt/gt
)
. The Cragg-Donald F-test, however, for multiple endogenous
variables does not specify the source of failure to reject the null hypothesis. There
may be a few strong instruments and many weak ones, resulting in a combined set of
instruments that is weak. Weak instruments may be generating undesirable biases in
point estimation results.
7. Seoul-Gwangju route: The Cragg-Donald F-tests for two endogenous variables, prjt
and ln(s jt/gt) , indicate that one can reject each of two null hypotheses, H0 : The Haus-
man type instruments are weak if one is willing to accept a maximum rejection rate of
25% for a test at the 5% level of significance, and H0 : A mix of BLP type and Haus-
man type instruments is weak if one is willing to accept a maximum rejection rate of
10% for a test at the 5% level of significance. There is no statistical evidence to reject
the null hypothesis H0 : The BLP type instruments are weak. The Cragg-Donald F-
test, however, for multiple endogenous variables does not specify the source of failure
to reject the null hypothesis.
In total, for at least one column in the demand estimation results tables for five of the routes
one can reject the null hypothesis for at least one of the instrument sets. This along with the
stability of the Fare coefficient across instruments sets within the route tables and the con-
sistency of the Fare results across route/tables, leads to a conclusion that weak instruments
are not driving results. Note that for most variables the coefficients are robust as well within
tables for a single route and across tables for the five Jeju routes. Since the coefficient on the
Fare variable is our primary focus we proceed using these estimates.
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Joint constraint for the nesting parameter, σr
A. Jeju island routes, ∀r = 1,2,3,4,5
The Wald tests for the joint equality for the nesting parameter σr across the Jeju island routes,
H0 : σ1 = σ2 = σ3 = σ4 = σ5, are tested.
1.Nesting parameter σr
Chi2(4) = 289.10
Prob >Chi2 = 0.000
B. Inland routes, ∀r = 6,7
The Wald tests for the joint equality for the nesting parameter σr across the inland routes,
H0 : σ6 = σ7 , are tested.
1.Nesting parameter σr
Chi2(1) = 15.73
Prob >Chi2 = 0.000
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Average own- and cross- price elasticities
Table 13: Average own- and cross-price elasticities: Jeju-Seoul route ( r = 1 )
Average own- and cross-price elasticities: Time period: June 2006 - June 2008 
Jeju-Seoul KAL AAR JNA ONA HAN JJA ESR TWB
KAL -2.051 2.880 N/A N/A 2.880 2.880 N/A N/A
AAR 1.505 -3.426 N/A N/A 1.505 1.505 N/A N/A
JNA
ONA
HAN 0.115 0.115 N/A N/A -3.812 0.115 N/A N/A
JJA 0.284 0.284 N/A N/A 0.284 -3.262 N/A N/A
ESR
TWB
Average own- and cross-price elasticities: Jin Air (JNA) presence: July 2008 - October 2010
Jeju-Seoul KAL AAR JNA ONA HAN JJA ESR TWB
KAL -3.045 1.974 1.974 1.974 1.974 1.974 1.974 1.974
AAR 1.303 -3.709 1.303 1.303 1.303 1.303 1.303 1.303
JNA 0.454 0.454 -3.566 0.454 0.454 0.454 0.454 0.454
ONA 0.020 0.020 0.020 -5.172 0.020 0.020 0.020 0.020
HAN 0.196 0.196 0.196 0.196 -4.159 0.196 0.196 0.196
JJA 0.491 0.491 0.491 0.491 0.491 -3.591 0.491 0.491
ESR 0.520 0.520 0.520 0.520 0.520 0.520 -3.408 0.520
TWB 0.148 0.148 0.148 0.148 0.148 0.148 0.148 -4.004
N/A
N/A
N/A
N/A
Cell entries (i, j), where i indexes row and j column, give the percentage change in mar-
ket share of j with a change in the price of i. The values in each diagonal cells represent the
own-price elasticities while the values in off-diagonal cells represent the cross-price elastic-
ities of demand for flight j with respect to flight i price.
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Table 14: Average own- and cross-price elasticities: Jeju-Busan route ( r = 2 )
Average own- and cross-price elasticities: Time period: June 2006 - June 2008 
Jeju-Busan KAL AAR ABL JNA ONA JJA
KAL -1.363 2.930 N/A N/A N/A 2.930
AAR 1.019 -3.243 N/A N/A N/A 1.019
ABL
JNA
ONA
JJA 0.266 0.266 N/A N/A N/A -2.905
Average own- and cross-price elasticities: July 2008 - March 2009
Jeju-Busan KAL AAR ABL JNA ONA JJA
KAL -2.004 N/A 2.817 N/A 2.817 2.817
AAR
ABL 1.228 N/A -3.437 N/A 1.228 1.228
JNA
ONA 0.081 N/A 0.081 N/A -4.696 0.081
JJA 0.538 N/A 0.538 N/A 0.538 -3.274
Average own- and cross-price elasticities: April 2009 - November 2009, Jin Air (JNA) presence
Jeju-Busan KAL AAR ABL JNA ONA JJA
KAL -2.566 N/A 1.653 1.653 N/A 1.653
AAR
ABL 1.239 N/A -2.653 1.239 N/A 1.239
JNA 0.538 N/A 0.538 -2.741 N/A 0.538
ONA
JJA 0.430 N/A 0.430 0.430 N/A -3.022
Average own- and cross- price elasticities: January 2010 - October 2010
Jeju-Busan KAL AAR ABL JNA ONA JJA
KAL -2.410 N/A 1.877 N/A N/A 1.877
AAR
ABL 1.597 N/A -2.391 N/A N/A 1.597
JNA
ONA
JJA 0.572 N/A 0.572 N/A N/A -2.997
N/A
N/A
N/A
N/A
Asiana Air rebadged to Air Busan (ABL) in Dec 2008.
Asiana Air rebadged to Air Busan (ABL).
N/A
N/A
Asiana Air rebadged to Air Busan (ABL).
N/A
Cell entries (i, j), where i indexes row and j column, give the percentage change in mar-
ket share of j with a change in the price of i . The values in each diagonal cells represent the
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own-price elasticities while the values in off-diagonal cells represent the cross-price elastic-
ities of demand for flight j with respect to flight i price.
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Table 15: Average own- and cross-price elasticities: Seoul-Busan route ( r = 6 )
Average own- and cross-price elasticities: Time period: June 2006 - September 2008 
Seoul-Busan KAL AAR ABL JNA JJA
KAL -0.823 3.331 N/A N/A 3.331
AAR 0.798 -3.326 N/A N/A 0.798
ABL
JNA
JJA+ 0.036 0.036 N/A N/A -3.210
+JJA ceased the Seoul-Busan route service in Feb 2007.
Average own- and cross-price elasticities: October 2008 - Decemeber 2008
Seoul-Busan KAL AAR ABL JNA JJA
KAL -0.845 N/A 3.681 N/A N/A
AAR
ABL 0.533 N/A -3.383 N/A N/A
JNA
JJA
Average own- and cross-price elasticities: January 2009 - March 2009, Jin Air (JNA) presence
Seoul-Busan KAL AAR ABL JNA JJA
KAL -1.000 N/A 3.038 3.038 N/A
AAR
ABL 0.765 N/A -2.771 0.765 N/A
JNA 0.094 N/A 0.094 -3.083 N/A
JJA
Average own- and cross- price elasticities: April 2009 - October 2010
Seoul-Busan KAL AAR ABL JNA JJA
KAL -1.661 N/A 2.360 N/A N/A
AAR
ABL 1.445 N/A -2.063 N/A N/A
JNA
JJA
AAR rebadged to Air Busan (ABL).
N/A
N/A
N/A
N/A
N/A
N/A
AAR rebadged to Air Busan (ABL) in Oct 2008.
N/A
AAR rebadged to Air Busan (ABL).
Cell entries (i, j), where i indexes row and j column, give the percentage change in mar-
ket share of j with a change in the price of i . The values in each diagonal cells represent the
own-price elasticities while the values in off-diagonal cells represent the cross-price elastic-
ities of demand for flight j with respect to flight i price.
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Calculation for the inter-firm departure flight times differentiation in-
dex, BtwnDIFF
1. BtwnDIFFcase(iii) = 1.1420
For case (iii) in Figure 5.2, AV GDIFFcase(iii) is the average time distance between each
pairs of six flights, |dA1−dA2|= |6AM−7AM|, |dA1−dA3|= |6AM−12PM|, |dA1−dB1|= |6AM−6PM|,
|dA1−dB2|= |6AM−7PM|, |dA1−dB3|= |6AM−1PM|, |dA2−dA3|= |7AM−12PM|, |dA2−dB1|= |7AM−6PM|,
|dA2−dB2|= |7AM−7PM|, |dA2−dB3|= |7AM−1PM|, |dA3−dB1|= |12PM−6PM|, |dA3−dB2|= |12PM−7PM|,
|dA3−dB3|= |12PM−1PM|, |dB1−dB2|= |6PM−7PM|, |dB1−dB3|= |6PM−1PM|, |dB2−dB3|= |7PM−1PM|.
The average time distance between all flights scheduled by different carriers is calcu-
lated by |dA1−dB1|= |6AM−6PM|, |dA1−dB2|= |6AM−7PM|, |dA1−dB3|= |6AM−1PM|, |dA2−dB1|=
|7AM−6PM|, |dA2−dB2|= |7AM−7PM|, |dA2−dB3|= |7AM−1PM|, |dA3−dB1|= |12PM−6PM|, |dA3−dB2|=
|12PM−7PM|, and |dA3−dB3|= |12PM−1PM|.
When α = 0.5,
BtwnDIFFcase(iii)
=
1
9×(7200.5+7800.5+4200.5+6600.5+7200.5+3600.5+3600.5+4200.5+600.5)
1
15×(600.5+3600.5+7200.5+7800.5+4200.5+3000.5+6600.5+7200.5+3600.5+3600.5+4200.5+600.5+600.5+3000.5+3600.5)
=
21.303
18.654 = 1.1420
194
2. BtwnDIFFcase(iv) = 1.146
For case (iv) in Figure 5.2, AV GDIFFcase(iv) is the average time distance between each
pairs of six flights, |dA1−dA2|= |6AM−7AM|, |dA1−dB1|= |6AM−6PM|, |dA1−dB2|= |6AM−7PM|,
|dA1−dC1|= |6AM−12PM|, |dA1−dC2|= |6AM−1PM|, |dA2−dB1|= |7AM−6PM|, |dA2−dB2|= |7AM−7PM|,
|dA2−dC1|= |7AM−12PM|, |dA2−dC2|= |7AM−1PM|, |dB1−dB2|= |6PM−7PM|, |dB1−dC1|= |6PM−12PM|,
|dB1−dC2|= |6PM−1PM|, |dB2−dC1|= |7PM−12PM|, |dB2−dC2|= |7PM−1PM|, |dC1−dC2|= |12PM−1PM|.
The average time distance between all flights scheduled by different carriers is calculated
by |dA1−dB1|= |6AM−6PM|, |dA1−dB2|= |6AM−7PM|, |dA1−dC1|= |6AM−12PM|, |dA1−dC2|= |6AM−1PM|,
|dA2−dB1|= |7AM−6PM|, |dA2−dB2|= |7AM−7PM|, |dA2−dC1|= |7AM−12PM|, |dA2−dC2|= |7AM−1PM|,
|dB1−dC1| = |6PM−12PM|, |dB1−dC2| = |6PM−1PM|, |dB2−dC1| = |7PM−12PM| , and |dB2−dC2| =
|7PM−1PM|.
When α = 0.5,
BtwnDIFFcase(iv)
=
1
12×(7200.5+7800.5+3600.5+4200.5+6600.5+7200.5+3000.5+3600.5+3600.5+3000.5+4200.5+3600.5)
1
15×(600.5+7200.5+7800.5+3600.5+4200.5+6600.5+7200.5+3000.5+3600.5+600.5+3600.5+3000.5+4200.5+3600.5+600.5)
=
21.380
18.654 = 1.146.
195
3. BtwnDIFFcase(v) = 1.358
For case (v) in Figure 5.3, AV GDIFFcase(v) is the average time distance between each pairs of
six flights, |dA1−dA2|= |6AM−7AM|, |dA1−dA3|= |6AM−8AM|, |dA2−dA3|= |7AM−8AM|, |dA1−dB1|=
|6AM−6PM|, |dA1−dB2|= |6AM−7PM|, |dA1−dB3|= |6AM−8PM|, |dA2−dB1|= |7AM−6PM|, |dA2−dB2|=
|7AM−7PM|, |dA2−dB3|= |7AM−8PM|, |dA3−dB1|= |8AM−6PM|, |dA3−dB2|= |8AM−7PM|, |dA3−dB3|=
|8AM−8PM|, |dB1−dB2|= |6PM−7PM|, |dB1−dB3|= |6PM−8PM|, |dB2−dB3|= |7PM−8PM|.
The average time distance between all flights scheduled by different carriers is calcu-
lated by |dA1−dB1|= |6AM−6PM|, |dA1−dB2|= |6AM−7PM|, |dA1−dB3|= |6AM−8PM|, |dA2−dB1|=
|7AM−6PM|, |dA2−dB2|= |7AM−7PM|, |dA2−dB3|= |7AM−8PM|, |dA3−dB1|= |8AM−6PM|, |dA3−dB2|=
|8AM−7PM|, and |dA3−dB3|= |8AM−8PM|.
When α = 0.5,
BtwnDIFFcase(v)
=
1
9×(7200.5+7800.5+8400.5+6600.5+7200.5+7800.5+6000.5+6600.5+7200.5)
1
15×(600.5+1200.5+600.5+7200.5+7800.5+8400.5+6600.5+7200.5+7800.5+6000.5+6600.5+7200.5+600.5+1200.5+600.5)
=
25.806
19.009 = 1.358
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